Effective service of an arbitral award must be made directly to the parties involved; service on an employee does not suffice to commence the limitation period.

JUDGMENT :

A.S. Chandurkar, J.

1. Admit. The Arbitration Appeal is taken up for final disposal.

2. This appeal filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration andConciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “Act of 1996”) raises a challenge to the order dated 1^st April 2024 passed in Interim Application (Lodging) No.2154 of 2024 (M/s. Health Care, Medical & General Stores and Ors. Vs. M/s. Amulya Investment, through Proprietor Mr. Sameer Gurunath Narvekar and Ors.). By that order, the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the Arbitration Petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 has been rejected by holding that the Arbitration Petition was filed beyond the permissible period of three months from passing of the award as well as further period of thirty days as provided under Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996.

3. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The 1^st respondent – Amulya Investment, a proprietary firm had business dealings with a partnership firm. Letters dated 15^th January 2016 and 7^th February 2016 exchanged between the parties contained an arbitration clause. The proprietary firm - Claimant invoked the arbitration clause in the light of disputes arising between it and the appellants. The 1^st appellant – M/s. Health Care, Medical & General Stores – hereinafter referred to as “the Partnership Firm” comprised of three partners being the 2^nd and 3^rd appellant as well as the 2^nd respondent. The learned Arbitrator passed his award on 1^st July 2017 holding the Claimant entitled to various reliefs. It is the case of the Partnership Firm through its partners as well as the partners who wereparties to the arbitration proceedings that they were not served in the said proceedings before the Arbitrator. It was only when the copy of the award was declined to be served on them by the Arbitrator on 10^th August 2023 that the limitation for filing proceedings under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 commenced. The Arbitration Petition was accordingly filed on 7^th September 2023. The learned Single Judge after hearing both sides recorded a finding that a signed copy of the award had been served on the Partnership Firm as well as its partners on 5^th July 2017. On the ground that the Arbitration Petition was filed beyond the permissible period of limitation including the extended period under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996, the proceedings were dismissed as being barred by limitation. Being aggrieved, the Partnership Firm and its two partners have filed this appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996.

4. Mr. Rohaan Cama, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the learned Arbitrator had signed the award on 1^st July 2017 and had issued two stamped original copies, one for each party. This would indicate that of the two signed copies, one was probably sent to the Partnership Firm while the other was sent to the Claimant. Under Section 31 of the Act of 1996, it was necessary for the Arbitrator to send a copy of the signed award to each party to the arbitration proceedings. In the arbitration proceedings before the learned Arbitrator there were fiveparties, namely, the Claimant, the Partnership Firm and its three partners. This indicated that the three partners were not served with a signed copy of the award and therefore it could not be said that the period of limitation for challenging the award dated 1^st July 2017 had even commenced. Referring to the acknowledgments that were placed on record, it was submitted that on the acknowledgments pertaining to the Partnership Firm and two partners, the signature of one Mr. Botekar who was stated to be a Clerk employed with the Partnership Firm could be seen. The acknowledgment insofar as the 3^rd appellant was concerned was unsigned. The Clerk Mr. Botekar had not been authorized to receive the envelopes and therefore it could not be said that the signed award had been served on the parties as required by law. To constitute effective service of an award, it ought to be served o