SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ABHAY S.OKA, UJJAL BHUYAN, JJ.
S.C. Narang – Appellant
Versus
State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. – Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 2125 of 2025 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Criminal) No. 824 of 2023)
Decided On : 22-04-2025
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. facts of the case detailing the incident and parties involved. (Para 2 , 3) |
| 2. arguments presented by both parties regarding responsibility and control. (Para 4 , 5 , 6) |
| 3. court's interpretation of section 75 of the jj act and its applicability. (Para 7 , 8 , 9) |
| 4. final ruling allowing the appeal. (Para 10 , 11) |
JUDGMENT
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of a very unfortunate incident. A four year old child was studying in the nursery class at Maxfort School, Dwarka, New Delhi. The alleged incident occurred on 17th November 2017. The girl child complained of pain in her private parts, and upon enquiry from the child, it was learnt that one of her classmates had allegedly sexually assaulted her. Therefore, a First Information Report was registered under Section 376 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860 and Section 21 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short 'POCSO Act'). The police, after investigation, filed a charge sheet. Two protest petitions were filed by the complainant (second respondent, mother of the victim child).
3. We may note here that since the prime accused was less than 7 years of age, the police filed a charge-sheet only under Section 21 of the POCSO Act read with Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for short "the JJ Act"). The charge sheet was filed against four persons: the Principal of the School, two teachers, and the Vice- Chairman/officiating Chairman of the Managing Committee, which runs the school. The present appellant is the Chairman of the Managing Committee. On the basis of the second protest petition, the learned Special Judge issued a summons to the appellant. The present appellant challenged the order by filing a Revision Application, which was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order.
4. The Special Court firstly observed that the appellant being the Chairman was responsible for implementation of the Guidelines issued by the Directorate of Education on 15th September, 2017 which made it mandatory to install sufficient number of CCTV cameras in the school premises so as to mandatorily cover all class rooms, labs, corridor, parking, library, areas outside wash rooms etc. The Special Court found fault with the appellant on the ground that the CCTV cameras were not installed in accordance with the Guidelines, and therefore, negligence was attributed to the appellant.
5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has invited our attention to Section 75 of the JJ Act. He submitted that even taking the case of the prosecution as correct, it cannot be said that the appellant had the actual charge or control over the victim child. He submitted that the incident occurred within a few days of the Guidelines dated 15th September, 2017. Therefore, when the incident occurred, the CCTV cameras were not installed, which was done subsequently. He pointed out that the Principal of the school, two teachers and the Vice-Chairman have already been shown as accused for the offence punishable under Section 75 of the JJ Act.
6. We also heard the learned Additional Solicitor General, who appeared for the respondent-State. The learned counsel appearing for the second respondent submitted that, as the Chairman of the institution running the school, the appellant is fully responsible for taking care of the children enrolled in the school. As the Chairman, the appellant had full control over the school, and that is how Section 75 of the JJ Act applies. He submitted that the appellant is morally responsible for ensuring that such an incident does not happen in the school.
7. Section 75 of the JJ Act reads thus:
A person must have actual charge or control over a child to be held liable under Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act. Mere managerial responsibility does not confer such control.
The interpretation of 'actual charge of, or control over' a child under Section 75 of the J.J. Act, 2015 should be construed in a strict sense, and liability under the provision depends on the actual....
The conduct of reprimanding a child did not constitute cruelty under the Juvenile Justice Act.
To constitute 'willful neglect' under Section 75 of the J.J. Act, actions must be intentional and deliberate, not merely negligent.
Insufficient evidence was found to support charges under the Juvenile Justice Act against the petitioner as she was not in actual control of the children and her actions did not constitute abuse.
Disciplinary measures in schools, such as enforcing a uniform dress code, do not constitute cruelty under the Juvenile Justice Act.
The central legal point established is that the actions of the accused did not constitute an offence under the Juvenile Justice Act or the Indian Penal Code due to the absence of malafide intention a....
(1) Courts must follow and implement law – Courts cannot commit violence against law.(2) Kidnapping and rape of minor girl – When such offences of rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault are c....
The main legal point established is that the duty to report offences under the POCSO Act requires actual knowledge or reason to believe, and mere information or suspicion is not sufficient to attribu....
The judgment emphasizes the need to consider the age and reformation of the child-in-conflict with law, the applicability of alternate punishment under Section 42 of the POCSO Act, and the provisions....
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