SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2025 Supreme(SC) 397

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
B. V. Nagarathna, Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.
Suneeti Toteja - Appellant
Versus
State Of U.P. & Another - Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. ……of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6898 of 2023)
Decided On : 25-02-2025

Advocates appeared:
For the Petitioner(s): Ms. Meenakshi Kalra, AOR Ms. Shobhana Takiar, Adv. Mr. S N Kalra, Adv. Ms. Gade Meghana, Adv. Ms. Anjali Chaudhary, Adv. Ms. Sakshi Gupta, Adv. Mr. Shubham, Adv. Mr. Kamal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Shaurya Sahay, AOR Mr. Aditya Kumar, Adv. Ms. Ruchil Raj, Adv. Mr. Vikas Bansal, Adv. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, AOR Ms. Alice Raj, Adv. Ms. Suroor Mandar, Adv.

IMPORTANT POINT
Section 197 of Cr.P.C. does not envisage concept of deemed sanction – Test to decide whether sanction is necessary in a particular case is, whether, act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether, there is a reasonable connection with official duty.

Headnote:

Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 509, 120B, 192, 354A, 506, 202, 218, 204 and 197 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Sections 197 and 482 – Sexual Harassment – Summoning order – Test to decide whether sanction is necessary in a particular case is, whether, act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether, there is a reasonable connection with official duty – It is only to be seen if accused public servant was acting in performance of his/her official duties, and if answer is in affirmative, then prior sanction for their prosecution is a condition precedent to cognizance of cases against them by courts – Correctness of allegations with regard to conduct of appellant need not be ascertained herein by this Court but fact that she was acting in her official duty is sufficient to hold that prior sanction from department was in fact necessary before Magistrate taking cognizance against her – Magistrate erred in proceeding to take cognizance against appellant without sanction for prosecution being received from BIS – Since BIS has eventually refused to grant sanction for prosecution of appellant, prosecution against appellant could not have been sustained – Section 197 of Cr.P.C. does not envisage concept of deemed sanction – Magistrate was not right in taking cognizance of offence against appellant without there being sanction for prosecution granted by competent authority – Necessary sanction not having been granted has vitiated very initiation of criminal proceeding against appellant – Charge-sheet, summoning order and consequent steps taken by trial court pursuant to same quashed qua appellant. (Paras 23, 29, 30 and 32)

Facts of the case:

Present Criminal Appeal arises out of the order dated 16.11.2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, wherein High Court has dismissed the petition filed by appellant for quashing of the summoning order dated 12.07.2022 and the charge-sheet for the offences punishable under Sections 509, 120B, 192, 354A, 506, 202, 218, 204 and 197 of IPC.

Findings of Court:

High Court erred in not considering the fact that sanction for prosecution was not granted by competent authority under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. and eventually sanction was expressly denied by competent authority with respect to the allegations against the appellant.

Result : Appeal allowed.

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:

  1. The core issue revolves around whether the prosecution of a public servant requires prior sanction from the competent authority under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. (!) (!)
  2. The court clarified that Section 197 does not envisage a concept of deemed sanction; rather, it mandates prior sanction only if the act is directly connected with the official duties of the public servant (!) (!)
  3. The determination of whether an act was performed in the discharge of official duties is a factual question, and if it is indisputably traceable to official duties, prior sanction is necessary before initiating prosecution (!) (!)
  4. In this case, the appellant was acting in her official capacity as a Presiding Officer of the Internal Complaints Committee and during her tenure, the allegations pertain to actions taken in that official capacity (!) (!)
  5. The relevant sanction was sought but was not granted; the competent authority (BIS) explicitly refused sanction after reviewing the case and the documents, including the FIR and chargesheet (!) (!) (!)
  6. The prosecution was initiated without the necessary prior sanction, which is a legal requirement when the acts are connected to official duties (!) (!)
  7. The court emphasized that the absence of sanction invalidates the initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellant, and the chargesheet, summons, and related steps are liable to be quashed (!) (!)
  8. The court rejected the argument of "deemed sanction," clarifying that Section 197 does not recognize such a concept, and the lack of timely sanction cannot be presumed as approval for prosecution (!) (!)
  9. Ultimately, the appeal was allowed, and the proceedings against the appellant were quashed due to the absence of proper sanction, which is a prerequisite for prosecuting public servants for acts connected to their official duties (!)

Please let me know if you need further analysis or assistance.


JUDGMENT :

NAGARATHNA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present Criminal Appeal arises out of the order dated 16.11.2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, in Application u/s 482 No.8057/2022, wherein the High Court has dismissed the petition filed by the appellant herein for quashing of the summoning order dated 12.07.2022 and the chargesheet No.01/2022 dated 02.07.2022.

3. The appellant herein is stated to be an employee of the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS). Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present case are that Dr. Manisha Narayan, the respondent No.2 herein (hereinafter referred to as “complainant”) had filed FIR No.610/2018 dated 30.10.2018 at the Aliganj Police Station, District Lucknow. It was stated in the said FIR that during her tenure with the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (hereinafter “FSSAI” or “authority”) in New Delhi in the capacity of an Associate Director, she was sexually harassed on multiple occasions by Dr. S.S. Ghonkrorkta, the Enforcement Director therein. Being aggrieved, she disclosed the same to her mother who then filed a complaint before the FSSAI for action to be taken under the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter “POSH Act”). An Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) was constituted to investigate the allegations of the complainant and the enquiry was referred to the ICC on 04.12.2014. The enquiry report of the ICC was submitted to the Chief Executive Officer of FSSAI on 22.06.2015, which found Dr. S.S. Ghonkrorkta to be guilty of the offences charged against him and thereby it was recommended to the Authority to register an FIR against him for offences under Sections 354, 509, 192, 197, 204, 218, 202 and 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter “IPC”), apart from taking appropriate disciplinary action against the other officers involved in the misconduct.

4. However, as per the complainant, since the Authority did not take any action against the persons involved in the offence and misconduct, she was compelled to file FIR No.610 of 2018 dated 30.10.2018, in respect of offences punishable under Sections 354, 509, 120B, 192, 197, 204, 218, 202, 468, 471 and 506 of IPC, against Dr. S.S. Ghonkrorkta and Mr. Sunil Kumar Bhadoria. It is pertinent to note that the appellant herein was neither part of the ICC proceedings, nor named in the FIR. Her name surfaced during the statement given by the complainant under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “CrPC”) on 14.10.2020.

5. Meanwhile, Dr. S.S. Ghonkrorkta challenged the investigation report of the ICC before the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi (hereinafter “the Tribunal” for short) by filing O.A. No.1505 of 2016, and vide order dated 16.09.2016, the Tribunal directed the respondents therein not to act on the report of the ICC. In the said case before the Tribunal, the complainant was arrayed as respondent No. 6 and the FSSAI was represented by its officials who were arrayed as respondent Nos.3 and 7. The appellant was posted on deputation during the period from 27.04.2016 to 25.07.2019 at the FSSAI, New Delhi. On 12.05.2016, the appellant herein was appointed as the Presiding Officer (PO) of the ICC. In her capacity as the PO of the ICC, she filed a short counter affidavit dated 16.01.2017 on behalf of respondent Nos.3, 6 and 7 therein before the Tribunal. In the said affidavit, the appellant largely defended the findings of the enquiry report submitted by the ICC. However, the complainant later asserted that she had not authorized the appellant to file the counter affidavit on her behalf and that the said counter affidavit was filed without her knowledge and consent. In response, the FSSAI, represented by the respondent Nos.3 and 7 therein, filed a Misc. Application No.1658 of 2017 before the Tribunal, seeking the amendment of the counter affidavit filed by them in O.A. No.1505 of 2016,

    Click Here to Read the rest of this document
    1
    2
    3
    4
    5
    6
    7
    8
    9
    10
    11
    SupremeToday Portrait Ad
    supreme today icon
    logo-black

    An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

    Please visit our Training & Support
    Center or Contact Us for assistance

    qr

    Scan Me!

    India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

    For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

    whatsapp-icon Back to top