JUDGMENT :

1. The succinct distinction between ‘venue’ and ‘seat’ of arbitration is one of the most hotly debated aspects of arbitration in India, though for some time a quietus was put, to it, by a Five-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhartiya Aluminium Company (for short, BALCO) Vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services INC, (2012) 9 SCC 552, but unfortunately after a decade of it’s authoritative pronouncement, once again the debate between the ‘venue’ and ‘seat’ has reappeared, in the wake of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 568.

2. This enigma is placed before me through the present case, where the counter arguments are advanced on issue, whether prescription of mere, ‘venue’ in the arbitration clause contained in the ‘Lease Agreement’ would confer jurisdiction on this Court to appoint an Arbitrator, as prayed in the application, particularly when the subject matter of the suit would fall outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

3. The applicant before me is a Private Limited Company, registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, inter alia, engaged in the business of manufacturing of Mustard oil, having it’s plant at Ganganagar, Rajasthan. The respondent is also engaged in the business of production, processing and preservation of edible oil.

The applicant and the respondent entered into a Lease Agreement on 01/04/2019, wherein the Mustard Oil Plant belonging to the applicant, and located in Rajasthan was leased out to the respondent, by executing a Lease Agreement in Indore (State of Madhya Pradesh).

The Lease Agreement executed on 01/04/2019, expired on 31/03/2020 and the respondent came with an offer to extend the arrangement for a further period of seven years. Correspondence was exchanged between the parties for extension of the existing Lease and, ultimately on October 20, 2020, the Lease Agreement was renewed and it became effective from 01/01/2021, where the monthly license rental was agreed at Rs.3,00,000/- per month. However, the Lessor sought to terminate the said Agreement, by issuing a notice of termination to the respondent, as contemplated in the Lease Agreement, by seeking vacant peaceful possession of it’s manufacturing plant, failing which it was notified that the respondent is liable to pay rent of Rs.15,00,000/- per month.

This notice was contested by submitting that the termination is illegal and not binding. The notice period expired on September 19, 2021 and on 13/10/2021, the applicant forwarded a notice for termination of the Lease Agreement and invoked arbitration on 24/11/2021 as per clause 20 of the Lease Agreement. The respondent con tested the invocation of arbitration, by submitting it’s reply.

4. Since the disputes arose between the applicant and the respondent, out of the Lease Agreement, which comprised of clause for referring the disputes for arbitration and since the parties failed to reach a consensus to negotiate the arbitration proceedings, within 30 days of the invocation notice, the applicant has approached this Court, with a request to exercise the power of the Court under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “The Act of 1996”).

5. I have heard the learned counsel Mr. Bidan Chandran for the Applicant and Mr. Kunal Vaishnav for the respondent.

SUBMISSIONS ADVANCED

The contentions raised by them in support of the applicant and the respondent are briefly culled out in the subsequent paragraphs.

6. The learned counsel for the applicant would justify the relief, for appointment of a sole Arbitrator, at the hands of this Court, by relying upon the following decisions of the Apex Court, which according to him, has sealed the position of law, to the effect that the seat of arbitration is it’s centre of gravity, as laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of BALCO (supra).

Reliance is placed particularly on paragr