SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Altamas Kabir, CJI., F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla and Vikramajit Sen, JJ.
MAHINDER KUMAR - Petitioners;
Versus
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH through registrar general -Respondents.
Writ Petitions (C) No. 289 of 2007 with No. 178 of 2008 and Civil Appeals Nos. 7790-91 of 2011,
Decided on : July 12, 2013
(b) Madhya Pradesh Uchchtar Nyayik Seva (Bharti Tatha Seva Sharten) Niyam, 1994 – Rule 7 – High Court vested with required power to evolve its own procedure of selection for direct recruitment and promotion in respect of Entry Level District Judges – Further, High Court can specify such procedure from time to time – Rule 7 fully empowered the High Court to evolve its own procedure – Rule 7 does not conflict with Shetty Commission. (Para 30, 31)
(c) Constitution of India – Article 23(1) r/w Rule 7, Madhya Pradesh Uchchtar Nyayik Seva (Bharti Tatha Seva Sharten) Niyam, 1994(Amended) and Para 9, Advertisement – High Court invested with power and authority to evolve appropriate procedure in the matter of selection for direct recruitment and promotion of Entry Level District Judges – Prescription in Para 9(iv) of the Advertisement empowering the High Court to decide which of the candidates can be called for the interview based on the evaluation of their performance in the written examination – In consonance with Rule 7. (Para 35)
(d) Service Law – Selection – Advertisement detailing every step from preliminary short listing before written examination through written examination, evaluation for viva voce – Contention that criteria of normalisation of marks and evaluation not disclosed beforehand – Not accepted. (Para 43, 44)
(2002) 4 SCC 247; (2007) 3 SCC 720; (2008) 3 SCC 512; (2008) 7 SCC 11; (2006) 6 SCC 395; (1974) 3 SCC 220 – Distinguished
(e) Legal Interpretation – Harmonious interpretation – Advertisement para 9(iv) and (v) – Para 9(iv) prescribing that candidates will be called for interview on the basis of evaluation of their performance in the written examination – Para 9(vi) stating that candidates will be selected on the basis of the aggregate marks in the written examination and the interview – Harmoniously read, it would mean that only candidates who secure the qualifying marks on the valuation of the written examination, are called for interview and the marks of such candidates called for interview are aggregated to find out their position in the merit list for the purpose of selection. (Para 48)
(f) Service Law – Selection – Reserved category – Only one OBC candidate against three posts advertised – Not selected – Advertisement clearly prescribing selection of candidates on suitability – Only belonging to the category is not enough – Candidate has to be suitable as well. (Para 49)
(g) Service Law – Selection – Selected candidate obtaining more than 50% marks and so stated in the communication – Tough it gives impression of fixing a benchmark of 50% it is not so – Selection Committee at no time fixing bench mark other than 40% - Selection cannot be held vitiated on basis of wrongly worded communication. (Para 61)
(h) Service Law – Selection – Selection to Higher judiciary should be based on merit – Selection of third respondent justified. (Para 64, 65)
(2010) 3 SCC 104 – Relied upon
Facts of the case:
This case relates to eligibility criteria for selection to MP higher judicial service.
It is a classic case of misinterpretation of statement.
Finding of the Court:
There is no infirmity in the selection process.
JUDGMENT
Altamas Kabir, C.J.I.
1. Having had the opportunity of going through the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J., 1 fully concur with the same. I just, however, wish to emphasise the fact that there is no material on record in support of Ground 'D' taken in the Writ Petition, wherein it has been mentioned that "To top it all, the minimum percentage requirement for final selection was increased to 50% at the final stage.
[Emphasis Supplied].
2. Nowhere in the advertisement inviting applications for filling up the 20 posts in the Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service by direct recruitment from the Bar, has it been indicated as to what would be the minimum percentage of marks, which would be required for final selection. The only place where reference has been made to the said figure is in the Resolution of the Selection Committee adopted on 23rd March, 2007, wherein in paragraph 1 it has been indicated that on the basis of the evaluation made by District Judges, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates would have to secure 35% marks and other candidates would have to secure 40% marks in the first paper and in the second paper in order to qualify for the viva-voce. Apart from the above, there is no mention anywhere in the materials placed before us that 40% marks was the bench-mark for the purpose of appointment in any of the vacant posts. It may be mentioned that all candidates who had obtained more than 40% marks in either of the two papers were called for the interview and were allotted separate marks in the interview.
3. Thereafter, on the aggregate of the marks obtained by the candidates, only Shri Axay Kumar Dwivedi, placed at Serial No. 1 of the merit list, was found suitable to be recommended for appointment as a District Judge on probation. However, the problem was caused by the note written by the Registrar General of the High Court indicated at the bottom of the final Select List, wherein it was mentioned that Shri Axay Kumar Dwivedi, who had obtained more than 50% marks, was found suitable to be recommended for appointment. The said note has given cause for Ground 'D' to the Writ Petition, although, there is nothing, even in the note, to suggest that previously 40% of the total marks had been declared or accepted to be the bench-mark for appointment. The note is merely a statement which indicates that the selected candidate, Shri Axay Kumar Dwivedi, had obtained more than 50% marks. The same does not either indicate or pre-suppose that there was a lower bench-mark for the Petitioners to claim in Ground 'D' that the bench-mark had been increased to 50%.
4. In that view of the matter, the Writ Petitions and the Civil Appeals cannot succeed and have to be dismissed, as has been indicated by my learned brother, Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
5. As the issues involved in these writ petitions and appeals are one and the same, the same are being disposed of by this common judgment.
6. In Writ Petition (C) No. 289 of 2007, the challenge is to the selection made by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the cadre of Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service to the post of entry level District Judge in the selection process for the year 2006-07 in which the third Respondent alone came to be selected for the 20 posts advertised. Petitioners and Respondent Nos. 4 to 8 were all unsuccessful candidates who participated in the said selection. Writ Petition No. 178 of 2008 was also by one of the candidates who also participated in the selection of 2006-07 and has come forward with the similar relief as in Writ Petition (C) No. 289 of 2007. Civil Appeal No. 7790 of 2011 and Civil Appeal No. 7791 of 2011 have been preferred by two candidates who were also not successful in the very same selection and who approached the High Court by filing independent writ petitions in W.P. (C) No. 4604 of 2007 and W.P. (C) No. 4605 of 2007, which were disposed of by a
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