SUGALABAI vs GUNDAPPA A. MARADI - 2007 Supreme(Kar) 613

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2007 Supreme(Kar) 613

Karnataka High Court
Judges : V.JAGANNATHAN
SUGALABAI - Appellant
Versus
GUNDAPPA A.MARADI - Respondent
RSA 1026 Of 2001
Decided On : 09/18/2007

Headnote:Interpretation of Statutes - Principles of - Stated. Dilatory Settled Principles: Statutory provisions which create or take away substantive rights are ordinarily prospective. They can be retrospective if made so expressly or by necessary implication and the retrospective operation must be limited only to the extent to which it has been so made either expressly or by necessary implication. (2) The intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the words used by it, giving them their plain, normal, grammatical meaning. (3) If any provision of a legislation, the purpose of which is to benefit a particular class of persons is ambiguous so that it is capable of two meanings, the meaning which preserves the benefits should be adopted. (4) If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency, such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose will be put on the words, if necessary, even by modification of the language used." In, in construing the Act, we must adhere closely to the language of the Act. If there is ambiguity in the terms of a provision, recourse must naturally be had to well established principles of construction, but it is not permissible first to create an artificial ambiguity and then try to resolve the ambiguity by resort to some general principles." The principles are so succinctly stated in American Jurisprudence (2nd Edition, Vo1.73, Page 434, Pro 366), quoted with approval in S.R.Bommai V s. Union of India (A.I.R. 1994 S.c. 1980). "While it has been held that it is duty of the courts to interpret as statute as they find it without reference to whether its provisions are expedient or inexpedient. It has also been recognised that where a statute is ambiguous and subject to more than one interpretation, the expediency of one construction or the other is properly considered. Indeed, where the arguments are nicely balanced, expediency may trip the Scales in favour of a particular construction. It is not the function of a court in the interpretation of statutes, to vindicate the wisdom of the law. The mere fact that the statute leads to unwise results is not sufficient to justify the Court in rejecting the plain meaning of unambiguous words or in giving to a statute a meaning of which its language is not susceptible, or in restricting the scope of a statute. By the same token an omission or failure to prove for contingencies, which it may seem wise to have provided for specifically, does not justify any judicial addition to the language of the statute. To the contrary, it is the duty of the Courts to interpret a statute as they find it without reference to whether its provisions are wise or unwise, necessary or unnecessary, appropriate or inappropriate, or well or in conceived." Rule of interpretation are meant to ascertain the true intent and purpose of the enactment and set right any anomaly, inconsistency or ambiguity, while giving effect to it. The several rules of interpretation when juxtapositioned may give an impression that they are inconsistent with each other. Further, the same provision, when interpreted with reference to different Rules of interpretation may lead to different results. This is because the Rules of interpretation are meant to set right different types of defects. It is not possible to apply all rules of interpretation together, to a provision of law. An appropriate rule of interpretation should be chosen as a tool depending upon the nature of the defect in drafting which has to be set right. The Rules of interpretation are to be applied in interpreting the statutes, only if there is ambiguity, inconsistency, absurdity or redundancy. Where the words are clear and unambiguous, there is little need to open the tool kit of interpretation. [AIR 1960 SC 936; ILR 2002 Kar 2304].
       Cases Referred: AIR 1951 SC 752; AIR 1956 SC 676; AIR 1979 SC 898; AIR 1939 Federal Court 74; AIR 1959 SC 648; ILR 2006 Karnataka 1158; AIR 1960 SC 335; ILR 2000 Karnataka 4809; AIR 2001 SC 1273; AIR 1996 SC 2384; AIR 1983 SC 150; ILR 2002 Karnataka 2304; AIR 1960 SC 936; (1993) 3 SCC 647; AIR 1985 SC 111; AIR 1962 Mysore 117; AIR 1999 SC 443; AIR 1954 SC 752; (2003) 1 SCC 228; ILR 2006 KAR 1158; 1960 MYS LJ 476; JT 2000 (10) SC 125; 2006 AIR SCW 2833.
       Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 - on and from as used in - Means immediately and after commencement of the Act - Effect. [V. Jagannathan, J.]: In other words, as soon as the Amending Act of 2005 was brought into force, the daughter of a coparcener becomes, by birth, a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son. Since the change in the law has already come into effect during the pendency of these appeals, it is the changed law that will have to be made applicable to the case on hand. A daughter, therefore, by birth, becomes a coparcener and there is nothing in the Central Amendment Act, 2005 to indicate that the said Amendment Act will be applicable in respect of daughter born on and after the commencement of the Amending Act of 2005. The effect of the use of the expressions "on" and "from" and the expression "by birth becomes a coparcener in her own right", therefore, will have the effect of the amended law being made applicable to the pending appeals as well.
       Cases Referred: AIR 1951 SC 752; AIR 1956 SC 676; AIR 1979 SC 898; AIR 1939 Federal Court 74; AIR 1959 SC 648; ILR 2006 Karnataka 1158; AIR 1960 SC 335; ILR 2000 Karnataka 4809; AIR 2001 SC 1273; AIR 1996 SC 2384; AIR 1983 SC 150; ILR 2002 Karnataka 2304; AIR 1960 SC 936; (1993) 3 SCC 647; AIR 1985 SC 111; AIR 1962 Mysore 117; AIR 1999 SC 443; AIR 1954 SC 752; (2003) 1 SCC 228; ILR 2006 KAR 1158; 1960 MYS LJ 476; JT 2000 (10) SC 125; 2006 AIR SCW 2833.
       Statute Law - Repugnancy of laws - State law repugnat to law made by Parliament - Can be protected by obtaining assent of President under - But, if a change is made to law made by Parliament and if it is later in point of time, it prevails over State law which is prior to change brought in by Parliament.
       Cases Referred: AIR 1951 SC 752; AIR 1956 SC 676; AIR 1979 SC 898; AIR 1939 Federal Court 74; AIR 1959 SC 648; ILR 2006 Karnataka 1158; AIR 1960 SC 335; ILR 2000 Karnataka 4809; AIR 2001 SC 1273; AIR 1996 SC 2384; AIR 1983 SC 150; ILR 2002 Karnataka 2304; AIR 1960 SC 936; (1993) 3 SCC 647; AIR 1985 SC 111; AIR 1962 Mysore 117; AIR 1999 SC 443; AIR 1954 SC 752; (2003) 1 SCC 228; ILR 2006 KAR 1158; 1960 MYS LJ 476; JT 2000 (10) SC 125; 2006 AIR SCW 2833.

V. JAGANNATHAN, J.

( 1 ) THESE two appeals are clubbed together and a common judgment is rendered in view of common question of law of considerable importance being raised concerning the question relating to a married daughter also being entitled to be treated as a co-parcener irrespective of the marriage taking place prior to the Karnataka Amendment Act, 1990 coming into force or afterwards, in view of the amendment affected to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, (for short 'the Principal act') by the State of Karnataka by The Hindu Succession (Karnataka amendment) Act, 1990 (Karnataka Act No. 23/1994), with effect from 30th July 1994 and the subsequent amendment brought to the principal Act by the Central Government by the Hindu succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (C. A. 39/2005) with effect from 9. 9. 2005.

( 2 ) BRIEFLY stating the facts, RSA No. 904/2001 is preferred by the plaintiff in the trial Court questioning the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court in modifying the share of the plaintiff/appellant from 1/4th to 1/8th on the ground that the appellant being one of the daughters was not entitled to claim partition as she was not a co-parcener and the said conclusion of the lower Appellate court therefore let to the judgment and decree of the trial Court being modified to the extent of the share of the appellant being reduced from 1/4th to 1/8th. Hence, this second appeal by the plaintiff.

( 3 ) AS far as R. S. A. No. 1026/2001 is concerned, the first defendant before the trial Court is the appellant herein and as the suit filed by the respondents-plaintiffs for declaration and separate possession came to be allowed by the trial Court and the appeal preferred by the appellant also came to be dismissed by the lower appellate Court, he is before this Court in this second appeal.

( 4 ) THE substantial questions of law raised for consideration in r. S. A. No. 904/2001 are as under:

i) Whether the court below could have decreed the suit when one of the respondents who had been granted 1/4* share had died during the pendency of the appeal and her heirs were not brought on record and whether the lower appellate court's judgment, therefore, is a nullity in the eye of law? ii) Whether the court below is justified in modifying the decree passed by the trial court?

( 5 ) AS regards R. S. A. No. 1026/2001 is concerned, this Court had framed the following substantial questions of law for consideration at the time of admission:

i) Whether the courts below were right in holding that suit schedule properties were self-acquired properties in the absence of evidence regarding source of income of the plaintiff and also without taking into consideration the presumption available under the Hindu law in respect of joint family where the parties pleaded as self-acquired properties. ii) Whether the courts below were right in applying the proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act? iii) Whether the impugned judgment of the courts below are erroneous for non-consideration of documentary evidence vide D-4, d-16 and D-18?

( 6 ) I have heard the submissions made by the learned Counsel shri K. S. Desai for the appellant in R. S. A. No. 904/2001 and the learned senior counsel Shri M. Ramabhat for respondent No. 1. Arguments were addressed by the learned Counsel Shri Gangireddy for the appellant and by Shri G. Balakrishna Shastry for the first respondent in R. S. A. No. 1026/2001, but other respondents in both the appeals though served remained unrepresented.

( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel Shri K. S. Desai for the appellant submitted that the lower appellate court was in error in reducing the share of the appellant and following the daughter being made a co-parcener by virtue of the Karnataka Amendment Act of 1990, the lower appellate court could not have taken the view that the appellant is not entitled to be treated as a Co-parcener. Referring to the Karnataka Amendment act, 1990, it was submitted that by virtue of Section 6-A of the sai

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2007 Supreme(Kar) 613

Karnataka High CourtJudges : V.JAGANNATHANSUGALABAI - AppellantVersusGUNDAPPA A.MARADI - RespondentRSA 1026 Of 2001Decided On : 09/18/2007

Cases Referred (1)

Karnataka High Court
Judges : V.JAGANNATHAN
SUGALABAI - Appellant
Versus
GUNDAPPA A.MARADI - Respondent
RSA 1026 Of 2001
Decided On : 09/18/2007