1. Professional misconduct complaints under Section 35, Advocates Act, 1961 — Allegations regarding suppression of material facts in consent terms and attestation of false affidavits. (Para 4 , 5 , 11 , 12 , 47 , 50 )
2025 Supreme(SC) 1726
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
VIKRAM NATH, SANDEEP MEHTA, JJ.
Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa - Appellant
Versus
Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula and Others - Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 12232 of 2025 [Arising Out of SLP (Civil) No. 27606 of 2023], SLP (Civil) No. 12232 of 2025 [Diary No. 38238 of 2023], SLP (Civil) No. 1492 of 2024
Decided On : 24-09-2025
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. S.R Singh, Sr. Adv. Dr. Arvind S. Avhad, AOR Mr. Rajat Kapoor, Adv. Mr. Sushil Sonkar, Adv. Mr. Nitin Jain, Adv. *Mr. Yash Tiwari, Adv. (VC) Mr. Praveen Kumar Jha , AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rohan Thawani, Adv. Ms. Pooja Dhar, AOR Ms. Aakriti Vikas, Adv. Mr. Prasenjit Keswani, Sr. Adv. Mr. Upmanyu Tewari, AOR
IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Professional misconduct by Advocate – Ordinarily, existence of a jural relationship between complainant and Advocate concerned is a precondition for invocation of disciplinary jurisdiction on the ground of professional misconduct – Recording of reasons to believe that Advocate has committed misconduct is a sine qua non before complaint can be referred to disciplinary committee for inquiry.
(2) Mere act of identifying deponent in an affidavit filed with Chamber Summons would not make Advocate responsible for contents of affidavit – An advocate, by mere attestation of affidavit, does not become a privy to contents of affidavit.
Headnote:
Civil Appeal @ SLP (Civil) No. 27606 of 2023
(A) Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 35 – Professional misconduct by Advocate – Ordinarily, existence of a jural relationship between complainant and Advocate concerned is a precondition for invocation of disciplinary jurisdiction on the ground of professional misconduct – Role assigned to respondent-Advocate was of identifying plaintiff in consent terms – No one can be allowed to raise an issue questioning Consent Terms that were arrived at between plaintiff and defendants – There existed no professional relationship between respondent-Advocate and complainant – His prosecution, as being Lawyer of opposite party in suit before High Court, was highly objectionable, totally impermissible, and absolutely uncalled for – Since respondent-Advocate was not representing complainant or his predecessor, there was no justification behind his arraignment in complaint for alleged misconduct within meaning of Section 35 of 1961 Act – Even if respondent-Advocate had actually represented and pleaded case of plaintiff in suit and had not merely identified plaintiff, that act in isolation could not be termed as misconduct within meaning of Section 35 of 1961 Act because acts attributed to Advocate, taken on their face value, cannot be regarded as misconduct, professional or otherwise. (Paras 30, 32, 33 and 34)
(B) Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 35 – Professional misconduct by Advocate – Recording of reasons to believe that Advocate has committed misconduct is a sine qua non before complaint can be referred to disciplinary committee for inquiry – Reference of a complaint of DC would have serious consequences on professional career of Lawyer and could tarnish his image and standing in profession – A cryptic order referring complaint to DC without a bare minimum discussion of allegations contained in complaint would not satisfy requirements of a valid reference order – In absence of such prima facie satisfaction, statutory requirement under Section 35 remains non-complied, and order of reference is ex-facie in teeth of Section 35(1) of 1961 Act – Same cannot be sustained – Complaint filed by complainant, before BCMG and all proceedings sought to be undertaken in furtherance thereof, hereby quashed and set aside – Cost of Rs. 50,000/- imposed on appellant-BCMG for entertaining frivolous complaint and for dragging respondent-Advocate to this Court. (Paras 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41)
SLP (Civil) No.....of 2025 [Diary No. 38238 of 2023], SLP (Civil) No. 1492 of 2024
Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 35 – Professional misconduct by Advocate – Mere act of identifying deponent in an affidavit filed with Chamber Summons would not make Advocate responsible for contents of affidavit – An advocate, by mere attestation of affidavit, does not become a privy to contents of affidavit – Ex-facie, complaint filed by petitioner against respondent-Advocate was not only bereft of substance but was also founded on malicious and spiteful insinuations directed against Advocate who merely identified opposite party in an affidavit – Steps taken and order passed by BCMG in directing registration of complaint and in referring the same to DC for undertaking inquiry were illegal on face of record, bordering on perversity – It is manifestly a case of malicious prosecution of Advocate at behest of opponent litigant – Impugned order passed by High Court quashing complaint in writ jurisdiction, does not, ex-facie, suffer from any infirmity – Complainant and thereafter, BCMG, have caused immeasurable grief and harassment to respondent-Advocate – Cost of Rs. 50,000/- each imposed on complainant-petitioner and BCMG. (Paras 52, 53, 54, 55 and 57)
Facts of the case:
Vide impugned order, Judge-Advocate took cognizance of complaint and directed reference thereof to Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council for inquiry against respondent-Advocate for alleged professional misconduct referred to under Section 35 of Advocates Act, 1961.
Findings of Court:
Cost shall be deposited with Registry of the Bombay High Court within a period of four weeks from today, from where the same shall be paid to the respondent-advocate.
Result : Appeal allowed. Special Leave Petitions dismissed.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:
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The existence of a jural relationship between the complainant and the advocate is generally a precondition for invoking disciplinary jurisdiction for professional misconduct. Additionally, recording reasons to believe that the advocate has committed misconduct is a mandatory requirement before referring a complaint to the disciplinary committee for inquiry (!) .
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The act of merely identifying a deponent in an affidavit filed with a chamber summons does not make the advocate responsible for the contents of the affidavit. An advocate, by simply attesting an affidavit, does not become privy to its contents (!) .
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In cases where a complaint is filed without a substantive basis and is malicious or frivolous, the proceedings and orders based on such complaints may be deemed illegal and perverse. The courts may quash such complaints and impose costs to deter frivolous proceedings (!) (!) .
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An order referring a complaint to the disciplinary committee must contain clear and specific reasons to demonstrate that there is a prima facie belief that misconduct has occurred. A cryptic or vague order lacking such reasoning does not satisfy legal requirements and may be invalid (!) (!) .
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The disciplinary process involves a detailed examination of allegations, and the absence of a minimum discussion or reasoning in the reference order indicates non-application of mind, rendering the referral invalid (!) .
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When an advocate has not represented the complainant or his predecessor, and there is no professional relationship established, the advocate cannot be held liable for misconduct under the relevant disciplinary provisions. Mere identification of a party in legal proceedings does not constitute misconduct (!) (!) .
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The statutory provisions require that the Bar Council or disciplinary authority record its reasons to believe that misconduct has occurred before initiating proceedings. Orders that do not meet this standard are liable to be set aside, and the proceedings can be quashed (!) .
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The courts may exercise jurisdiction under constitutional provisions to quash disciplinary proceedings if they are found to be based on malice, lack of proper reasoning, or if they violate procedural requirements (!) .
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Imposing costs on parties for frivolous or malicious complaints serves as a deterrent and reflects the importance of maintaining the dignity and integrity of the legal profession (!) (!) .
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Overall, the legal process emphasizes the need for proper application of mind, sufficient reasoning, and adherence to procedural safeguards before initiating disciplinary actions against advocates. Orders lacking these elements are subject to being invalidated and the complaints dismissed (!) (!) .
Please let me know if you need further analysis or specific legal advice.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Challenge to the validity of reference orders to Disciplinary Committees — Contention regarding the necessity of reasoned orders versus the prematurity of judicial intervention. (Para 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 )
3. Reference orders must record a reasoned belief of prima facie misconduct; mere identification of parties or attestation of affidavits does not constitute professional misconduct. (Para 29 , 30 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 38 , 39 , 52 , 53 )
4. Recording reasons to believe an advocate committed misconduct is a sine qua non under Section 35, Advocates Act, 1961, before referring a complaint to the Disciplinary Committee. (Para 35 , 36 , 37 , 39 )
5. Complaints and disciplinary proceedings quashed — Costs imposed on the Bar Council and complainants for initiating frivolous litigation. (Para 40 , 41 , 56 , 57 )
6. What is the statutory requirement for a State Bar Council to refer a complaint to its Disciplinary Committee under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961?
The State Bar Council must record a reasoned belief that the advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct. A cryptic or laconic order that fails to discuss the allegations indicates non-application of mind and is legally unsustainable. (Para 35 , 37 , 38 , 39 )
7. Does the act of identifying a party in consent terms or attesting an affidavit constitute professional misconduct?
No. Mere identification of a party in consent terms or the attestation of an affidavit does not make the advocate responsible for the contents of the document or privy to its truthfulness. (Para 29 , 30 , 52 , 53 )
8. Is a professional relationship between the complainant and the advocate necessary to invoke disciplinary jurisdiction for professional misconduct?
Ordinarily, the existence of a jural relationship between the complainant and the advocate concerned is a precondition for the invocation of disciplinary jurisdiction on the ground of professional misconduct. (Para 33 )
JUDGMENT :
SANDEEP MEHTA, JJ.
Civil Appeal @ SLP (Civil) No. 27606 of 2023
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. The Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa1 [Hereinafter, referred to as the “BCMG”] is before us through this appeal by way of special leave assailing the interim order dated 04th November, 2023, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay2 [Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”] in Writ Petition (L) No. 23662 of 2023, staying the order dated 6th July, 2023, passed by the appellant-BCMG in Disciplinary Case No. 27 of 2023, which reads as below:
“Exhibit “A”
• After hearing the Complainant and Respondent and after going through the document available on record, according to me, Complainant has made out a case by invoking Jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Advocates Act.
• There is a prima facie case made out by the Complainant against the Respondent. Hence, I pass the following Order.
ORDER:
Complaint is referred to D.C. for further inquiry and disposal in accordance with law.
Ashish P. Deshmukh
Judge
06.07.2023.”
4. By the aforesaid order, the Judge-Advocate took cognizance of the complaint and directed reference thereof to the Disciplinary Committee3 [For short “DC”] of the Bar Council for inquiry against respondent No. 1, Shri Rajiv Narula4 [Hereinafter referred to as the “respondent-advocate”] for alleged professional misconduct referred to under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961.5 [For short “the 1961 Act”]
5. The complaint in question was filed by one Khimji Devji Parmar6 [Hereinafter referred to as the “complainant”] against the respondent-advocate in the year 2022, alleging inter alia that he was an heir to one Devji Parmar, who during his lifetime was a partner of Dara Nariman Sarkari in a firm functioning in the name and style of M/s. Volga Enterprises. Shri Devji Parmar expired in the year 2009, on which the complainant inherited his assets and liabilities.
6. The complainant set up a case that one Nusli Randelia was the owner of a piece of land bearing CTS Nos. 433 and 438, Old Survey No. 30 Hissa No. 4 (P) in Village Valnai, Taluka Malad which he leased out to Dara Nariman Sarkari.
7. Nusli Randelia had also entered into a development agreement with the firm M/s. Volga Enterprises, in which Shri Devji Parmar was a partner, and in that capacity, he was in possession of the property. A suit was instituted by Dara Nariman Sarkari bearing Suit No. 1129 of 1987 in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, in relation to the above land wherein an injunction was granted against Nusli Randelia, as well as M/s. Unique Construction, which was also asserting title to the suit property.
8. The suit was dismissed for default on account of the fact that Dara Nariman Sarkari had already been impleaded as a party-defendant (defendant No. 2) in another similar suit bearing No. 2541 of 1985, instituted by M/s Unique Construction, pending before the High Court, wherein his rights would be adjudicated. The complainant claimed that his father always confided in him that the suit No. 2541 of 1985 was pending, wherein he had the right, title, and interest in the capacity of a partner of M/s. Volga Enterprises.
9. Shri Devji Parmar, the complainant’s father passed away in 2009, upon which he made enquiries about the stage and status of the suit, and was shocked to find out that the same had been disposed of as settled on Consent Terms. Thereafter, he tried to approach Dara Nariman Sarkari, but despite best efforts, he could not trace him at his last known address. The complainant also made efforts to locate Nusli Randelia, but without any success. Thereupon, the complainant contacted his father’s advocate and collected the documents pertaining to the suit in question and on a perusal thereof, he came to know that M/s. Unique Construction - the plaintiff therein, and Nusli Randelia - defendant No. 1, had obtained a consent decree without the knowledge and consent of defendant No. 2, i.e., Dara Nariman Sarkari. The complainant continued to se