IMPORTANT POINT
Immunity against No Confidence Motion is calculated from the date of election of the first Sarpanch, not subsequent elections, ensuring stability in the democratic process.

JUDGMENT :

SHARMILA U. DESHMUKH, J.

1. Rule. With consent, Rule made returnable forthwith and taken up for final hearing.

2. The question which arises for consideration is the meaning which should be given to the words “date of election of Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch” occurring in the 4th proviso to sub Section 3 of Section 35 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958 (Village Panchayats Act) for the purpose of computing period of two years of immunity. The dispute is whether the immunity of two years against No Confidence Motion is to be computed from the date of election of the first Sarpanch or from the date when the new Sarpanch is elected by filling the vacancy occurred in the manner provided under Section 43 of Village Panchayats Act.

3. The undisputed facts are that on 15th January 2021 elections were held for Village Panchayat Bhavdi, Taluka Haveli District Pune. On 9th February 2021, the Respondent No. 8 was elected as Sarpanch. On 29th November, 2021 the Respondent No. 8 resigned from the post of Sarpanch and on 27th December 2021 the Petitioner was elected unopposed as the Sarpanch of the Village Panchayat. On 13th December, 2023 Respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 7 to 11 moved No Confidence Motion against the Petitioner. On 13th December, 2023 notice was issued by the Respondent No. 2-Tehsildar for convening the special Meeting and on 19th December 2023, the motion of no confidence was carried against the Petitioner.

4. Heard Mr. Dani, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, Mr. Anturkar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Respondent Nos. 5, 7, 8, 9 and 11 and Mr. Pawar, AGP appearing for the Respondent-State.

5. Mr. Dani, would submit that the 4th proviso to Section 35 (3) of the Village Panchayats Act makes clear reference to the “date of election of Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch and the same implies that it is referable to the person and not to the post. He submits that the definition of Sarpanch contained in Section 3 (17) of the Village Panchayats Act includes directly elected Sarpanch as well as Sarpanch elected under Section 43. He submits that Section 43 of the Village Panchayats Act refers to the term of office of the Sarpanch i.e. remainder period of the term of the Panchayat whereas the 4th proviso to Section 35(3) refers to the grant of immunity and date of election which will not relate back to the date of the first meeting held for election of Sarpanch. He would submit that in case of directly elected Sarpanch the first proviso to Section 35(1A) provides that motion of no confidence shall not be brought within a period of two years from the date of election of Sarpanch and would submit that in case there is change in Sarpanch the next Sarpanch will get immunity from the no confidence motion which will be counted from the date of his election and the same meaning has to be given to the 4th proviso to Section 35 (3). He would submit that the immunity is available to the person elected on the said post and not the post. He submits that what is crucial is the date of entering office and it cannot be assumed that the date of election would be the date of election of the first Sarpanch. He submits that the legislative intent is that there should be stability in democratic set up as a Grampanchayat and therefore the meaning which is required to be ascribed must be the one which furthers the intention of the legislature i.e. two years from the date the Sarpanch enters the office. He draws support from the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Rajaram Patil vs. State of M.P. 2002 (5) M.P.L.J. 513.

6. Per contra, Mr. Anturkar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Respondent Nos. 5, 7, 8, 9 and 11 would submit that the immunity which is granted by the 4th proviso to Section 35(3) is only for a period of two years from the date of first election. He would submit that acceptance of Petitioner’s interpretation would render the statutory provisions meaningless as in that eventuality the second