The High Court retains discretion to dismiss a Writ Petition challenging an FIR as infructuous once a charge-sheet and cognizance of the offense has been filed, emphasizing jurisdictional principles over mere nomenclature.

ORDER

1. Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 8432 of 2023 under Article 226 of the Constitution [Writ Petition] was filed by the petitioners before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad [High Court], challenging a First Information Report dated 16th February, 2023 lodged by the respondent no.4 under sections 406, 504 and 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court, by the impugned judgment and order dated 23rd August, 2024 [impugned order], has dismissed the Writ Petition holding the same to have been rendered infructuous in view of filing of charge-sheet dated 10th October, 2023 under section 173(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Cr. PC] as well as an order dated 21st October, 2023 passed by the competent criminal court taking cognizance of the offence.

2. Mr. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, argues that the High Court grossly erred in dismissing the Writ Petition. According to him, it is settled principle of law that a First Information Report [FIR] can be quashed by a high court even when a discharge application is pending. Support is sought to be drawn from the decision in Anand Kumar Mohatta vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706 more particularly paragraph ‘16’ thereof. The decision in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal , (1992) 1 SCC 335 is placed to remind us of the situations when a high court either under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 , Cr. PC could exercise the power for quashing an FIR. He, thus, urges that merely because cognizance of the offence has been taken upon filing of the chargesheet, the same per se did not have the effect of curtailing the authority of the High Court in any manner to interfere if the allegation that the FIR does not disclose any offence or that the FIR has been lodged to wreak vengeance is sufficiently proved, and a satisfaction is reached that continuance of proceedings on the basis thereof would amount to an abuse of the process of the court.

3. We have no doubt in our mind about the contours of jurisdiction of a high court when a challenge is presented asserting that the impugned FIR ought to be quashed on the settled parameters. However, sight cannot be lost of the settled legal position that it is entirely within the discretion of a high court whether to interfere or not when other remedies are available. If during the pendency of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before a high court where an FIR is challenged the investigation is completed and chargesheet filed, in pursuance whereof the competent criminal court takes cognizance of the offence, the court would be disabled in proceeding with the writ petition owing to a judicial order having intervened. We can profitably refer to the decision of the bench of three Judges of this Court made on a reference in Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath , (2015) 5 SCC 423. While disapproving the view expressed in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai , (2003) 6 SCC 675 it was held that judicial orders of the civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and that jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226 [para 29 of Radhey Shyam]. We may also note from such decision that upon considering decisions of high authority, a principle of law was laid down that challenge to judicial orders could lie by way of an appeal or a revision or under Article 227 of the Constitution and not by way of a writ under Articles 226 and 32.

4. The underlying reason why judicial orders are not amenable to challenge in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seems to be that such orde