2019 Supreme(SC) 804

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Ranjan Gogoi, CJI., Deepak Gupta, Aniruddha Bose, JJ.
TALAT FATIMA HASAN THROUGH HER CONSTITUTED ATTORNEY SH. SYED MEHDI HUSAIN – APPELLANT(S)
Versus
NAWAB SYED MURTAZA ALI KHAN (D) Y LRS. & ORS. – RESPONDENT(S)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1773 OF 2002 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4012 OF 2002 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1079 OF 2018 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1773 OF 2002
Decided On : 31-07-2019

IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Gaddi or rulership and private property have two different connotations even in merger agreement/instrument of accession.
(2) Estate of a Shia will devolve upon his heirs under Muslim personal law, as applicable to Shias.

Headnote:(A) Constitution of India – Article 366, clause (22) – Succession to properties by an erstwhile ruler – Rulers had agreed to merge their States with Indian Union because they were to be paid privy purses and would enjoy certain privileges – They were also entitled to declare some properties to be their private properties – In case of disputes whether property is private or State property, Union could refer dispute for decision to a committee headed by a judicial officer – Rulers were no longer sovereign – There was no paramountcy vested in rulers – Rulers were rulers only in name – They held no land except personal properties – There were no subjects – They were Maharajas or Rajas without a Praja; without any sovereignty and without any territory – Declaration under clause (22) of Article 366 relates only to Gaddi or rulership and not to properties which were declared to be private properties by ruler – They had been given choice of declaring certain properties to be their private properties and these private properties could not be said to be attached to Gaddi – Since they were rulers only as a matter of courtesy, to protect their erstwhile titles, properties which were declared to be their personal properties had to be treated as their personal properties and could not be treated as properties attached to Gaddi. (Paras 32, 33, 34, 36 and 37)

       (B) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 – Constitution of India – Article 366, clause (22) – Succession to properties by an erstwhile ruler – Property is not mentioned as one of attributes of a Gaddi – Gaddi or rulership and private property have two different connotations even in merger agreement/instrument of accession – Article 6 of agreement does not relate to properties mentioned in Article 4 of agreement and private properties would remain the private properties of Nawab (Ruler) as a common citizen of country – On death of ruler, in year 1966, succession to his private properties was governed by personal laws – If personal law is to apply then Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 will apply – Since Nawab was a Shia, his estate will devolve upon his heirs under Muslim personal law, as applicable to Shias – Judgments of Single Judge and Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad set aside – Parties shall be entitled to property as per shares set out in para 9F of plaint which shall form a part of decree. (Paras 38, 39, 40, 45, 46 and 47)

       Facts of the Case:

       Whether succession to properties declared by an erstwhile ruler to be his private properties in the agreement of accession with Dominion of India will be governed by rule of succession applicable to “Gaddi” (rulership) or by personal law applicable to ruler”, is the question for consideration in present appeals. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 was applicable to the State of Rampur. Only issue to be decided is whether the properties held by Nawab Raza Ali Khan would devolve on his eldest son by applying the rule of primogeniture or would be governed by Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 and devolve on all his legal heirs.

       Findings of the Court:

       We find a contradiction in findings of High Court in this regard. On the one hand, it is said that plaintiff and the other family members cannot urge that estate of Nawab should be governed by personal law because they have derived benefits from the Raza Trust and gifts in their life time and, on the other hand, when it comes to defendant no. 1, it is said that gifts were made only with a view that defendant no. 1 should be able to maintain his status as the prospective heir. If he was to get all properties of Nawab, then why gifts would have to be made in his favour in his life time. Therefore, this contention is rejected.

       Result : Appeals allowed.