Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2022 Supreme(SC) 538

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dinesh Maheshwari, Vikram Nath, JJ.
MS. P¹ xxx – Appellant
Versus
State Of Uttarakhand & Anr. – Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 903 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No. 6548 of 2019)
Decided On : 16-06-2022
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[¹Looking to the subject matter of this appeal, which involves the accusations pertaining to the offence of rape punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, we have masked the identity of the appellant and substituted her name by the expression “Ms. P” in the title as also in the body of this judgment, wherever occurring.
The office shall take care while issuing the relevant copies to not disclose the identity of the appellant.]

Advocates appeared:
For the Petitioner(s):Abhimanyu Jhamba, Thonpinao Thangal, Hage Nanya, Samir Ali Khan, Advocates
For the Respondent(s):Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Ashutosh Kumar Sharma, Satyajit A. Desai, Satya Kam Sharma, Siddharth Gautam, Deb Deepa Majumdar, Anagha S. Desai, Advocates

IMPORTANT POINT
Territorial jurisdiction of court – No formula of universal application could be enunciated for determining as to whether two or more acts constitute same transaction – Core elements like proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design, are of relevant considerations and when these factors are applied to common sense and ordinary use of language, vexed question of ‘same transaction’ could be reasonably determined.

Headnote:
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Sections 177, 178, 179, 180, 184, 218 and 220 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 376, 504 and 506 – Territorial jurisdiction of court – No formula of universal application could be enunciated for determining as to whether two or more acts constitute same transaction – Core elements like proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design, are of relevant considerations and when these factors are applied to common sense and ordinary use of language, vexed question of ‘same transaction’ could be reasonably determined – Allegations consist of offences of distinct nature inasmuch as one set of allegations is of offence of rape at Delhi (Section 376 IPC) and other set of allegations is of hurling abuses and extending threat on phone calls received by appellant at her village in District Chamoli (Sections 504 and 506 IPC) – Whether series of acts as alleged in present case could be said to be so connected together as to form same transaction, is a pure question of fact and has been decided by Sessions Judge against appellant essentially on considerations that place of occurrence of alleged offence of rape was at Delhi; offence of rape was not a continuing offence; and alleged threats given by respondent No. 2 to appellant on phone were not constituting such offences as to form a series of acts with first-mentioned offence of rape – Acts in question were neither proximate in time nor proximate in place; they were not of continuity either – Two alleged set of acts, one of sexual exploitation, leading to offence of rape (Section 376 IPC) and another of hurling abuses and threats, leading to offences of insult and intimidation (Sections 504/506 IPC), cannot be connected together so as to form same transaction on facts of this case – Offence under Section 376 IPC as allegedly committed at Delhi, being different and distinct than other offences and being not of same transaction, could not have been tried by Courts at Chamoli – Order passed by Sessions Judge calls for no interference – So far as offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC are concerned, it cannot be said that Judicial Magistrate was not empowered by law to try these offences – Accused-respondent No. 2 having gone through trial in relation to offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC and having been acquitted, cannot be subjected to another trial for same charges on same facts – Any such process would be in blatant disregard of settled principles which disapprove double jeopardy and are precisely contained in Article 20(2) of Constitution of India as also Section 300 of Cr.P.C. – Alleged offence under Section 376 IPC and other offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC do not fall within ambit of ‘one series of acts so connected together as to form same transaction’ for the purpose of trial together in terms of Section 220 Cr.P.C. – Sessions Judge, Chamoli had rightly discharged accused-respondent No. 2 of offence under Section 376 IPC for want of territorial jurisdiction – Appeal dismissed. (Paras 20, 20.3, 21, 22.1, 22.2, 23, 24.1.1, 24.2,25 and 26)
Facts of the case:
Present appeal is directed against the order dated 25.09.2018 as passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Revision Petition No. 42 of 2018 whereby, High Court declined to interfere with order dated 28.10.2017, as passed by the Sessions Judge, Chamoli in Sessions Trial No. 8 of 2017, discharging the accused-respondent No. 2 of offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602 on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction with liberty to the prosecution to proceed against the accused in the appropriate Court while also directing transfer of the case in relation to the other offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC to the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gairsain, District Chamoli.
Operation of law, with regard to territorial jurisdiction for the offence pertaining to Section 376 IPC and segregation of charges, calls for examination in this appeal with reference to the question as to whether the said offence under Section 376 IPC and other offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC fall within the ambit of ‘one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction’ for the purpose of trial together in terms of Section 220 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
Findings of Court:
Alleged threat was to cause death which relates to Part II of Section 506 IPC and is triable by a Judicial Magistrate of First Class. It is not the case that the Magistrate concerned who had tried the matter was in any way lacking in power and authority to try the offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC. The validity and correctness of the order of segregation of charge under Section 376 IPC is a matter entirely different but until said order was in operation, the matter had to go to the trial before said Magistrate and he was bound to proceed with the same. Hence, this contention on behalf of the respondent No. 1-State stands rejected.
Result : Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT :

Dinesh Maheshwari, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 25.09.2018 as passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Revision Petition No. 42 of 2018 whereby, the High Court declined to interfere with the order dated 28.10.2017, as passed by the Sessions Judge, Chamoli in Sessions Trial No. 8 of 2017, discharging the accused-respondent No. 2 of the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860²[‘IPC’, for short.] on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction with liberty to the prosecution to proceed against the accused in the appropriate Court while also directing transfer of the case in relation to the other offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC to the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gairsain, District Chamoli.

3. The relevant background aspects and factual matrix of the case are not of much complications, but the operation of law, with regard to territorial jurisdiction for the offence pertaining to Section 376 IPC and segregation of charges, calls for examination in this appeal with reference to the question as to whether the said offence under Section 376 IPC and the other offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC fall within the ambit of ‘one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction’ for the purpose of trial together in terms of Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973? ³[‘CrPC’, for short.]

4. The question above-mentioned carries the peculiarities of its own in the present case; and the peculiarities have got confounded with cursory disposal of revision petition by the High Court with an erroneous assumption as if it were a case of challenge to the acquittal of the accused-respondent No. 2. We are rather impelled to observe at the outset and with respect that, the impugned order of the High Court is a cryptic one, where neither the facts nor the relevant questions of law have gone into appropriate consideration; and the case of ‘discharge’ because of territorial jurisdiction has been treated by the High Court as that of ‘acquittal’. This aspect of the matter has indeed formed a point of contention before us. In the ordinary course, we would have set aside the order impugned and remanded the matter for reconsideration by the High Court but, looking to the subject-matter and the status of parties involved in this protracted litigation since the year 2016 as also looking to the fact that, after trial, the accused-respondent No. 2 has been acquitted of the said offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, we have considered it proper to deal with the relevant question on its merits in this appeal itself.

5. In the aforesaid backdrop, the relevant factual aspects could be summarised as follows:

5.1. The present case has its genesis in the proposed matrimonial alliance by way of engagement of the appellant and respondent No. 2, both being the residents of Village Dangidhar (Saliyana), Tehsil Gairsain, District Chamoli, Uttarakhand. Admittedly, they were engaged on 13.11.2015 at their village.

5.2. Put in a nutshell, the allegations of the appellant had been that after their engagement, she was invited by the respondent No. 2 to Delhi; and was subjected to sexual intercourse by respondent No. 2 against her wishes at Delhi in the month of February 2016. The appellant further alleged that the respondent No. 2, thereafter, made a demand of money and refused to marry her when the demand was not met; and later on, he hurled abuses on her and also threatened to kill. These aspects and other facts/allegations were specified in a complaint filed by the appellant under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gairsain, District Chamoli while complaining of inaction of police on the complaint made by her mother. The learned Judicial Magistrate, after having gone through the complaint, formed an opinion in his order dated 21.01.2017 that the matter required investigation and, accordingly, directed