G.N.PRASAD, J.

1. This Bench of five Judges has been constituted for the purpose of deciding whether the view taken by this court in Raja Singh V/s. Mahendra Singh, (AIR 1963 Pat 243 (FB)) is correct. In that case the Full Bench has held, by a majority of 2 to 1, that in exercise of its revisional cowers under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), the High Court can, in suitable cases, interfere with the decision of the Civil Court given by it under Sub-Section (1-A) upon a reference made to it under Sub-Section (1) of Sec.146 of the Code after the referring Magistrate has disposed of the proceeding under Sec.145 under Sub-Section (1-B), and that the bar as to appeal, review and revision imposed by Sub-Section (1-D) operates only so long as the Magistrate has not passed his order under Sub-Section (1-B) of Sec.146. But the bar is lifted when the finding of the Civil Court has been "adopted by the Magistrate and order passed upon its basis", because it is only such a finding that "becomes a part of the order of the Magistrate and is integrated into it that it becomes operative and binding upon the parties". The minority view expressed by Sahai, J., on the other hand, is that the bar of Sub-Section (1-D) continues even after the Magistrate has disposed of the proceeding under Sub-Section (1-B). All the three learned Judges constituting the Full Bench are, however, agreed that nothing in Sub-Section (1-D) affects the power of Superintendence which the High Court enjoys under Article 227 of the Constitution, and that despite the provision contained in Sub-Section (1-D), it is open to this Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction to strike down the finding of the Civil Court where "a flagrant violation of legal principles, or principles of natural Justice" is disclosed.

2. In my judgement, the correctness of this unanimous view taken in Raja Singhs case, AIR 1963 Pat 243 (FB) cannot be called in question. It is well-settled that the power of superintendence which has been conferred upon the High Court over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not confined to administrative matters only, but also includes the power of judicial revision. It is also well settled that this power cannot be curtailed or whittled down by any enactment short of a constitutional amendment. In my Judgement the law on the subject has been correctly expounded in Jodhev V/s. State, (AIR 1952 All 788). In re Annamalai Mudaliar, (AIR 1953 Mad 362) and Israil Khan V/s. The State, (AIR 1951 Assam 106).

3. In Jodhevs case, (AIR 1952 All 788), the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court had occasion to consider the impact of Section 85 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act (26 of 1947) upon the High Courts power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Sub-Section (1) of Section 85 gave power to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, inter alia, to quash any decree or order passed by a Panchayati Adalat if in his opinion there was a miscarriage of Justice or apprehension of miscarriage of Justice in any case, and Sub-Section (5) provided that :

"Except as aforesaid, a decree or order passed by a Panchayati Adalat in any suit, case or proceeding under this Act shall be final and shall not be open to appeal or revision in any Court."

Nasir Ullah Beg, J. traced the history of the constitutional legislation leading up to the enactment of Article 227 of the Constitution, and observed at page 729 as follows :-

"A reading of the entire Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the light of the antecedent law on the subject leads one to the irresistible conclusion that the purpose of the constitution makers was to make the High Court responsible for the entire administration of Justice and to vest in the High Court an unlimited reserve of Judicial power which could be brought into play at any t