Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. Under the said rules, part n was specifically framed in respect of the employees including the teachers in Panchayat Samithis and Zilla parishads and Part I specifically deals with the teachers and teaching staff working in Government schools. Therefore, when once the Government the already framed the rules for the teachers working in panchayat Raj Institutions, the question that arise for consideration is as to whether the Government can issue G. O. Ms. No. 538 by virtue of power conferred under sections 78 and 99 of A. P. Education Act and by virtue of the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India in respect of the same service.

( 83 ) IN A. B. Krishna v. State of karnataka, AIR 1998 SC 1050, it was observed by the Supreme Court that: "9. It is no doubt true that the rule-making authority under Article 309 of the Constitution and Section 39 of the Act is the same, namely, the Government (to be precise, the Governor, under Article 309 and the Government under section 39), but the two jurisdictions are different. As has been seen above, power under Article 309 cannot be exercised by the Governor, if the Legislature has already made a law and the field is occupied. In that situation, rules can be made under the law so made by the Legislature and not under Article 309. It has also to be noticed that rules made in exercise of the rule- making power given under an Act constitute delegated or subordinate legislation, but the rules under Article 309 cannot be treated to fall in that category and, therefore, on the principle of "occupied field", the rules under article 309 cannot supersede the rules made by the Legislature. 10. So far as the question of implied supersession of the rules made under Section 39 of the Act by the General Recruitment Rules, as amended in 1977, is concerned, it may be pointed out that the basic principle, as set out in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edn. p. 168) is that:"a general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication. Generalia specialibus non derogant, or, in other words, 'where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so'. In such cases, it is presumed to have only general cases in view, and not particular cases which have been already otherwise provided by the special Act. "11. This principle was reiterated in Vera cruz case (Seward v. Vera Cruz (1884) 10 ac 59) as under:"where there are general words in a later act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation. . . . that earlier and special legislation is not to be held indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. "12. Vera Cruz case (supra) was followed in eileen Louise Nicolle v. John Winter Nicolle (1992) (1) AC 284) as under:"it is no doubt a sound principle of all jurisprudence that a prior particular law is not easily to be held to be abrogated by a posterior law, expressed in general terms and by the apparent generality of its language applicable to and covering a number of cases of which the particular law is but one. "

( 84 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit that when once the service rules were framed by virtue of the provisions contained in 1959 Act, no further rules could be framed by virtue of proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. He thus submits that the rules having been framed in G. O. Ms. No. 278, no further rules could be made by virtue of proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of india. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid c

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