IMPORTANT POINT
The reckoning point for limitation under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act begins only upon the party receiving the signed copy of the arbitral award, not merely upon its delivery to an advocate.

JUDGMENT :

RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD,  J.

Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent no.1 as also perused the records. This Court has been informed that respondent no.2 is not a necessary party and no notice need be served upon respondent no.2.

2. The present appeal has been preferred for setting aside the order dated 22.03.2024 passed by the learned District Judge, Patna in Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case No.115 of 2022. By the impugned order, the learned court has been pleased to dismiss the miscellaneous case on the ground of its being barred by limitation.

3. It appears on perusal of the records that being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the arbitral award dated 25.04.2022, the present appellant presented a Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1996’) for setting aside of the award. The Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case was presented/filed on 30.08.2022. The Sheristedar of the court placed a report saying that there is a delay of 37 days in filing of the miscellaneous case.

4. It further appears that at the time of hearing of the miscellaneous case, no one appeared on behalf of the appellant. The learned District Judge, Patna heard learned counsel for the respondents, perused the records and having noticed that there is a delay of 37 days in filing of the case which is more than the maximum period which may be condoned by the court in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, decided to dismiss the miscellaneous case as being barred by limitation.

5. In appeal before us, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned District Judge has erred in appreciating the true import of the scheme of the Statute i.e. the Act of 1996. Referring to Section 31 of the Act of 1996, learned counsel submits that sub-section (5) of mandates that after the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party.

6. It is submitted that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34 for filing an application for setting aside of the award is three months. Sub-section (3) provides that an application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award. Thus, a conjoint reading of sub-section (5) of Section 31 and sub-section (3) of would make it clear that the reckoning point for computation of the period of limitation is the date on which the party making the application had received the arbitral award.

7. It is further submitted that under proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 , the court is empowered to condone a delay after the stipulated period of three months but the maximum period which may be condoned by the court shall not exceed beyond a period of thirty days.

8. In the aforementioned background, learned counsel submits that in the case of Union of India Vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 239 and in the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee & Others VS. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 9 SCC 496, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the meaning of the word ‘delivery of a signed copy of the Arbitral Award on the party’. Learned counsel has relied upon the opinion of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as recorded in paragraph ‘15’ of the judgment in the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee (supra). It is submitted that on perusal of the impugned award, it would appear that in this case the learned arbitral tribunal after signing of the arbitral award recorded that a co