Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Amar Dave, Adv. Mr. Viraj Kadam, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Mr. Rohan Talwar, Adv. Ms. Sukirti Bhatnagar, Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala, AOR Mr. Devdat Kamat, Sr. Adv. Mr. Nishanth Patil, AOR Ms. Vagisha Kochar, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Nitin S. Tambwekar, Adv. Mr. Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, AOR Mr. Viraj Kadam, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Mr. Rohan Talwar, Adv. Ms. Sukirti Bhatnagar, Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala, AOR Mr. H. S. Parihar, AOR Mr. Kuldeep S. Parihar, Adv. Ms. Ikshita Parihar, Adv. Mr. Shirish K. Deshpande, Adv. Mr. Rahul Chitnis, Adv. Mr. Sachin Patil, AOR Mr. Aaditya A. Pande, Adv. Mr. Geo Joseph, Adv. Mr. Shwetal Shepal, Adv. Dr. Lalit Bhasin, Adv. Ms. Nina Gupta, Adv. Ms. Ruchika Joshi, Adv. Ms. Ananya Marwah, Adv. Mr. Mudit Sharma, AOR Mr. Anup Jain, AOR Ms. Jasmine Damkewala, AOR Ms. Vaishali Sharma, Adv. Mr. Dinesh Chander Trehan, Adv.

Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points regarding the judgment:

• Time spent pursuing remedies under SARFAESI Act or other recovery laws cannot be excluded when computing the period of limitation for initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings, as such proceedings do not affect the right of a Financial Creditor to initiate CIRP unless the debt is repaid (!) .
• Pre-existing disputes between the Corporate Debtor and the Financial Creditor are of no consequence to an application under Section 7 of the IBC for initiation of CIRP, unlike applications under Section 9 which may be dismissed if a pre-existing dispute exists (!) .
• The primary focus of the IBC is the revival and continuation of the corporate debtor to protect it from liquidation; the resolution process is not adversarial to the corporate debtor's interests (!) (!) .
• Legislative intent must be found in the words used by the Legislature, and statutes must be read as a whole, considering their context, previous state of law, and the mischief intended to be remedied (!) (!) .
• The Limitation Act, 1963 applies "as far as may be" to proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and NCLAT under the IBC, allowing for a liberal, contextual interpretation where provisions are not patently inconsistent with the IBC (!) (!) .
• The period of limitation for making an application under Section 7 or 9 of the IBC is three years from the date of accrual of the right (date of default), governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act (!) (!) .
• Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires the existence of "sufficient cause," which is a mixed question of law and facts dependent on the specific circumstances of each case (!) (!) .
• A Court/Tribunal may exercise discretion to condone delay even in the absence of a formal application for condonation (!) .
• An agreement to pay a time-barred debt is enforceable under Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act if it is in writing, signed by the debtor, and constitutes a valid contract, creating a fresh starting point for limitation (!) (!) .
• There is a distinction between acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act and a promise under Section 25 of the Contract Act: while both restart limitation, an acknowledgment under Section 18 must be made within the original limitation period and need not include a promise to pay, whereas Section 25 specifically applies to a written promise to pay a debt barred by limitation (!) (!) .
• Entries in books of accounts or balance sheets of a Corporate Debtor can amount to an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, provided they are signed and indicate a subsisting liability (!) .
• The NCLAT erred in closing CIRP proceedings without giving the Financial Creditor an opportunity to explain sufficient cause for delay or file additional pleadings/documents, as the Adjudicating Authority can consider documents filed at any time until the application is finally dismissed (!) .
• The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of the NCLAT was set aside to the extent that CIRP proceedings were closed, directing the Adjudicating Authority to consider the application afresh (!) (!) .