IMPORTANT POINT
In an offence punishable under Section 409 IPC there is no presumption regarding culpability of a Director.

ORDER

1. Leave granted.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. This appeal arises from an order of the Delhi High Court dated 21.07.2025 which rejects the prayer of the appellant for extension of interim bail in connection with FIR No. 200/2019, registered at P.S. Economic Offences Wing, District EOW, inter alia, under Section 409/ 120B IPC.

4. It appears that in respect of diversion of subsidy amount of about Rs.4.10 crore provided to a Company, namely, M/s Pragat Akshay Urja Limited, a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged implicating the Company and its Directors. The appellant is stated to be one of the Directors. Pursuant to the FIR, the appellant was taken into custody on 12.12.2019. Part of the subsidy amount i.e., Rs. 2,17,92,500 was deposited by the Company on 26.12.2019. Noticing the same and recording the statement made on instructions by the learned counsel for the appellant that remaining amount would also be deposited, the High Court granted interim bail to the appellant on 22.04.2020 on certain conditions. It appears that the main bail prayer of the appellant remained pending before the High Court, and the appellant continued to be on interim bail. However, instead of deciding the main bail prayer, the High Court vide impugned order cancelled the interim bail on failure of the appellant in complying with the undertaking.

5. On 01.08.2025, while issuing notice on the Special Leave Petition preferred by the appellant, this Court passed the following order:

“1. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that as per allegations an amount of Rs. 4,00,00,000/- was siphoned off and diverted from the project for which subsidy was provided by the Government. These allegations were against the petitioner as well as other co-accused. However, on 22.04.2020, after having suffered incarceration of about five months, the petitioner was released on interim bail by taking into account that petitioner had deposited a sum of Rs. 2,17,92,500/- on 26.12.2019 and a statement was made that he would arrange for deposit of the balance amount. The aforesaid interim order was extended from time to time. However, by the impugned order dated 21.07.2025 extension was denied on the ground that the petitioner had failed to deposit the remaining amount.

2. It has been contended that there are several co accused who have been granted the benefit of bail therefore, merely because the petitioner could not arrange to deposit the balance amount, the benefit of bail ought not to be denied more so, when the investigation is complete and a chargesheet has been filed.

3. Issue notice returnable in six weeks.

4. In the meantime, the effect and operation of the order 21.07.2025 refusing extension of interim bail shall remain stayed. The petitioner shall not be required to surrender provided he submits fresh bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Trial Court within a period of two weeks from today alongwith an undertaking that he shall cooperate in the trial and shall not threaten the witnesses or tamper the evidence.”

6. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that even if the appellant had failed to deposit the amount as undertaken to be deposited by his Counsel, there was no good reason for the High Court not to decide the bail prayer on merits. He has placed reliance on a recent decision of this Court in Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1571 wherein this Court deprecated the practice of courts imposing conditions of deposits for securing bail. In paragraph 19 of the said judgment it was observed:

“19. By this order, we make it clear and that too in the form of directions that henceforth no Trial Court or any of the High Courts shall pass any order of grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on any undertaking that the accused might be ready to furnish for the purpose of obtaining appropriate reliefs.”

7. Based on the above decision, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the s