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2023 Supreme(SC) 7

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
AJAY RASTOGI, C.T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.
Sabarmati Gas Limited – Appellant
Versus
Shah Alloys Limited – Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 1669 of 2020
Decided On : 04-01-2023

Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Piyush Joshi, Adv. Mr. Senthil Jagadeesan, AOR Ms. Sumiti Yadava, Adv. Ms. Sonakshi Malhan, Adv. Mr. Sajal Jain, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Sumit Attri, Adv. Ms. Ritu Anand Vishwakarma, Adv. Mr. Satatya Anand, Adv. For M/S. Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas

IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Initiation of CIRP – Exclusion of period of limitation – In absence of provisions for exclusion of such period in respect of application under Section 9, IBC, despite combined reading of Section 238A, IBC and provisions under Limitation Act what is legally available to such a party is to assign the same as a sufficient cause for condoning delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act.
(2) Existence of a ‘pre-existing dispute’ should entail dismissal of an application filed under Section 9 IBC at threshold.

Headnote:

(A) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 9, 238A and 252 – Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 – Section 22(5) – Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 – Rule 5 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5 read with Article 137 – Initiation of CIRP – Exclusion of period of limitation – When limitation period for initiating CIRP under Section 9, IBC is to be reckoned from date of default, as opposed to date of commencement of IBC and period prescribed therefor, is three years as provided by Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 and same would commence from date of default and is extendable only by application of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 it is incumbent on Adjudicating Authority to consider claim for condonation of delay when once proceeding concerned is found filed beyond period of limitation – In absence of provisions for exclusion of such period in respect of an application under Section 9, IBC, despite combined reading of Section 238A, IBC and provisions under Limitation Act what is legally available to such a party is to assign the same as a sufficient cause for condoning delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act – In such eventuality, in accordance with factual position obtained in any particular case viz., period of delay and period covered by suspension of right under Section 22 (1), SICA etc., question of condonation of delay has to be considered lest it will result in injustice as the party was statutorily prevented from initiating action against industrial company concerned. (Paras 23, 24 and 25)

(B) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 9 – Initiation of CIRP – Existence of ‘pre-existing dispute’ should entail dismissal of application filed under Section 9 IBC at threshold – It is enough that a dispute exists between parties – What is to be seen is whether there was a plausible contention requiring investigation for the purpose of adjudication – Dismissal of application under Section 9, IBC on the ground of ‘pre-existing dispute’ cannot be held to be patently illegal or perverse – When expression ‘pre-existing dispute’ is used it will only indicate existence of a dispute prior to receipt of a demand notice under Section 8, IBC and correctness or its truthfulness is a matter of evidence. (Paras 32 and 38)

Facts of the case:

In captioned appeal mainly, twin questions of law call for consideration id est :-

(i) Whether in computation of period of limitation in regard to an application filed under Section 9, IBC period during which operational creditor’s right to proceed against or sue corporate debtor that remain suspended by virtue of Section 22 (1) of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) can be excluded, as provided under Section 22 (5) of SICA?

(ii) Whether the respondent has raised a dispute which is describable as 'pre-existing dispute’ between itself and appellant warranting dismissal of application under Section 9 of IBC at threshold?

Findings of Court:

Respondent has succeeded in raising a dispute describable as ‘pre-existing dispute’. In that view of matter once we find that Tribunals have rightfully held that there existed a ‘pre-existing dispute’ between parties there cannot be an order of remand of the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration of Section 9 application under IBC.

Result : Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT :

C.T. Ravikumar, J.

1. This appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) is preferred by Sabarmati Gas Limited (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) against the final judgment dated 19.12.2019 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 820 of 2019. As per the same the NCLAT dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant against order dated 27.06.2019 in CP (IB) No. 516/9/NCLT/AHM/2018 of the National Company Law Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench, (NCLT) dismissing the application filed under Section 9 of the IBC, in its capacity as operational creditor of ‘Shah Alloys Limited’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘respondent’).

2. In the captioned appeal mainly, twin questions of law call for consideration id est :-

    (i) Whether in computation of the period of limitation in regard to an application filed under Section 9, IBC the period during which the operational creditor’s right to proceed against or sue the corporate debtor that remain suspended by virtue of Section 22 (1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions Act, 1985) (SICA) can be excluded, as provided under Section 22 (5) of SICA?

    (ii) Whether the respondent has raised a dispute which is describable as 'pre-existing dispute’ between itself and the appellant warranting dismissal of application under Section 9 of the IBC at the threshold?

While considering the stated twin questions certain other allied questions of relevance may also crop up for consideration, which we will state and consider at the appropriate time. The respondent -corporate debtor was the petitioner in Case No. 13 of 2010 before the Board for Industrial and Financial Re-construction (BIFR) and the appellant herein was the applicant in Miscellaneous Application No. 432 of 2013 in Case No. 13 of 2010.

3. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the appellant Shri Shyam Divan and Mr. S. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent.

4. Consideration of the questions, mentioned above and to be mentioned hereinafter, is called for, in the following factual background:

The respondent, for its manufacturing needs, required commercial supply of natural gas. To facilitate the same on 30.05.2008 the appellant and the respondent entered into a Gas Sales Agreement (GSA) whereby and whereunder the appellant was having the obligation to supply natural gas conforming to the specifications laid down in Annexure-2, appended to GSA and it also forms part of the contract. Going by clause 11.2 of GSA, notwithstanding any dispute in relation to any amount invoiced, the respondent could not withhold payment in accordance with the GSA. According to the appellant, the respondent defaulted payment of invoices inasmuch as it made only partial irregular payments from November, 2011. Meanwhile, the respondent approached BIFR to get it declared as a ‘sick unit’ and for recommendation of a plan for its rehabilitation, in terms of the provisions under SICA. The reference was admitted by BIFR as case No. 13 of 2010 and as per order dated 31.08.2010 the respondent was declared as a ‘sick company’. It is the case of the appellant that by virtue of Section 22 of SICA there was a moratorium on the respondent and therefore, it could not have proceeded against the respondent for outstanding dues, thenceforth, without obtaining the permission of the BIFR. On 07.08.2012 the appellant stopped the gas supply and then, intervened in the pending proceedings before the BIFR viz., 13 of 2010. On 08.03.2013, as per Miscellaneous Application No. 432 of 2013 the appellant sought permission of the BIFR for initiating proceedings against the respondent for recovery of an outstanding dues of Rs. 4,71,56,095/-. On 09.09.2015, the BIFR passed an order thereon. Shortly thereafter, to be precise, w.e.f. 01.12.2016, SICA was repealed.

5. According to the appellant, BIFR became functus officio and all proceedings pending before it, including the case of the respo


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