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1991 Supreme(SC) 671

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.Fathima Beevi : N.D.Ojha : S.Ranganathan
Revathinnalbalagopala Varma: Indirabayi
Versus
His Highness Shri Padmanabha Dasa Bala Rama Varma (Since Deceased)
Case No. : 534 of 1983
Date of Decision : 11/28/91
Advocates Appeared: Chari I.M.A. : Chari T.V.S.N. : Dhillon P.K. : Francis V.J. : Iyer G.Vishwanatha : Iyer T.S.Krishnamurthy : Mohan K.V. : Murlidhar S. : Nambiar K.R. : Natarajan S. : Pillai P.K. : Ramachandran Raju : Rao A.Subba : Shishodia Pallav : Sudhakaran N. : Vaidyanathan C.S.

Advocates:
A.SUBBA RAO, C.S.VAIDYANATHAN, G.VISHVANATHA IYER, I.M.A.CHARI, K.R.NAMBIAR, K.V.MOHAN, N.SUDHAKARAN, P.K.DHILLON, P.K.PALLI, PALLAV SHISHODIA, RAJU RAMACHANDRAN, S.MURALIDHARAN, S.NATARAJAN, T.S.KRISHNAMURTHY IYER, T.V.S.N.Chari, V.J.Francis

Headnote:

Constitution of India – Article 372 – Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 – Hindu Succession Act – Section 7, 5 – Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 – Section 82, 83, 85 – State ceased to be a sovereign princely State and respondent 1 ceased to be its sovereign ruler with effect – State was integrated with erstwhile Cochin State to form United State of Travancore and Cochin of which respondent 1 became Rajpramukh – With effect from territories of integrated State got merged with rest of territories of Union of India to constitute after certain modifications present State of Kerala – Maharaja of Travancore respondent several items of immovable properties consisting of houses palaces and lands – Most if not properties held by him had been inherited by him from his predecessor may also have acquired some properties after he became Ruler but no details are available – Held, Learned counsel for appellant was that covenant could not confer any right of respondent 1 which he did not otherwise possess nor could it take away rights of members of joint Hindu family by accepting properties in suit to be personal properties of respondent – Suffice it to say so far as this submission is concerned that as has been held above, the properties in suit had been earmarked by respondent 1 as his personal properties which he was competent to do as a sovereign and government by accepting or approving the list of properties submitted by him as his personal properties in pursuance of the covenant did not purport on its own to create any right in favour of respondent 1 in such properties – Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT

RANGANATHAN, J.

(1) SHRI Padmanabhadasa Varma (hereinafter referred to as respondent I) was the erstwhile Maharaja of Travancore, the sovereign ruler of that part of the territory of India which was formerly known as the State of Travancore. The State ceased to be a sovereign princely State and respondent 1 ceased to be its sovereign ruler with effect from 1/07/1949. On this date, the State was integrated with the erstwhile Cochin State to form the United State of Travancore and Cochin of which respondent 1 became the Rajpramukh. With effect from 1/11/1956, the territories of the integrated State got merged with the rest of the territories of the Union of India to constitute, after certain modifications, the present State of Kerala. As the Maharaja of Travancore, respondent 1 held several items of immovable properties consisting of houses, palaces and lands. Most, if not all) the properties held by him had been inherited by him from his predecessor-Maharajahas. He may also have acquired some properties after he became the Ruler but no details are available. It is, however, common ground that the cost of properties acquired by respondent 1 or his predecessors had been met from the State coffers, there being nothing until 1949 to distinguish between the funds belonging to a Ruler in his individual capacity and the funds belonging to the State. They were also disposing of the properties held by them from time to time at their sweet will and pleasure and it is common ground that even respondent 1 had disposed of several items of properties at various points of time and these alienations - even those made after 1/07/1949 - remained unchallenged.

(2) IN the context of the political developments referred to earlier, it became necessary to make certain provisions regarding the properties which were formerly held by the Princely Rulers. On 27/05/1949, a covenant Ex. A-2 (the terms of which have been extracted in the order of my learned brother Ojha, J.) was entered into between the Rulers of the States of Travancore and Cochin. It is common ground that, under the terms of the said covenant and the connected document (Ex. A-3, the properties we are here concerned with were declared by respondent 1 to be his private properties and not State properties liable to be taken over by the government of India and that the government of India have not contested the correctness of this declaration at any stage.

(3) IN the present appeals, arising out of a partition suit filed by the appellant (inspired possibly by proceedings taken under the Kerala Land Reforms Act which resulted in 191.23 acres out of the 309.25 acres of land held by respondent 1 being declared surplus over the permissible ceiling on the basis that they were the absolute properties of respondent 1, the appellant claims that the suit properties are divisible among himself and the 34 defendants to the suit in equal shares and that respondent 1 was entitled only to an one-thirty fifth share therein.

(4) SRI Bhaskaran Nambiar, who argued the case elaborately and meticulously, attempted to convince us that respondent 1 owned these properties, not as sole owner, but only in his capacity as the holder of an impartible estate, the kamavan of an undivided marumakkathayam tarwad or a sthanee and that, in any one of the three situations, these properties have become partible under the provisions of recent legisiations. The argument was that, if the properties were those comprised in an impartible estate, the rule of primogeniture could be lost (i) by renunciation, (ii) by statutory abolition or (iii) by the properties being no longer needed to maintain the status and dignity of the holder on the basis of the "cessante rations legls, cessat ipsa lex" doctrine. In this case, it is said situation (iii) developed when, on 1/07/1949, respondent 1 ceased to be a ruler. The properties thereupon became the properties of the family or tarwad to which the Ruler be






























































































































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