The court established that compliance with Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act is mandatory, but the government's final decision on land acquisition is subject to judicial review if found arbitrary.

JUDGMENT :

SURYA KANT, J.

1. These appeals have been preferred by the Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA, now HSVP) (hereinafter, ‘Appellant’) against the judgement dated 15.07.2008 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), whereby the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the State of Haryana annulled by quashing the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, ‘1894 Act’).

A. FACTS

2. A notification was issued on 16.03.1999 under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act for acquiring 952.18 acres land, of which 748.56 acres fall in Village Saketri and 203.62 acres in Village Bhainsa Tiba, both in Tehsil and District Panchkula, Haryana. The land was being acquired for development and utilization for residential, commercial, institutional and recreational purposes.

3. Located between the Union Territory of Chandigarh and the Shivalik Range, the lands are bordered on one side by the Sukhna Lake, and a designated Forest Area on the other. It is also adjacent to several other residential sectors that the Appellant has fully developed as part of the Mansa Devi Complex in the Panchkula Urban Area.

4. The Respondents submitted their objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act on 16.04.1999, contending that their portion of the land under acquisition ought to be exempted as they contained fruit trees and the state policy mandates the exemption of such lands from acquisition. Additionally, they claimed that a cattle- shed, greenhouse, and an attendant room were also erected on the land, for which authorization had been granted by the Commissioner, Ambala, on 23.12.1992 under the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952 (hereinafter, ‘Punjab Periphery Act’). Similarly, a farmhouse was also claimed to have been constructed with the approval of the Additional District Judge, Ambala, (hereinafter, ‘ADJ’) vide judgement dated 05.04.1994.

5. The Collector accepted these objections, noting that since the Commissioner and the ADJ had authorized the construction on the land, it could be exempted from acquisition. However, the State Government went ahead with the acquisition, asserting that the structures were unauthorized. A declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act was issued on 16.03.2000 to acquire both the land and the constructions thereon.

6. Aggrieved, the Respondents approached the High Court, pleading that their objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act had not been appropriately considered.

7. Subsequently, vide the impugned judgement dated 15.07.2008, the High Court allowed the Respondents’ writ petition and quashed the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act. This finding stood on two primary legs: (i) the Respondents’ objections were wrongfully rejected as the constructions were duly authorized; and (ii) it was discriminatory to acquire the Respondents’ land when similarly situated land belonging to Maharaja Harinder Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja Varinder Singh had been exempted from acquisition.

8. Discontented with the quashing of the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act, the Appellant—beneficiary of the acquisition, is before us in these appeals. This Court, vide order dated 01.09.2008, directed the parties to maintain status quo which is operating till date.

B. CONTENTIONS

9. Mr. Lokesh Sinhal, Learned Senior Additional Advocate General of Haryana, appearing on behalf of the Appellant— beneficiary of the acquisition contended that the High Court erred in quashing the aforementioned notifications. In support of this assertion, he made the following submissions:

(a) The constructions undertaken by the Respondents were unauthorized. Although permission was granted by the Commissioner, Ambala, it was conditioned on the Respondents submitting the building plan. However, there is no evidence substantiating that such a plan was ever submitted. Hence it cannot be presumed that the construction was duly authorized, and consequen