1. Challenge to High Court order condoning delay in filing second appeal under Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963, involving a party not originally arrayed in the suit. (Para 1 , 4 )
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2025 Supreme(SC) 1547
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J.K. MAHESHWARI AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.
Punam Kumari Sharma – Appellant
Versus
The State Of Bihar And Others – Respondent
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 5722 of 2025 [Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 20-01-2025 in IA No. 46/2019 in SA No. 502/2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna]
Decided on : 02-05-2025
The Court held that condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, depends on whether 'sufficient cause' is shown, regardless of the delay's length. A liberal approach should be adopted to prioritize substantial justice over technicalities, ensuring meritorious cases are decided on their merits.
Headnote:(A) Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - Application for condonation of delay allowed by High Court - The court stated that it would examine the cause shown for the delay rather than its length - A liberal approach should be adopted to ensure that meritorious matters are not dismissed on technical grounds, thereby facilitating access to justice. (Paras 2, 3, 4)
(B) Legal notice under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Importance of serving legal notice to all necessary parties - The applicant contended ignorance about judgment and decree as a reason for the delay, which was accepted by the High Court. (Paras 4)
Facts of the case:
The applicant was not made a party in the original suit or subsequent appellate proceedings and cited ignorance of the impugned judgment as the cause for the delay in filing the second appeal.
Findings of Court:
The High Court's decision to condone the delay was based on sound legal principles and justifiable reasons presented in the application.
Issues: Whether the High Court appropriately exercised its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the appeal?
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the sufficient cause shown for the delay must be accepted to prevent the dismissal of potentially meritorious cases - the discretion exercised by the High Court was justified.
Result: Special leave petition dismissed.
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2. Petitioner challenged the High Court's discretionary relief in condoning delay; respondent asserted sufficient cause based on lack of knowledge of the judgment and decree. (Para 1 , 4 )
3. The court emphasized a liberal approach to condonation of delay, prioritizing substantial justice over technicalities and focusing on the sufficiency of the cause rather than the length of delay. (Para 2 , 3 , 4 )
4. Condonation of delay under Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963, depends on the existence of sufficient cause, regardless of the length of the delay. (Para 2 , 3 )
5. Special leave petition dismissed; High Court's order condoning the delay upheld. (Para 5 )
6. What is the primary consideration for condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
The court considers whether the cause shown for the delay is sufficient. The length of the delay is irrelevant; if the cause is sufficient, the delay should be condoned, regardless of the period. (Para 2 )
7. What approach should courts adopt when deciding applications for condonation of delay?
Courts should adopt a liberal and pragmatic approach, prioritizing substantial justice over technical considerations. A pedantic interpretation of the requirement to explain every day's delay should be avoided to prevent meritorious matters from being dismissed. (Para 3 )
8. Is there a presumption that delay in filing an appeal is intentional or due to negligence?
No, there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, through culpable negligence, or due to mala fides. Litigants generally do not benefit from lodging appeals late and instead run a serious risk. (Para 3 )
ORDER :
1. Application for condonation of delay which has been allowed by the High Court has been challenged in these proceedings.
2. Having considered the submissions made by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, we are not inclined to entertain this special leave petition for the simple reason that the High Court while exercising the discretionary relief by condoning the delay under Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 1963 Act') has found sufficient and cogent reasons has been offered by the applicants. The Courts while examining the plea for condonation of delay, would not consider the length of delay, but the cause shown for such delay. If the cause shown is sufficient, irrespective of the period of delay, same would be condoned. On the other hand, if the cause shown would not fall within the definition of sufficient cause, irrespective of the length of delay, same would not be condoned.
3. At this juncture, we are reminded of the judgment of this Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition , Anantnag and Another vs. Mst. Katiji and Others (1987) 2 SCC 107 whereunder this Court held:
'3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay XXX in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: -
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
4. No litigant would stand to benefit by approaching the Courts belatedly. In the instant case, when the facts on hand are examined by applying the principles enunciated by this Court referred to supra, it would emerge from the records that the cause shown for delay is that the applicant not having been made a party to the suit and in the appellate proceedings and also feigning, ignorance about knowledge of judgment and decree or in other words it was contended that the applicant had no knowledge about the impugned judgment and decree. Hence, applicant sought for condoning the delay in filing second appeal. It was also contended that plaintiffs being conversant with the fact that the applicant was a necessary and proper party to the suit, yet they had not arrayed the applicants as party to the proceedings in the original suit as well as in the appeal before the High Court. In this factual background the High Court has accepted the cause shown for delay in filing the second appeal by condoning the delay. Hence, it would not detain us too long to reject the present special leave petition and also for the simple reason that undisputably Public Works Department (road construction department) was made a party and only in the execution proceedings or in other words was impleaded as additional judgment debtor. This Court in order to ascertain as to whether at the first instance namely even prior to the institution of suit while is
