SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPANKAR DATTA, PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.
Rajeev Gupta and Others – Appellants
Versus
Prashant Garg and Others – Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 11061 of 2024 [Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 2998 of 2022]
Decided On : 23-04-2025
(A) Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 58 – Period of limitation – If cause of action to sue means accrual of right for an actionable claim, it is the moment from which such right first accrues that clock of limitation would start ticking – Even though cause of action for instituting a suit might arise on varied occasions and/or at different times, what is material and assumes relevance for computing period of limitation under Article 58 is the date when right to sue first accrues to aggrieved suitor – Though dominus litus, suitor cannot pick and choose time for approaching court – Period of limitation in terms of Article 58 being three years, prescribed period has to be counted from that date of right to sue first accruing and suit, if not instituted within three years therefrom, would become barred by time – Any suit seeking cancellation of a particular instrument as void or voidable would be governed by Article 59 and has to be instituted within three years from date suitor could be said to have first derived knowledge of fact of such an instrument (which, according to him, is void or voidable) coming into existence – Word “first” in Article 59 would ordinarily have same connotation as in Article 58. (Paras 30 and 31)
(B) Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Sections 31 and 38 – Suit for cancellation of sale deeds, recovery of possession and injunction – Execution of sale deeds was followed by registration as required by law – After civil suit failed on the ground of limitation, relief of declaration was belatedly sought to be inserted in plaint in course of first appeal – With execution of sale deeds, subsequently registered, this was the moment when right to sue first accrued to plaintiffs – Conduct of plaintiffs does throw light on how they juggled to overcome bar of limitation by seeking a decree for cancellation of sale deeds, which they sought to abandon midway by applying for amendment; thereafter, again they made attempt for insertion of prayer for declaration, also by way of amendment at appellate stage, which did not ultimately fructify – Civil suit of plaintiffs having been instituted in 2003, it was hopelessly barred by limitation and Section 3 of Limitation Act essentially entails its dismissal – Trial court was right in dismissing suit, on the ground of limitation. (Paras 33, 34, 35, 36 and 68)
(C) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Lis Pendens – Section 52 of T.P. Act does not ipso facto render a sale transaction as inoperative, it merely subjects it to outcome of pending proceedings – Effect of doctrine of lis pendens, which Section 52 of T.P. Act embodies, is not to annul all voluntary transfers effected by a party to suit but only to render it subservient to rights of parties thereto under decree or order that court may make in the suit – Transfer, subject to result of suit, could remain valid – There being no proof that appellants had knowledge of injunction order, transaction could not have been declared void ab initio – This is a case which falls within exceptions laid down under Section 52 of T.P. Act, i.e. non-applicability of the provision to collusive suits – Appellants would have to be held to be bona fide purchaser for value and entitled to benefit of Section 41 of T.P. Act. (Paras 41, 42 and 43)
(D) Indian Succession Act, 1925 – Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 68 – Proof of Will – Requirement of proof of a Will in accordance with Section 68 is not done away with, even if Will is not disputed by opposite party – Where original documents are not produced without a plausible reason and factual foundation for laying secondary evidence not established it is not permissible for court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. (Paras 48 and 55)
Facts of the case:
Present appeal, by special leave, is at instance of second to fifth defendants [appellants] in a suit for cancellation of sale deeds, recovery of possession and injunction. Appellants mount a challenge to judgment and decree dated 21st September, 2021 of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing their second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In such appeal, first appellate judgment and decree was under challenge which reversed decree of the trial court of dismissal of the civil suit instituted by the respondent.
Findings of Court:
High Court, in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction, did not fare better. In fact, application of judicial mind to substantial questions of law arising for decision on second appeal is conspicuous by its absence.
Result : Civil Appeal allowed.
JUDGMENT :
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
THE APPEAL
1. This appeal, by special leave, is at the instance of the second to fifth defendants1 [appellants, hereafter] in a suit for cancellation of sale deeds, recovery of possession and injunction. The appellants mount a challenge to the judgment and decree dated 21st September, 2021 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad2 [High Court, hereafter] dismissing their second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.3 [CPC, hereafter] In such appeal, the first appellate judgment and decree was under challenge which reversed the decree of the trial court of dismissal of the civil suit instituted by the respondent 1.
RESUME OF FACTS
2. The factual conspectus of the case, to the extent relevant for adjudication of the present lis, is set out below:
(i) The common ancestor of the parties, Dr. Babu Ram Garg, allegedly executed a will dated 17th October, 19514 [WILL, hereafter] bequeathing House No. 49/1, Nai Mandi, Muzaffarnagar5 [suit property, hereafter] in favour of his two sons - Ishwar Chand and Dr. Karam Chand. The third son, i.e. Ramesh Chand was not given a share in the suit property; instead, he was bequeathed the business of a pharmacy and a sum of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only). The suit property was a two storeyed building, with shops being run in part/portion of the ground floor.
(ii) The genealogical chart of the family is reproduced below for the sake of convenience:
(iii) In the year 1956, a family settlement was entered into by the parties concerned in terms whereof the names of Leelawati and Ramesh Chand were mutated in respect of the suit property, with the remaining properties being allotted to Dr. Karam Chand.
(iv) After the death of Ishwar Chand in 1984, a civil suit6 [Original Suit No. 307/1987, referred to as the “first suit” hereafter] was filed by his wife Leelawati against Ramesh Chand, praying that she be declared the owner of the western portion of the suit property admeasuring 48 ft x 83 ft 6 inches, leaving the eastern portion of the house, admeasuring 96 ft 6 inches x 48 ft for Ramesh Chand. The said suit stood decreed on 30th May, 1987 by compromise.
(v) Litigation inter se the family members did not end with the first suit being decreed on compromise. The same continued with Dr. Karam Chand instituting a suit7 [Original Suit No. 458/1992, referred to as the “second suit” hereafter] against his brother Ramesh Chand as well as the heirs of late Ishwar Chand, whereby permanent injunction was sought restraining them from alienating the suit property. An ex-parte ad-interim injunction was granted vide order dated 15th June, 1992 as regards the suit property. Such order does not seem to have been served upon Ramesh Chand or Ishwar Chand’s heirs.
(vi) During the pendency of the second suit, on 16th June, 1992 and 29th June, 1992 to be precise, two sale deeds were executed qua the southern and eastern portion of the suit property by Ramesh Chand, in favour of the appellants for a total consideration of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees Eighty thousand only). The deeds were duly registered, and entered in the relevant book (Book No. 1) on 17th June, 1992 and 30th June, 1992, respectively. It is material to note that the appellants were not wholly unknown to the family; they resided in the building immediately to the south of the suit property.
(vii) During the pendency of the second suit instituted by Dr. Karam Chand, again a compromise was arrived at between Dr. Karam Chand and Ishwar Chand’s heirs on 28th September, 1992. In terms thereof, Dr. Karam Chand relinquished his rights in respect of the western portion of the house which had continuously been in the possession of Ishwar Chand’s family.
(viii) In yet another seemingly filial turn of events, the second suit was finally compromised between Dr. Karam Chand and Ramesh Chand. Dr. Karam Chand’s absolute rights over the eastern portion of the suit property having been accepted, Ramesh Chand was permitted to re
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AI
(1) Period of limitation – If cause of action to sue means accrual of right for an actionable claim, it is the moment from which such right first accrues that clock of limitation would start ticking ....
The application of Section 17 of the Limitation Act to protect the rights of a party defrauded from lapse of time until they remain in ignorance of the fraud, and the presumption of validity of a reg....
The main legal point established in the judgment is that sale deeds executed in violation of injunction orders and lacking legal sanctity can be declared null and void, and the issue of limitation ca....
Sale deeds executed against injunction orders lack legal sanctity; thus, the cancellation of such deeds is upheld based on prior court judgments.
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