1. FIR registered under Sections 417, 376, and 506 IPC alleging sexual relations established on the pretext of a promise of marriage. (Para 3 , 4 )
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2025 Supreme(SC) 1382
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SUDHANSHU DHULIA AND K. VINOD CHANDRAN, JJ.
Prithivirajan – Appellant
Versus
The State Rep By The Inspector Of Police And Another – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No(s). 282 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 12663 of 2022)
Decided on : 20-01-2025
Important Points
Sexual relations based on a promise to marry do not constitute rape unless the promise was made solely to secure consent without any intention of fulfilling it from the start, and consent was directly influenced by such false promise. Consensual relationships failing due to intervening circumstances are not rape.
Subject
Criminal Law - Sexual Offenses
Act Referred
Headnote
(A) Indian Penal Code - Sections 417, 376, and 506 Part I - Appellant charged for rape based on alleged false promise of marriage to the prosecutrix - Court reiterates that consensual relationships cannot be criminalized under the guise of false promise, referencing principles established in prior cases including 'Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. The State of Maharashtra' and 'Mahesh Damu Khare vs. The State of Maharashtra'. (Paras 6 and 7)
(B) The court reviewed that for a promise of marriage to constitute rape, it must be proven that there was no genuine intent to fulfill it, which was not established in the current case. (Para 7)
Facts of the case:
FIR was registered against the appellant for alleged rape, consisting of a complaint of establishing sexual relations under a false pretext of marriage. The appellant argued the relationship was consensual.
Findings of Court:
The FIR was quashed, indicating the relationship was consensual and did not amount to rape.
Issues: The main questions involved whether the relationship was consensual and the legitimacy of the charges based on alleged false promises of marriage.
Ratio Decidendi: The court found insufficient evidence to support the claim of consent being obtained through misconception, thus ruling out the application of rape laws in this case.
Result: Appeal allowed and criminal proceedings quashed.
(B) The court reviewed that for a promise of marriage to constitute rape, it must be proven that there was no genuine intent to fulfill it, which was not established in the current case. (Para 7)
Facts of the case:
FIR was registered against the appellant for alleged rape, consisting of a complaint of establishing sexual relations under a false pretext of marriage. The appellant argued the relationship was consensual.
Findings of Court:
The FIR was quashed, indicating the relationship was consensual and did not amount to rape.
Issues: The main questions involved whether the relationship was consensual and the legitimacy of the charges based on alleged false promises of marriage.
Ratio Decidendi: The court found insufficient evidence to support the claim of consent being obtained through misconception, thus ruling out the application of rape laws in this case.
Result: Appeal allowed and criminal proceedings quashed.
Judgement Key Points
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:
- The case involved allegations of rape based on a false promise of marriage, with the prosecution arguing that the appellant obtained consent through deception (!) (!) .
- The court clarified that consensual relationships cannot be criminalized solely on the basis of a false promise of marriage, especially if there is no evidence to show that the promise was false from the outset or that there was an intention not to fulfill it [paras 6 and 7].
- It was emphasized that for a promise of marriage to constitute rape, it must be proven that there was no genuine intention to fulfill the promise, which was not established in this case [para 7].
- The court examined whether the relationship was consensual and found that the FIR indicated the relationship was consensual and did not amount to rape [para 7].
- The court relied on principles that establish that establishing physical relations based on a promise to marry does not automatically amount to rape, unless specific conditions are met, such as the promise being false from the beginning and made solely to secure consent without any intention of fulfillment [para 6].
- The court observed that the initial promise to marry was not proven to be false and that circumstances prevented its fulfillment, leading to the end of the relationship and the filing of the FIR [para 7].
- The court concluded that continuing with criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process and accordingly allowed the appeal, quashing the FIR and all related proceedings [paras 8 and 9].
Please let me know if you need further analysis or assistance.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Prosecution alleges rape via misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC; appellant contends the relationship was consensual and the proceedings should be quashed. (Para 4 , 5 )
3. The relationship was consensual, and the promise to marry was not false from the inception but unfulfilled due to intervening circumstances. (Para 7 )
4. Rape is not attracted by a promise to marry unless the promise was made solely to secure consent without any intention to fulfill it from the beginning. (Para 6 )
5. Appeal allowed, High Court order set aside, and criminal proceedings arising from the FIR quashed. (Para 8 , 9 )
6. When does a promise to marry constitute the offence of rape under the IPC?
For rape to be attracted, the accused must have promised marriage solely to secure sexual consent without any intention of fulfilling the promise from the beginning, and the prosecutrix must have been directly influenced by this false promise. (Para 6 )
7. Does a failure to fulfill a promise to marry necessarily imply a misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC?
No. If the initial promise was not false from the beginning but could not be fulfilled due to intervening circumstances, the relationship is considered consensual rather than a case of rape. (Para 7 )
8. What is the legal consequence of a consensual relationship in proceedings for rape based on a promise to marry?
Where the relationship is found to be consensual and the promise to marry was not fraudulent from the start, allowing the appellant to face trial is considered an abuse of the process of the court. (Para 7 )
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the State. The respondent no.2 has not turned up in spite of service of notice.
3. An FIR bearing Crime No.1/2019 was filed against the appellant by the respondent police based on a complaint lodged by the respondent no.2 (prosecutrix) for the offences punishable under Sections 417 , 376 & 506 Part I of the INDIAN PENAL CODE (for short "IPC") alleging that the appellant had established sexual relations with her on the pretext of marriage.
4. The entire case of the prosecution is that the appellant is being charged, inter-alia, under Section 376 of the IPC for the reason that the appellant had given false promise of marriage to the prosecutrix and thus obtained her consent for sexual relationship but later backed out of his promise, and for that reason it is a case of rape. The logic given here is that in case there is no consent then it would be rape as defined under section 375 of IPC. In order to prove that there is no consent usually reliance on Section 90 of IPC is also taken.
Section 90 of IPC is as follows:
90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception- A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or
Consent of insane person- if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or
Consent of child- unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.
The prosecution would thus like to prove that because of the 'misconception', consent was given and hence it is a case of rape.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant argued that this is not a case of rape but of consensual relationship, and hence deserves to be quashed. In order to strengthen this submission, he relied upon several cases.
These are:
i. Sonu Vs State of Uttar Pradesh, 2021 SCC Online SC 181 .
ii. Maheshwar Tigga Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2020) 10 SCC 108.
iii. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608.
iv. Dr. Dhruvram Murlidhar Sonar VS. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191.
v. Kaini Raja Vs. State of Kerala, (2013) 9 SCC 113.
vi. Deepak Gulati Vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675.
vii. K.P. Thimmappa Gowda Vs State of Karnataka, (2011) 14 SCC 475.
viii. Deelip Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88.
ix. Uday Vs State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46.
x. Rahul Sasi Vs State of Kerala, 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 4370 .
6. This Court has time and again reiterated that only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape. For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied: first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage. [See: Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2019) 9 SCC 608; Mahesh Damu Khare vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 347 ]
7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the
