The court established the principle that a litigant's procedural missteps should not preclude them from having their substantive rights considered by the appropriate appellate forum.

ORDER

1. This civil appeal arises from an order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (for short, APTEL) dated 02.04.2014 in DFR No.2718 of 2013 by which APTEL has dismissed appellant’s appeal as not maintainable for being confined to rejection of the review petition. Besides, APTEL held the appeal to be barred since the Karnataka Electricity Regulatory Commission, Bangalore (for short, the State Commission) had taken the view that review was belated and the prayer to condone the delay was liable to be rejected.

2. This case has a checkered history, therefore, a look at the facts would be necessary. Relevant facts are as follows:

(i) On 29.04.2010, the State Commission passed an order, against which the appellant filed a misconceived appeal before the High Court by placing reliance on provisions of a State Act which stood impliedly repealed by the Electricity Act, 2003 (for short, 2003 Act). As a result, the High Court dismissed that appeal, vide order dated 13.02.2012, on the ground that appropriate remedy for the appellant would be to file an appeal before APTEL under Section 111 of the Electricity Act. While dismissing the appeal, the High Court gave liberty to the appellant to prefer an appeal under the 2003 Act within four weeks.

(ii) Instead of filing an appeal under Section 111 of the 2003 Act, the appellant chose to file a review before the High Court which came to be dismissed on 05.02.2013. While dismissing the review, the High Court granted liberty to the appellant to file an appeal before APTEL within 30 days.

(iii) As a result, the appellant finally filed an appeal before APTEL against the order dated 29.04.2010.

(iv) However, though APTEL condoned the delay in filing appeal, the appeal was dismissed vide order dated 20.05.2013 while observing that the ground on which the appeal was preferred ought to have been taken before the State Commission by filing a review. APTEL also observed that remedy for the appellant lies elsewhere.

(v) Taking a clue from the order of APTEL dated 20.05.2013, the appellant preferred a review before the State Commission seeking review of the order dated 29.04.2010.

(vi) The State Commission, vide Order dated 17.10.2013, dismissed the review petition on the ground that it was barred by limitation as sufficient cause was not shown to condone the same.

(vii) Aggrieved therewith, the appellant filed appeal before APTEL impugning not only the order passed on the review petition but also the order dated 29.04.2010. The appellant also filed an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the order dated 29.04.2010.

(viii) By the impugned order APTEL dismissed the appeal by treating the same as one preferred only against the order passed on the review petition. APTEL took the view that since the original order was not subjected to challenge and the review petition was dismissed, the appeal was not maintainable as there would be no merger of the original order with the order passed on the review petition. Besides above, APTEL took the view that there was no sufficient ground to condone the delay.

7. Assailing the order passed by APTEL, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted:

(i) APTEL overlooked that the challenge in the appeal was to the original order dated 29.04.2010 and the order passed on the review petition. In such circumstances, the view taken by APTEL that since the original order was not subjected to challenge, there being no merger of the original order in the order passed on review, the appeal was not maintainable, is erroneous and contrary to records.

(ii) Besides, the view taken by APTEL that sufficient cause for condonation of delay was not shown is contrary to the records since the appellant had been throughout litigating for his right, though he took recourse to an erroneous remedy before the High Court. However, once the High Court was satisfied that the appellant had pursue