The High Court's revisional jurisdiction is limited; it cannot convert an acquittal into a conviction without manifest illegality or miscarriage of justice.

ORDER :

(Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J.)

The Revision was filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C .,’) for acquitting the Revisionist for the alleged offence under Sections 498-A , 323 , 342 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C.,’) by the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Srikalahasti in C.C.No.94 of 2005 vide judgment dated 08.12.2009.

2. Sri Challa Srinivasa Reddy, the learned Counsel for the Revisionist while reiterating the grounds of the Revision, argued that even though the prosecution could prove the guilt of the Respondent Nos.1 & 2, being A1 and A2, before the learned Magistrate, beyond all reasonable doubt, the learned Magistrate did not believe the version of the prosecution and acquit them.

3. The learned Counsel for the Revisionist further argued that P.Ws.1 & 2 had supported the case of the prosecution. P.W.1 was harassed by Respondent No.1 by maintaining illegal intimacy with one woman, who was working in his office and he got illegal contact with some other woman; Respondent No.1 indiscriminately had beat on P.W.1 and locked the door from outside by keeping P.W.1 inside; Respondent Nos.1 & 2 demanded for additional dowry from the parents of P.W.1.

4. Mr.K.Sandeep, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would argue that the learned Magistrate had rightly appreciated the evidence of all prosecution witnesses and acquitted the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 as the guilt was not proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

5. Now the point for consideration is:

“Whether the judgment in C.C..No.94 of 2005 dated 08.12.2009, passed by the learned Additional Judicial I Class Magistrate, Srikalahasti, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?”

6. It is apposite to refer the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar, [(2002) 6 SCC 650] wherein at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 it is held as under:

“12. … We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re- appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party.

13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise