IMPORTANT POINT
The main legal point established in the judgment is that an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, requires a pre-existing right or an award passed by a competent court before initiation, and the benefit sought to be enforced under this section is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right.

ORDER :

In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 12/3/2021 in Application No.4/2019 on the file of the Labour Court, Hubballi, allowing the application in part.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties in this writ petition shall be referred to in terms of their status and ranking before the Labour Court.

3. The relevant facts for adjudication of this writ petition are that, the Applicant has filed application before the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) claiming arrears of salary by contending that the Applicant was appointed as conductor and he met with an accident in the year 1996 and thereafter, he was not able to discharge his duties and therefore, he made an application to respondent-Corporation seeking change of cadre. Thereafter, the Applicant was sent for Medical Board and Medical Board, in its certificate, stated that, Applicant is having disability to an extent of 50% and accordingly, the respondent-Corporation changed cadre of the Applicant from March 2003. It is the grievance of the petitioner that the petitioner was not able to work from 1/1/2001 till 9/3/2003 and accordingly, filed an application before the Labour Court seeking arrears of salary to an extent of Rs.2,02,049/-. The said application was contested by the respondent-corporation by filing objections stating that there is delay in approaching the Labour Court and further, the Applicant has no leave at his credit at the relevant point of time and therefore, it is contended by the respondent-corporation that relief sought by the applicant cannot be accepted.

4. In order to prove their case, the Applicant was examined as AW.1 and has not produced any document before the Labour Court. On behalf of the respondent- corporation, an Officer of the respondent-corporation was examined as RW.1 and produced 17 documents and the same were marked as Ex.R.1 to R.17. The Labour Court, after considering the material on record, by order dated 12.03.2001, allowed the Application in part, holding that, the Applicant is entitled for arrears of back wages from 01.01.2001 to 09.03.2003, without interest. Being aggrieved by the same, the Corporation has preferred this writ petition.

5. I have heard Smt. Veena Hegde, learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation and Sri. Ravi Hegde, learned counsel for the respondent-applicant.

6. Smt. Veena Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the corporation made two fold submissions. Firstly the Application made by the Applicant under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, is not maintainable on the ground of delay and laches. Secondly, she argued that, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, unless there is a pre-existing right accrued in favour of the Applicant. Accordingly, she sought for interference of this Court. To buttress her arguments, with regard to the maintainability of the Application, she places reliance on the Judgment of the Apex in the State of U.P. and another Vs. Brijpal singh, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 58 and in the case of Bombay Chemical Industries Vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner and another, reported in (2022) 5 SCC 629.

7. Per contra, learned counsel Sri. Ravi Hegde, appearing for the Applicant, sought to justify the impugned order passed by the Labour Court. He contended that, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain an Application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, as already pre-existing right accrued in favour of the Applicant as there is no dispute with regard to the payment of arrears of salary by the respondent- corporation. He also invited the attention of the Court to Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and argued that, in view of the disability suffered by the Applicant on account of accident, there is no need to approach the Labour Court prior to filing of an Application und