IMPORTANT POINT
The interpretation of procedural rules, particularly the distinction between mandatory and permissive language, is crucial in determining the court's authority to grant interim relief in the context of appeals, ensuring that the rights of parties are preserved during the appeal process.

ORDER

1. By these interim applications, the Applicants are seeking stay of the operation, implementation and execution of the respective impugned judgments and awards passed by the respective Motor Accident Claims Tribunals.

2. Since an issue was raised with respect to the interpretation/construction of sub-rule (3) of Rule 3-A of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( the 'CPC') which directs that the Court shall not make order of stay of execution pending disposal of the application for condonation of delay made under Order XLI Rule 3-A (1) as to whether the said Rule was imperative or permissive, this Court had vide order dated 3rd August, 2023 in Interim Applications no. 13789 of 2023 and 13790 of 2023 in First Appeal Stamp No. 15533 of 2023 after briefly hearing the learned Counsel for the applicant in the light of Division Bench decision of this Court ( by Hon'ble Shri Justice G. H. Guttal and Hon'ble Shri Justice P. V. Nirgudkar, as their Lordships then were) in the case of Bhagwan s/Ganpantrao Godsay Vs. Kachrulal s/Bastimal Samdariya and in connected matters Civil Revision Applications No. 6, 8, 9 and 10 of 1986 decided on 23rd January, 1987 had invited other learned Counsel appearing in similar applications and desirous of addressing the Court on the issue whether the use of the word 'shall' in Order XLI Rule 3-A (3) is permissive or imperative.

3. Accordingly, on 11th August, 2023, learned Counsel had addressed this Court on the issue and the arguments had been concluded and orders were reserved. The learned Counsel were also granted liberty to summarise their arguments and submit the same in the form of written submissions.

4. I have now had the occasion to consider the submissions made on behalf of the learned Counsel and also perused the judgments in support.

5. Mr. Pandey, learned Counsel upon invitation of this Court has drawn the attention firstly to the provisions of Rule 279 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (the 'MV Rules') to submit as to how the provisions of Order XLI of the CPC apply to appeals under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the 'MV Act'). For the sake of convenience, the said Rule is usefully quoted as under:-

'279. Form of appeal and contents of memorandum.- (1) Every appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or an Advocate or Attorney of the High Court duly authorised in that behalf by the applicant and presented to High Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf. This memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the award.

(2) The memorandum shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the award appealed from without any argument or narrative, and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively.

(3) Save as provided in sub-rules (1) and (2) the provisions of Order XXI and Order XLI in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, l908 (V of l 908), shall, mutatis mutandis apply to appeals preferred to High Court under Section 173.'

6. For the sake of completeness Section 173 of the MV Act, which provides for appeals under the Act is also usefully quoted as under:-

'173. Appeals.-(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:

Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court, unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent. of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court:

Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.

(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the