SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.K. PATNAIK & SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.
NAMIT SHARMA - Petitioner
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA - Respondent
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 210 of 2012
Decided on : 13-09-2012.
Constitution of India - Articles 13, 14, 50, 245, 323(a) and 323(b) - Right to Information Act, 2005 - Ss. 12, 12(5), 15, 15(5), 18, 19, 20 - Human and Civil Rights - Appointment - Reasonable restrictions imposed by the State - Appointment of the persons who are to adjudicate the disputes under this Act are too vague, general, ultra vires the Constitution and contrary to the established principles of law laid down by a plethora of judgments of this Court - Held, Under the scheme of the Act of 2005, it is clear that the orders of the Commissions are subject to judicial review before the High Court and then before the Supreme Court of India - In terms of Article 141 of the Constitution, the judgments of the Supreme Court are law of the land and are binding on all courts and tribunals - Thus, it is abundantly clear that the Information Commission is bound by the law of precedence, i.e., judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court of India - Writ petition partly allowed
Key Points: - The Supreme Court holds Sections 12(5) and 15(5) constitutionally valid with a reading down to include a basic degree and post-qualification experience in the relevant field (!) (!) . - It reads Sections 12(6) and 15(6) as applicable post-appointment restrictions (cessation of prior offices/business/profession) to ensure eligibility, rather than pre-appointment disqualification, to some extent reinterpreting the provisions to maintain equality (!) . - The Act is a judicial/ quasi-judicial framework; Information Commissioners possess adjudicatory powers and must operate with a judicial mind, necessitating legally trained personnel (!) (!) (!) (!) . - Appointments should involve consultation with judiciary and a fair, transparent process, including a High Powered Committee, with benching (one judicial member and one expert) and consultation requirements as outlined (!) (!) (!) . - The proceedings and orders of Information Commissions are subject to judicial review, preserving supremacy of Article 141 precedents and High Court/Supreme Court oversight (!) (!) . - The judgment directs procedural rules to be framed within six months to implement these constitutional interpretations and appointment processes (!) .
JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.-The value of any freedom is determined by the extent to which the citizens are able to enjoy such freedom. Ours is a constitutional democracy and it is axiomatic that citizens have the right to know about the affairs of the Government which, having been elected by them, seeks to formulate some policies of governance aimed at their welfare. However, like any other freedom, this freedom also has limitations. It is a settled proposition that the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India (for short ‘the Constitution’) encompasses the right to impart and receive information. The Right to Information has been stated to be one of the important facets of proper governance. With the passage of time, this concept has not only developed in the field of law, but also has attained new dimensions in its application. This court while highlighting the need for the society and its entitlement to know has observed that public interest is better served by effective application of the right to information. This freedom has been accepted in one form or the other in various parts of the world. This Court, in absence of any statutory law, in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India & Ors. v. Cricket Association of Bengal & Anr. [(1995) 2 SCC 161] held as under :
“The democracy cannot exist unless all citizens have a right to participate in the affairs of the polity of the country. The right to participate in the affairs of the country is meaningless unless the citizens are well informed on all sides of the issues, in respect of which they are called upon to express their views. One-sided information, disinformation, misinformation and non-information, all equally create an uninformed citizenry which makes democracy a farce when medium of information is monopolized either by a partisan central authority or by private individuals or oligarchy organizations. This is particularly so in a country like ours where about 65 per cent of the population is illiterate and hardly 1 ½ per cent of the population has an access to the print media which is not subject to pre-censorship.”
2. The legal principle of ‘A man’s house is his castle. The midnight knock by the police bully breaking into the peace of the citizen’s home is outrageous in law’, stated by Edward Coke has been explained by Justice Douglas as follows:
“The free State offers what a police state denies – the privacy of the home, the dignity and peace of mind of the individual. That precious right to be left alone is violated once the police enter our conversations.”
3. The States which are governed by Policing and have a policy of greater restriction and control obviously restrict the enjoyment of such freedoms. That, however, does not necessarily imply that this freedom is restriction-free in the States where democratic governance prevails. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution itself is controlled by the reasonable restrictions imposed by the State by enacting various laws from time to time.
4. The petitioner, a public spirited citizen, has approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution stating that though the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short ‘Act of 2005’) is an important tool in the hands of any citizen to keep checks and balances on the working of the public servants, yet the criterion for appointment of the persons who are to adjudicate the disputes under this Act are too vague, general, ultra vires the Constitution and contrary to the established principles of law laid down by a plethora of judgments of this Court. It is the stand of the petitioner that the persons who are appointed to discharge judicial or quasi-judicial functions or powers under the Act of 2005 ought to have a judicial approach, experience, knowledge and expertise. Limitation has to be read into the competence of the legislature to prescribe the eligibility for appointmen
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