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2022 Supreme(SC) 653

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Indira Banerjee, J.K. Maheshwari, JJ.
Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited - Appellant
Versus
Kew Precision Parts Private Limited & Ors. - Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2176 of 2020
Decided On : 05-08-2022

Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Amar Dave, Adv. Mr. Viraj Kadam, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Mr. Rohan Talwar, Adv. Ms. Sukirti Bhatnagar, Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala, AOR Mr. Devdat Kamat, Sr. Adv. Mr. Nishanth Patil, AOR Ms. Vagisha Kochar, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Nitin S. Tambwekar, Adv. Mr. Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, AOR Mr. Viraj Kadam, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Mr. Rohan Talwar, Adv. Ms. Sukirti Bhatnagar, Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala, AOR Mr. H. S. Parihar, AOR Mr. Kuldeep S. Parihar, Adv. Ms. Ikshita Parihar, Adv. Mr. Shirish K. Deshpande, Adv. Mr. Rahul Chitnis, Adv. Mr. Sachin Patil, AOR Mr. Aaditya A. Pande, Adv. Mr. Geo Joseph, Adv. Mr. Shwetal Shepal, Adv. Dr. Lalit Bhasin, Adv. Ms. Nina Gupta, Adv. Ms. Ruchika Joshi, Adv. Ms. Ananya Marwah, Adv. Mr. Mudit Sharma, AOR Mr. Anup Jain, AOR Ms. Jasmine Damkewala, AOR Ms. Vaishali Sharma, Adv. Mr. Dinesh Chander Trehan, Adv.

IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) In computing period of limitation for initiation of CIRP proceedings, time spent in pursuing remedy under SARFAESI Act or any other recovery law cannot be excluded.
(2) IBC is essentially a statute which works towards revival of a Corporate body, unable to pay its debts, by appointment of a Resolution Professional – Unlike coercive recovery litigation, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under IBC is not adversarial to interests of Corporate Debtor.
(3) Period of limitation for making application under Section 7 or 9 of IBC is three years from date of accrual of right (Date of default) – Application under Section 7 of IBC in statutory form which requires filling in of particulars cannot be judged by same standards as a plaint or other pleadings in a court of law.
(4) Limitation – Court/Tribunal may exercise its discretion to condone delay, even in absence of a formal application.
(5) Entries in books of accounts and/or balance sheets of a Corporate Debtor would amount to acknowledgment under Section 18 of Limitation Act, 1963.
(6) Intention of statute has to be found in words used by Legislature itself.

Headnote:

(A) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 7 and 9 – Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – When an application is filed by a Financial Creditor under Section 7 of IBC for initiation of CIRP, all that Adjudicating Authority is required to see is, whether there is a financial debt owed by Corporate Debtor to Financial Creditor and whether amount of debt exceeded Rs.1,00,000/- on the date of filing of company petition, said amount being threshold limit for initiation of CIRP at material time – Adjudicating Authority also has to examine if application is barred by limitation – Pre-existing disputes between Corporate Debtor and Financial Creditor are of no consequence to an application of a Financial Creditor, under Section 7 of IBC for initiation of CIRP, unlike application of an Operational Creditor for initiation of CIRP under Section 9 of IBC which may have to be dismissed if there is a pre-existing dispute – In computing period of limitation for initiation of CIRP proceedings, time spent in pursuing remedy under SARFAESI Act or any other recovery law cannot be excluded – Initiation of proceedings under SARFEASI or any other recovery law does not affect right of a Financial Creditor to initiate CIRP unless its debt is repaid. (Paras 14, 15 and 16)

(B) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 7 and 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 62 – Contract Act, 1872 – Section 25(3) – Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Corporate Debtor defaulted in payment of Rs.24,55,00,000/- to appellant Financial Creditor as agreed – Any agreement to pay a time barred debt, would be enforceable in law, within three years from due date of payment, in terms of such agreement – IBC is essentially a statute which works towards revival of a Corporate body, unable to pay its debts, by appointment of a Resolution Professional – Unlike coercive recovery litigation, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under IBC is not adversarial to interests of Corporate Debtor – NCLT/NCLAT has discretion to entertain application/appeal after prescribed period of limitation – Condition precedent for exercise of such discretion is existence of sufficient cause for not preferring appeal and/or application within period prescribed by limitation – Period of limitation for making application under Section 7 or 9 of IBC is three years from date of accrual of right (Date of default) – Application under Section 7 of IBC in statutory form which requires filling in of particulars cannot be judged by same standards as a plaint or other pleadings in a court of law – Additional affidavits filed subsequent to filing of application, by way of additional affidavits or applications would have to be construed as pleadings, as also documents enclosed with or relied upon in application made in statutory format – Pleadings can be amended at any time during pendency of proceedings – NCLAT erred in closing CIRP proceedings without giving Appellant Financial Creditor opportunity to explain if there was sufficient cause for delay in approaching NCLT – Impugned Judgment set aside. (Paras 17, 45, 51, 56, 61, 64, 70 and 71)

(C) Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 18 – Contract Act, 1872 – Section 25(3) – Enforcement of time-barred debt – Under Section 25(3), a debtor can enter into an agreement in writing, to pay the whole or part of a debt, which creditor might have enforced, but for limitation of a suit in law – A written promise to pay the barred debt is a valid contract – Such a promise constitutes novation and can form basis of a suit independent of original debt since debt is not extinguished, remedy gets barred by passage of time – Section 25(3) applies only where debt is one which would be enforceable against defendants, but for law of limitation – Where a debt is not binding on defendant for other reasons, and consequentially not enforceable against him, there is no question of applicability of Section 25(3) – There is a distinction between acknowledgment under Section 18 of Limitation Act, 1963 and a promise within meaning of Section 25 of Contract Act – Both promise and acknowledgment in writing, signed by a party or its agent authorised in that behalf, have effect of creating a fresh starting of limitation. (Paras 31, 32 and 33)

(D) Interpretation of Statute – Legislative Intent – In construing and/or interpreting any statutory provision one must look into legislative intent of statute – Intention of statute has to be found in words used by Legislature itself – In case of doubt it is always safe to look into object and purpose of statute or reason and spirit behind it – Each word, phrase or sentence has to be construed in light of general purpose of the Act itself – When a question arises as to meaning of a certain provision in a statute, provision has to be read in its context – Statute has to be read as a whole – Previous state of law, general scope and ambit of statute and mischief that it was intended to remedy are relevant factors. (Paras 47 and 48)

(E) Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5 – Limitation – Condonation of delay – Condition precedent for condonation of delay in filing application or appeal, is existence of sufficient cause – Whether explanation furnished for delay would constitute “sufficient cause” or not would be dependent upon facts of each case – Court/Tribunal may exercise its discretion to condone delay, even in absence of a formal application – Limitation is essentially a mixed question of law and facts and when a party seeks application of any particular provision for extension in enlargement of period of limitation, relevant facts are required to be pleaded and requisite evidence is required to be adduced. (Paras 52, 53 and 60)

Facts of the case:

Corporate Debtor carries on business of manufacture of tempo and tractor components. Present appeal filed by the Appellant Financial Creditor, Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, is against the judgment and order dated 8th January, 2020 of National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (NCLAT) allowing Company Appeal (AT) Insolvency No. 1349 of 2019 filed by the Respondent-Corporate Debtor, against an order dated 6th September, 2019 passed by the Adjudicating Authority/National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) admitting the application being Company Petition No.(IB) 672/ND/2019 filed by the Appellant Financial Creditor under Section 7 of the IBC for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Corporate Debtor.

Findings of Court:

Impugned judgment and order of the NCLAT is set aside to the extent that the CIRP proceedings have been closed. The Adjudicating Authority shall consider application for CIRP afresh, in accordance with law, in the light of observations made here, after giving Appellant and Respondent opportunity to file additional affidavits disclosing documents/additional affidavit in response.

Result : Appeal allowed.

Judgement Key Points

Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points regarding the judgment:

  • Time spent pursuing remedies under SARFAESI Act or other recovery laws cannot be excluded when computing the period of limitation for initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings, as such proceedings do not affect the right of a Financial Creditor to initiate CIRP unless the debt is repaid (!) .
  • Pre-existing disputes between the Corporate Debtor and the Financial Creditor are of no consequence to an application under Section 7 of the IBC for initiation of CIRP, unlike applications under Section 9 which may be dismissed if a pre-existing dispute exists (!) .
  • The primary focus of the IBC is the revival and continuation of the corporate debtor to protect it from liquidation; the resolution process is not adversarial to the corporate debtor's interests (!) (!) .
  • Legislative intent must be found in the words used by the Legislature, and statutes must be read as a whole, considering their context, previous state of law, and the mischief intended to be remedied (!) (!) .
  • The Limitation Act, 1963 applies "as far as may be" to proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and NCLAT under the IBC, allowing for a liberal, contextual interpretation where provisions are not patently inconsistent with the IBC (!) (!) .
  • The period of limitation for making an application under Section 7 or 9 of the IBC is three years from the date of accrual of the right (date of default), governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act (!) (!) .
  • Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires the existence of "sufficient cause," which is a mixed question of law and facts dependent on the specific circumstances of each case (!) (!) .
  • A Court/Tribunal may exercise discretion to condone delay even in the absence of a formal application for condonation (!) .
  • An agreement to pay a time-barred debt is enforceable under Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act if it is in writing, signed by the debtor, and constitutes a valid contract, creating a fresh starting point for limitation (!) (!) .
  • There is a distinction between acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act and a promise under Section 25 of the Contract Act: while both restart limitation, an acknowledgment under Section 18 must be made within the original limitation period and need not include a promise to pay, whereas Section 25 specifically applies to a written promise to pay a debt barred by limitation (!) (!) .
  • Entries in books of accounts or balance sheets of a Corporate Debtor can amount to an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, provided they are signed and indicate a subsisting liability (!) .
  • The NCLAT erred in closing CIRP proceedings without giving the Financial Creditor an opportunity to explain sufficient cause for delay or file additional pleadings/documents, as the Adjudicating Authority can consider documents filed at any time until the application is finally dismissed (!) .
  • The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of the NCLAT was set aside to the extent that CIRP proceedings were closed, directing the Adjudicating Authority to consider the application afresh (!) (!) .

JUDGMENT :

INDIRA BANERJEE, J.

This appeal filed by the Appellant Financial Creditor, Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, hereinafter referred to as the ‘IBC’, is against the judgment and order dated 8th January, 2020 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (NCLAT) allowing Company Appeal (AT) Insolvency No. 1349 of 2019 filed by the Respondent-Corporate Debtor, against an order dated 6th September, 2019 passed by the Adjudicating Authority/National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) admitting the application being Company Petition No.(IB) 672/ND/2019 filed by the Appellant Financial Creditor under Section 7 of the IBC for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against the Corporator Debtor.

2. The Corporate Debtor carries on business of manufacture of tempo and tractor components. In or about 2012-2013, the Corporate Debtor decided to expand its business and operations and entered into negotiations with bankers for finance for the proposed expansion.

3. According to the Corporate Debtor, some-time in July- August 2012, some employees of the Appellant Financial Creditor approached the Corporate Debtor, offering financial assistance at lesser rate of interest than the then existing bankers of the Corporate Debtor, and better facilities and business support.

4. The Appellant Financial Creditor has, since November 2012 sanctioned loan facilities to the Corporate Debtor from time to time. At the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Corporate Debtor held on 29th November 2012 and on 15th March 2013, resolutions were adopted, inter alia, authorizing Mr. Munish Kumar Bhunsali to execute loan and security documents on behalf of the Corporate Debtor.

5. On or about 29th November, 2012, necessary documents with regard to the loans/credit facilities were executed by and between the Appellant Financial Creditor and the Corporate Debtor. Between 23rd November, 2012 and 31st December, 2013, loan amounts were disbursed.

6. The following loan and security documents were executed between the Appellant Financial Creditor and the Corporate Debtor on 29th November 2012:-

    (i) “Master Fund Based Facility Agreement

    (ii) Deed of Hypothecation

    (iii) Deed of guarantee by Muhish Kumar Bhunsali

    (iv) Demand Promissory Note

    (v) Take Delivery Letter for the Demand Promissory Note.

    (vi) Supplementary cum Modification Agreement

    (vii) End Use Undertaking”

7. On 27th May 2013, further loan and security documents were executed between the Appellant Financial Creditor and the Corporate Debtor, namely:-

    (i) “Memorandum of deposit of title deeds

    (ii) End Use Undertaking

    (iii) Undertaking (Mortgage) by Mr. Munish Kumar Bhunsali

    (iv) Power of Attorney (Mortgage) by Kew Precision Parts Pvt. Ltd.

    (v) Declaration (Mortagage) by Mr. Munish Kumar Bhunsali”

8. By a Memorandum of Deposit dated 13th December 2013 executed by the Corporate Debtor through Mr. Munish Kumar Bhunsali, the Corporate Debtor mortgaged its assets in favour of the Appellant Financial Creditor.

9. By a letter of sanction dated 7th February 2014, the Appellant Financial Creditor sanctioned credit/loan facilities aggregating Rupees Rs.2036.00 Lakhs to the Corporate Debtor as per the particulars given below:-

(i)

Cash credit

Rs.1000.00 lakhs

(ii)

WCDL (Sub Limit of CC

Rs.680.00 Lakhs

(iii)

Invoice Finance discounting

Rs.680.00 Lakhs (submit of CC)

(iv)

Term Loan – I

Rs.240 Lakhs

(v)

Term Loan – II

Rs.334.00 Lakhs

(vi)

Term Loan – III

Rs.426.00 Lakhs

(vi)

Conditional WCDL

Rs.200.00 Lakhs

Total Exposure

Rs. 2036 Lakhs

10. According to the Appellant Financial Creditor, the Corporate Debtor defaulted in making repayment of its dues to the Financial Creditor. The Appellant Financial Creditor,


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