IMPORTANT POINT
Compromise decree – Once Court passes compromise decree after such satisfaction, decree cannot be challenged in appeal as no appeal lies against compromise decree – Compromise decree cannot be challenged by filing fresh suit.

JUDGMENT

SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal arises out of pure civil proceedings initiated at the hands of the present appellants in the year 2003. The appellants filed a suit for declaring a compromise decree entered into between the respondents (defendants) as null and void, and not binding on the appellants. Additionally, the appellants also sought partition of a certain share in the ancestral property, which was in the possession of the defendants. The trial court dismissed the suit of the appellants vide order dated 02.03.2007. Thereafter, the appellants filed the first appeal before the High Court, which has also been dismissed by the impugned order dated 23.09.2022.

3. Since the present matter concerns various suits, we would like to state the facts of the matter in short and the same are as follows:

(a) In 1974, a family partition takes place between brothers and their father, i.e. appellants’ father, his five brothers and appellants’ grandfather, and the family property was partitioned which was registered.

(b) Thereafter, in the year 1998, the appellants filed a suit (O.S No.219/1998) against their father and mother seeking partition and division of ancestral property by metes and bounds. However, during the pendency of this suit, the grandfather of the appellants filed a different suit (O.S No.58/1999) for partition in which his six sons, including appellants’ father, were a party. In that, it was stated that a part of the joint family property (7 acres of land) was mistakenly left out of the 1974 partition. Vide order dated 18.01.2000, Trial Court passed a decree based on a compromise between the defendants under which that 7 acres of land was equally divided amongst the appellants’ father, his five brothers and appellants’ grandfather. Consequently, 1 acre out of the 7 acres fell to the share of the appellants’ father.

(c) Taking into consideration the compromise decree dated 18.01.2000, the Trial Court, vide order dated 02.08.2002, decreed the appellants’ partition suit (O.S No.219/1998), and the appellants together received half of the share of their father’s property. Consequently, both cases were decided. The 1999 suit was decided on 18.01.2000 by a decree of compromise and later the 1998 suit was decided on 02.08.2002 based on the decree of compromise passed in 1999 suit.

(d) From here, the main dispute arises. In 2003, the appellants filed the present suit (No.1/2003) seeking a declaration that the compromise decree dated 18.01.2000 is null and void as, according to the appellants, the 7 acres of land was their father’s property and not the ancestral property. Thus, the appellants’ claim that they are entitled to half of the 7 acres of land (hereinafter referred to as ‘suit property’). This is the suit with which we are dealing in the present appeal. This suit of the appellants was dismissed by the Trial Court, and then the first appeal filed by the appellants has also been dismissed by the High Court vide the impugned order dated 23.09.2022. Now, appellants are before us.

4. It is the case of the appellants that they are the sons of Tirakappa Gurusiddappa Malagi, who had colluded with his father (appellants’ grandfather) and brothers (appellants’ uncles) to deprive the appellants of their rights. Appellants contend that the suit property (7 acres of land) was purchased by their grandmother in the name of their father when he was a minor and thus, suit property was rightly not included in the 1974 partition. However, according to the appellants, their father, in collusion with his father and brothers, got the suit property partitioned by a compromise decree, and this has led to the reduction of the appellants’ share in the suit property. They further argue that the compromise decree should be set aside as they were never made a party to that suit in which the compromise decree was passed.

5. On the contrary, the other side would argue that the appellants’ interest was represented by their fa