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2023 Supreme(Bom) 2307

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
M.S. Sonak, Bharat P. Deshpande, JJ.
Mahendra Ladu Sawant - Appellant
Versus
State - Respondent
Criminal Writ Petition No. 3 of 2020
Decided On : 06-09-2023

Advocates appeared:
A.D.Bhobe, Advocate, A.Fernandes, Advocate, S.Shaikh, Advocate, Ramona Prazeres, Advocate, Pravin Faldesssai, Advocate, S.Shetye, Advocate, V.Amonkar, Advocate

IMPORTANT POINT
Consent obtained under a false promise or misconception does not constitute valid consent for the purposes of Sec. 375 of IPC; a mere breach of promise does not amount to rape.

Headnote:

RAPE - Consent and False Promise - Sec. 375, Sec. 90 of IPC, Sec. 482 of CrPC - The court discussed the legal definitions of consent under Sec. 375 of IPC, emphasizing that consent obtained under fear or misconception is not valid. It highlighted the distinction between a false promise and a mere breach of promise, referencing several Supreme Court cases that clarify the conditions under which consent is considered valid. The court concluded that the allegations did not establish the elements of rape as defined by law, leading to the quashing of the FIR.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, accused in FIR No.151/2018 for an alleged rape under Sec. 376 of IPC, sought to quash the FIR claiming that the relationship with the complainant was consensual and based on a love relationship, not a false promise of marriage.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the relationship was consensual and that the complainant's allegations did not establish the necessary elements of rape under Sec. 375 of IPC. The court noted that the complainant had consented to the relationship and that the complaint arose after she suspected the accused of infidelity.

Issues: Whether the allegations in the FIR constituted an offence under Sec. 376 of IPC, particularly regarding the nature of consent and the existence of a false promise of marriage.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that consent must be free and informed, and that a mere breach of promise does not equate to rape. The court referenced previous judgments to clarify that the promise must be false from the inception to constitute an offence under Sec. 375.

Final Decision: The court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR, concluding that the allegations did not prima facie constitute an offence under Sec. 376 of IPC.

JUDGMENT/ORDER

BHARAT P.DESHPANDE, J. - Rule. The rule is made returnable forthwith. The matter is taken up for final disposal with the consent of the learned Counsel for the respective parties.

2. Heard Mr. A.D. Bhobe with Ms. A. Fernandes, Ms. S. Shaikh and Ms Ramona Prazeres, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Pravin Faldesssai, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. S. Shetye h/f Mr. V. Amonkar, learned Counsel for respondent No.3.

3. The petitioner, who is an accused in FIR No.151/2018 lodged on 01/11/2018 for the offence punishable under Sec. 376, on a complaint made by respondent No.3, preferred the present petition under Sec. 482 of CrPC praying for quashing of such FIR.

4. Mr Bhobe learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that ingredients of Sec. 375 of IPC are not at all made out in the present matter since the complainant disclosed that she, along with the accused, were having a love relationship and were staying together. He would then submit that physical contact was not on the promise of marriage. Such physical contact was with the consent of respondent No.3, and only when she suspected another girl in the life of the petitioner she filed the complaint.

5. Mr. Bhobe would submit that, at the most, it could be considered as a breach of promise, and there was no such promise from the inception, only with an intention to cheat. He placed reliance on the following decisions:

1. Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [2022 SCC OnLine SC 1032]

2. Sonu alias Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [2021 SCC OnLine SC 181]

3. Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2019) 18 SCC 191]

4. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and another [(2019) 9 SCC 608]

5. Rajesh Sankarsan Tripathy v. State of Maharashtra and another [2019 SCC OnLine Bom 2376]

6. Tikal Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh [(2016) 4 SCC 140]

7. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [(2013) 7 SCC 675]

8. Uday v. State of Karnataka [(2003) 4 SCC 46]

6. The learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Faldessai would submit that the complaint disclosed that there was a promise to marry, and under that pretext, the physical relationship developed, but subsequently, the complainant realised that the petitioner made such a false promise and, therefore offence under Sec. 376 is made out.

7. Mr. S. Shetye h/f. Mr. Vibhav Amonkar would submit that the complaint itself shows that there was a promise to marry, and only on that basis the petitioner took advantage and developed physical relationship with the complainant and subsequently, it was observed that there was a false promise. He would submit that the aspect as to whether the promise from the inception was to deceive and to obtain consent by a misconception will have to be gone into during trial. He would submit that at this stage and from the contents of the FIR, which is supportive of the medicate evidence, ingredients of Sec. 376 of IPC are clearly made out.

8. The rival contentions fall for determination.

9. Sec. 375 of IPC deals with "Rape", wherein clause (d), secondly, it refers to "without her consent".

10. The question of consent is also covered under Sec. 90 of IPC, which reads thus :

    "Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.-A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any sec. of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or"

11. Thus, when consent is either obtained under fear of injury or misconception of fact, it cannot be termed as free consent in the eyes of law and specifically for the offences under IPC.

12. The Supreme Court held that consent with respect to Sec. 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasone

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