IMPORTANT POINT
The presence of some evidence in a domestic inquiry is sufficient to uphold findings, and the standard of proof is based on preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt.

JUDGMENT :

1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the learned counsel appearing for parties, the Petitions are taken up for final disposal.

2. The challenge in the present Petitions is to the Part-I Awards dated 15 July 2022 passed by the Labour Court No.3, Pune by which the enquiry conducted against Respondents is found to be fair, proper and not in violation of principles of natural justice. The Labour Court has however held that the findings of the enquiry officer are perverse. The employer has filed these Petitions to the limited extent of the findings of the Labour Court about perversity in the findings of the enquiry officer.

3. Before proceeding further with merits of the Petitions, it is necessary to first deal with preliminary objection raised by Mr. Kshirsagar, the learned counsel appearing for Respondents about maintainability of the Petitions. According to him Part-I Award deciding the issues of fairness in inquiry and perversity in findings cannot be challenged during pendency of determination of remaining issues by way of Part-II Award. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in The Cooper Engineering Ltd. vs. P.P. Mundhe, AIR 1975 SC 1900 he would submit that the Apex Court has held in paragraph 22 of the judgment as under:

22. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication the labour court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the labour court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, It will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the line issue. We should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication.

(emphasis and underlining added)

4. Mr. Kshirsagar has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in D.P. Maheshwari V/s. Delhi Administration and others, AIR 1984 SC 153 in which it is held in paragraph 5 as under:

5. Curiously enough, the Learned Single Judge of the High Court affirmed the finding of the Labour Court that D.P. Maheshwari was not employed in a supervisory capacity. He said,

"In the face of this material and the admitted hypothesis the conclusion that the respondent was not mainly employed in a supervisory capacity is certainly a possible conclusion that may be arrived at by any Tribunal duly instructed in the law as to the manner in which the status of an employee may be determined. It is, therefore, not possible for this Court to disturb such a conclusion having regard to the limited admit of review of the impugned order."

Having so held, the Learned Single Judge went on to consider whether the workman was discharging duties of a clerical nature. He found that it would be difficult to say that D.P. Maheswari was discharging 'routine duties of a clerical nature which did not involve initiative, imagination, creativity and a limited power of self direction.' The Learned Single Judge did not refer to a single item of evidence in support of the conclusions thus recorded by him. He appeared to differ from the Labour Court on a question of fact on the basis of a generalisation without reference to specific evidence. No appellate court is entitled t