IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD, PRAVEEN KUMAR, JJ.
The New India Assurance Company Limited - Appellants
Versus
Krishna City Hospital Represented through Dr. Manoj Kumar Jayaswal Male - Respondents
Commercial Appeal No.6 Of 2024
Decided On : 04-02-2026
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – Setting aside arbitral award – Service of arbitral award on General Manager by way of receipt in his inwards office cannot be taken to be sufficient notice so as to activate Department to take appropriate steps in respect of and in regard to award passed by Arbitrators to constitute starting point of limitation for the purposes of Section 34(3) of Act – Mere receipt of a signed copy of impugned award on emails of Advocate of respondent-appellant and then forwarding of said e-mail with his opinion by Advocate to his client cannot be taken to have satisfied mandate of sub-section (5) of Section 31 of Act of 1996 – Reckoning date for period of limitation in this case would be date on which copy of arbitral award was received by appellant through registered post – Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case is within time – Appeal allowed. (Paras 16, 18, 20 and 21)
Cases Referred:
Government of Maharashtra vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 460 – Distinguished.
Union of India vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239; Benarsi Krishna Committee vs. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 9 SCC 496; Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Department of Ports, Government of India vs. Ernst and Young Pvt. Ltd. (Now known as Ernst and Young LLP), 2023:DHC:6055; Continental Telepower Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2009 SCC OnLine Del. 1859 – Relied.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. case introduction and dismissal basis (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4) |
| 2. arguments on limitation period and delivery of award (Para 5 , 6 , 7 , 9 , 10) |
| 3. analysis of compliance with delivery provisions (Para 12 , 13 , 14 , 16 , 18 , 19) |
| 4. substantive legal outcome based on findings (Para 17) |
JUDGMENT :
RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD, J.
Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the contesting respondent no.1 as also perused the records. This Court has been informed that respondent no.2 is not a necessary party and no notice need be served upon respondent no.2.
2. The present appeal has been preferred for setting aside the order dated 22.03.2024 passed by the learned District Judge, Patna in Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case No.113 of 2022. By the impugned order, the learned court has been pleased to dismiss the miscellaneous case on the ground of its being barred by limitation.
3. It appears on perusal of the records that being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the arbitral award dated 25.04.2022, the present appellant presented a Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1996’) for setting aside of the award. The Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case was presented/filed on 26.08.2022. The Sheristedar of the court placed a report saying that there is a delay of 33 days in filing of the miscellaneous case.
4. It further appears that at the time of hearing of the miscellaneous case, no one appeared on behalf of the appellant. The learned District Judge, Patna heard learned counsel for the respondents, perused the records and having noticed that there is a delay of 33 days in filing of the case which is more than the maximum period which may be condoned by the court in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, decided to dismiss the miscellaneous case as being barred by limitation.
5. In appeal before us, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned District Judge has erred in appreciating the true import of the scheme of the Statute i.e. the Act of 1996. Referring to Section 31 of the Act of 1996, learned counsel submits that sub-section (5) of Section 31 mandates that after the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party.
6. It is submitted that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34 for filing an application for setting aside of the award is three months. Sub-section (3) provides that an application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award. Thus, a conjoint reading of sub-section (5) of Section 31 and sub-section (3) of Section 34 would make it clear that the reckoning point for computation of the period of limitation is the date on which the party making the application had received the arbitral award.
7. It is further submitted that under proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 , the court is empowered to condone a delay after the stipulated period of three months but the maximum period which may be condoned by the court shall not exceed beyond a period of thirty days.
8. In the aforementioned background, learned counsel submits that in the case of Union of India Vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 239 and in the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee & Others VS. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 9 SCC 496, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the meaning of the word ‘delivery of a signed copy of the Arbitral Award on the party’. Learned counsel has relied upon the opinion of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as recorded in paragraph ‘15’ of the judgment in the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee (supra). It is submitted that on perusal of the impugned award, it would appear that in this case the learned arbitral tribunal after signing of the arbitral award recorded that a copy of the singed award is delivered to the claimant and
Union of India Vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors
Benarsi Krishna Committee & Others Vs. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd.
Government of Maharashtra Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Private Ltd.
The reckoning point for filing an application for setting aside an arbitral award is the date of receipt of the signed copy, not merely the signing, with strict requirements for delivery under the Ar....
The reckoning point for limitation under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act begins only upon the party receiving the signed copy of the arbitral award, not merely upon its delivery to an advocate.
The court established that non-compliance with the mandatory delivery of the arbitral award affects the limitation period for filing an application to set aside the award.
Effective service of an arbitral award must be made directly to the parties involved; service on an employee does not suffice to commence the limitation period.
The limitation period for challenging an arbitral award under Sections 31(5) and 34(3) of the Arbitration Act begins upon receipt of a signed copy, making timely receipt crucial for valid appeals.
Limitation for setting aside an arbitral award commences on receipt of a signed copy; photocopies satisfy statutory requirements under modern arbitration practices.
The necessity of delivering a signed copy of the arbitral award to each party to begin the running of the limitation period under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
The issue of stamping and executability of an Award should be determined at the execution stage, not under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The limitation period for challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, commences only from the date the aggrieved party receives a signed copy of the aw....
Compliance with Sec. 31(5) of the Act of 1996 regarding the delivery of the arbitration award to each party is crucial in commencing the period of limitation for filing objections under Sec. 34(3) of....
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