The appealability of composite orders and the entitlement of the assessee to seek stay of the recovery of disputed dues, including interest, under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, Sections 26(6A) and 26(6B, should not be restricted by the bar to appealability under Section 85(2)(b-3).

JUDGMENT :

G.S. KULKARNI, J.

1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenges an order dated 30 September, 2019 passed by the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal at Mumbai (for short, “the tribunal”) on a stay application filed by the petitioner praying for stay of the order dated 27 March, 2018 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Appeals) IV, Mumbai (the ‘first appellate authority’). By the impugned order, while admitting the petitioner’s second appeal, the petitioner’s stay application has been partly allowed, whereby although stay is granted to the petitioner on the tax as demanded, stay has been refused on the order qua the interest amount of Rs. 3,60,932/-, as demanded under Section 30(2) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (for short, the “Act”), forming part of the order as appealed.

2. The assessment in question is for the period 2012-13. The Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax passed an assessment order inter alia holding that the petitioner is liable to pay tax of Rs.34,85,603/-and interest under Section 30(2) and 30(3) of the Act, quantified at Rs.3,60,932/- and Rs.20,38,268/- respectively. Further, penalty under Section 29(3) of the Act was levied at Rs.8,71,401/-. In pursuance of such order passed by the Assessing Officer, the petitioner deposited an amount of Rs.56,00,000/-. Thus, the balance amount including interest amount and penalty as payable by the petitioner was an amount of Rs. 61,96,204/-.

3. The order passed by the Assessing Officer was carried by the petitioner in a first appeal (First Appeal No. VAT-495/2017-18) filed under Section 26(6A) of the Act, which came to be adjudicated by an order dated 27 March, 2018 passed by the first appellate authority. By such order the first appellate authority partly allowed the petitioner’s appeal, thereby modifying the assessment order, with a direction to the assessing authority to recover the balance dues along with appropriate amount of interest and proceed further as per the provisions of law. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order passed by the first appellate authority, approached the tribunal in a second appeal (VAT Second Appeal No. 1109 of 2018), in which the stay application in question was filed by the petitioner, on which the impugned order has been passed.

4. The grievance of the petitioner is in regard to the tribunal holding that the petitioner’s appeal qua the challenge to the demand of interest as ordered by the first appellate authority, in terms of what Section 30(2) of the Act would provide, itself being not maintainable and the petitioner’s stay application qua the order on interest, accordingly being rejected. It is the petitioner’s contention that the tribunal has not considered and/or has overlooked that the order impugned before it was not merely an order under Section 30(2), however, it was a composite order passed by the appellate authority. It is submitted that the subject matter of the first appeal was the assessment order passed by the assessing authority under Section 23 of the Act, which itself was a composite order, from which an appeal was filed by the petitioner before the first appellate authority as per provisions of sub-section (6A) of Section 26 of the Act.

5. The petitioner has contended that once the nature of order passed by the first appellate authority itself was a composite order, it was not correct for the tribunal to dissect such composite order by bifurcating/ separating the order as to the interest component and to reject the petitioner’s stay application qua the interest amount as demanded under Section 30(2) of the Act. This more particularly as the subject matter of assail and consideration before the tribunal was a composite order passed by the first appellate authority in the petitioner’s second appeal.

6. In supporting the above contentions, Mr. Thakar, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the Court’s attention to the relevant provisions of the Act being th