ORDER :

1. Application for condonation of delay which has been allowed by the High Court has been challenged in these proceedings.

2. Having considered the submissions made by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, we are not inclined to entertain this special leave petition for the simple reason that the High Court while exercising the discretionary relief by condoning the delay under Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 1963 Act') has found sufficient and cogent reasons has been offered by the applicants. The Courts while examining the plea for condonation of delay, would not consider the length of delay, but the cause shown for such delay. If the cause shown is sufficient, irrespective of the period of delay, same would be condoned. On the other hand, if the cause shown would not fall within the definition of sufficient cause, irrespective of the length of delay, same would not be condoned.

3. At this juncture, we are reminded of the judgment of this Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition , Anantnag and Another vs. Mst. Katiji and Others (1987) 2 SCC 107 whereunder this Court held:

'3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay XXX in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: -

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

4. No litigant would stand to benefit by approaching the Courts belatedly. In the instant case, when the facts on hand are examined by applying the principles enunciated by this Court referred to supra, it would emerge from the records that the cause shown for delay is that the applicant not having been made a party to the suit and in the appellate proceedings and also feigning, ignorance about knowledge of judgment and decree or in other words it was contended that the applicant had no knowledge about the impugned judgment and decree. Hence, applicant sought for condoning the delay in filing second appeal. It was also contended that plaintiffs being conversant with the fact that the applicant was a necessary and proper party to the suit, yet they had not arrayed the applicants as party to the proceedings in the original suit as well as in the appeal before the High Court. In this factual background the High Court has accepted the cause shown for delay in filing the second appeal by condoning the delay. Hence, it would not detain us too long to reject the present special leave petition and also for the simple reason that undisputably Public Works Department (road construction department) was made a part