The court reaffirmed that the preferential right of a landowner over slum redevelopment schemes must be respected before any acquisition is initiated under relevant legislation.

JUDGMENT

J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Original Ordinary Civil Jurisdiction) dated 18.12.2024 by which the writ petition filed by the appellant herein seeking to challenge the orders passed by the respondent No. 1 herein dated 03.10.2022 and respondent No. 3 herein dated 07.10.2024 respectively came to be dismissed.

3. Over and above the challenge to the two orders referred to above, the appellant also prayed before the High Court for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 herein respectively to implement the order dated 26.02.2015 passed by the respondent No. 1 herein i.e. the Chief Executive Officer, Slum Rehabilitation Authority (CEO-SRA).

4. This litigation has a chequered history. The facts are quite complicated. In such circumstances, we need to give a fair idea about this litigation which, according to the High Court, was a third round of litigation between the parties.

FACTUAL MATRIX

5. The dispute in the present case relates to a parcel of land admeasuring 2,005 sq. mts. bearing CTS No.620/A/1A/1(Part) (now renumbered as CTS No. 620/A/1A/1B/1 and 620/A/1A/1B/2) of Village Malad in Taluka Borivali, Mumbai Suburban District (“Subject Property”).

6. The Subject Property was originally owned by F.E. Dinshaw Trust. Since there were hutments on the Subject Property and the same had no proper hygiene and sanitation, it was declared as a slum on 26th November, 1987 under Section 4 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (for short “Slum Act”).

7. On 25th March, 1991, the Development Plan of 1991 for Mumbai was published, wherein the Subject Property was reserved for Recreational Ground (“RG”). The Subject Property even today is reserved for RG.

8. The respondent No. 5, i.e., Phuldai R. Yadav claims to have purchased the Subject Property from the Trust on 18th September, 1991 under a distressed sale for an amount of Rs. 1,06,000/-. Within a period of 6 months from the date of purchase, the respondent No. 5 is said to have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 9th February, 1992 (“1992 MOU”) for sale of the Subject Property with the appellant’s predecessor in interest viz. Harishree Enterprises (“Harishree Enterprises”). The respondent No. 5 is said to have granted her consent to Harishree Enterprises for redevelopment. It is the case of the appellant that such act on the part the respondent No. 5 is a pointer that she was not interested in developing the property herself or in any case, had waived her preferential right, if any, to redevelop the slum land i.e. the Subject Property way back in the year 1992.

9. Initially, Harishree Enterprises propounded the slum scheme on a larger property consisting of seven plots of land, admeasuring 19456.7 sq. mts. (“Larger Property”). The Subject Property is one of the said seven plots. The 1992 MOU was considered as grant of consent by the owner for the proposed redevelopment as per the prevailing law. The other six plots of land are either owned by the appellant’s predecessor (and thereafter the appellant) or the development rights/consent for the slum scheme had been given for the same.

10. Accordingly, a survey was undertaken