SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPANKAR DATTA, UJJAL BHUYAN, JJ.
United Bank Of India (Now Punjab National Bank) – Appellant
Versus
Swapan Kumar Mullick & Ors. – Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 9679 of 2025 [Arising Out Of Slp (Civil) No. 13592 of 2020]
With
Swapan Kumar Mullick – Appellant
Versus
United Bank Of India & Ors.(now Punjab National Bank) – Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 9770 of 2025 [Arising Out Of SLP (Civil) No. 30919 of 2024]
Decided on : 22-07-2025
(A) Service Law – Resignation and Voluntary Retirement – “Resignation” and “voluntary retirement” are different – Employees resigning from service and employees retiring from service voluntarily constitute two different classes – Treating two classes differently may not offend Article 14 – When a provision for voluntary retirement does exist, yet, an employee elects to resign, such resignation (irrespective of length of service) cannot be treated as voluntary retirement unless, in a given case, employee also satisfies conditions for voluntary retirement – What is applicable in a case of voluntary retirement ex proprio vigore may not apply to resignation in all cases. (Paras 52 and 53)
(B) Service Law – Pension – Resignation from service – Forfeiture of past service – Respondent by tendering resignation averted a crisis situation which could have ensued had he, because of mental depression, mishandled cash and failed to perform his duty as before – Since Respondent had served Bank without blemish for more than 35 years and is now a septuagenarian – It is appropriate to extend some relief to him in exercise of power under Article 142 of Constitution of India to assist him survive in winter years of his life with a fair measure of dignity – A fortnight’s time more granted to respondent to opt for pension as a very special case. (Paras 71 and 72)
(C) Constitution of India – Article 226 – Judicial Review – Scope and ambit – Judicial Review Courts should refrain from assessing merits of policies formulated by legislative or regulatory authorities which are codified in statutes/regulations – Such codified policy may be wise or flawed, policy may be effective in achieving objectives or could warrant a revision by way of an improvement – However, any shortcomings in policy do not render the regulation ultra vires – Courts cannot invalidate a regulation merely because in its opinion policy is unwise or ineffective – Scrutiny has normally to be restricted to process of policy making – As long as policy is not beyond scope of regulation-making power or does not transgress bounds of parent enactment or is in violation of any of limitations imposed by Constitution, there is little or no scope for interference by Courts – Power under Article 226 of Constitution cannot be exercised by High Court to direct legislature/executive to enact a law (primary or subordinate) or frame a regulation/bye-law – These are executive functions which are required to be performed based on policy decisions taken at appropriate level. (Paras 56 and 67)
Facts of the case:
The issue that arises for determination is: whether an employee resigning from service citing mental depression, after having served his employer much in excess of period stipulated to qualify for being entitled to pension, forfeits his right to opt for pension in terms of a specific provision in the Pension Regulations for all times to come, or, in view of pension being a social welfare measure for employees in the winter years of their life, adopting a beneficial approach is permissible and/or called for?
Findings of Court:
Jurisdiction of a high court is limited to the extent of pointing out why a law, in the given circumstances, is necessary for regulating the affairs of the public/society and/or to remedy a particular mischief that is noticed in course of proceedings; but in such a case too, it is only a nudge in the form of a request that could be made to the executive to consider the desirability of enacting/framing such a law or to amend an existing law.
Result : Applications dismissed.
The judgment explicitly addresses the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. It states that courts should refrain from assessing the merits of policy decisions made by legislative or executive authorities, and their power is limited to examining whether such policies or regulations are within the scope of the authority's power, whether they transgress constitutional limits, or whether they are arbitrary or manifestly arbitrary. The judgment emphasizes that courts do not have the jurisdiction to declare a rule or regulation ultra vires solely on the ground that the policy is flawed, unwise, or ineffective, as this falls within the domain of the policy-making authority.
Furthermore, the judgment clarifies that the courts' role is to ensure that the regulation or rule is made within the bounds of the law and constitutional limits, not to substitute their judgment for that of the legislature or executive on policy matters. It explicitly mentions that the power under Article 226 cannot be exercised to direct the legislature or executive to enact or amend laws or regulations, which are executive functions based on policy decisions.
Therefore, the judgment affirms that a high court cannot declare a rule ultra vires solely on the basis that the rule or regulation is flawed or unwise without a challenge to the law's validity or without examining whether the rule exceeds the constitutional or statutory authority. The court's review is limited to procedural and constitutional bounds, not to the merits of policy or the wisdom of the regulation.
This reasoning confirms that the judgment does answer the question: a high court cannot declare a rule ultra vires merely because the rule is not challenged or because it considers the policy flawed; such decisions are beyond the scope of judicial review under the constitutional framework described.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. overview of the case and key facts. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4) |
| 2. court's examination of applicable precedents. (Para 5 , 6 , 8) |
| 3. analysis of arguments from both parties. (Para 9 , 10 , 11) |
| 4. court's final determinations and conclusions. (Para 33 , 34 , 50 , 51 , 56) |
JUDGMENT :
DIPANKAR DATTA J.
THE APPEALS
1. Leave granted. These appeals, arise out of a common judgment and order dated 17th June, 20201[impugned order] of a Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta2[High Court]. The operative part of the impugned order reads thus:
B) The Board of Directors of the United Bank of India shall consider amendment of Regulation 22 of the United Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 according to the circular of the Indian Banks Association dated 30th June, 2015 with or without retrospective effect within 3 months of physical communication of this order.
C) The appellant bank by constituting an authority shall determine by 21st October, 2020 upon giving an opportunity to Mullick to place facts and adduce evidence before it whether he could be treated as having voluntarily retired from service, strictly following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shashikala case reported in (2014) 16 SCC 260 read with UCO Bank & Ors. Vs. Sanwar Mal reported in (2004) 4 SCC 412 and Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. Vs. Shree Lal Meena reported in (2019) 4 SCC 479, BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. Vs. Sh. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma & Anr. reported in AIR 2020 SC 76 and the observation made in this judgment and order.
D) Depending on such determination the option form/application submitted by Mullick dated 23rd August, 2010 in the terms of the circular dated 16th August, 2010 for availing of the pension scheme shall be processed by the bank by 20th November, 2020. The appeal (FMA 4412 of 2016) is disposed of by this judgment and order.
(bold in original)
2. The appellant - United Bank of India (now Punjab National Bank) 3[Bank] - is aggrieved by the directions contained in (B) to (D) supra; hence, it has preferred the lead appeal.
3. Upon service of notice, the 1st respondent - Shri Swapan Kumar Mullick4[Mullick] - has preferred the connected appeal.
FACTS
4. The uncontroverted facts giving rise to the present appeals are as under:
4.1. Mullick joined the services of the Bank as a typist on 23rd November, 1970. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of machine operator in the year 1978, and later to the post of head cashier.
4.2. After rendering 36 years of service with the Bank, Mullick tendered his resignation on 21st August, 2006, citing mental depression. The Bank accepted Mullick’s resignation on 19th October, 2006, and relieved him from its service.
4.3. On 27th April, 2010, a bipartite settlement was signed between the Indian Banks Association5[IBA] and various unions of workmen. Based on this bipartite settlement, the Bank issued a circular (No.SP/OPTION/2/OM-0293/10-11) dated 16th August, 20106[circular] extending ‘another option for pension’ for the employees who had not opted for the pension scheme under the United Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 19957[1995 Regulations].
4.4. The circular assumes primacy since it defined retired employees who would be entitled to pensionary benefits. It is this circular upon which Mullick based his claim for pension. Clause 2 of the circular defines retired employees and reads thus:
4.5. Clause 3 of the circular lays down the eligibility and terms and conditions, and reads thus:
A) This ‘another option for pension’ will be available to those hitherto non optee retired employee
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