P. B. Bajanthri, J.—Heard learned counsels for the respective parties.

2. In the instant appeal, appellant has assailed the order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.07.2018 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6898 of 2002.

3. The appellant was subjected to disciplinary proceedings and it was concluded in imposition of penalty of dismissal from service on 02.05.2000 and it was affirmed by the appellate authority on 30.04.2002. Still aggrieved by the order of the disciplinary and appellate authorities, appellant invoked remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution before this Court in filing C.W.J.C. No. 6898 of 2002 and it was decided against appellant on 02.07.2018. Hence the present L.P.A. 1235 of 2018.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant restricted his argument for the time being that appellate authority’s order dated 30.04.2002 is not a speaking order with reference to memorandum of appeal dated 23.05.2000. Appellate authority’s order reads as under:—

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5. Prima facie the appellate authority has not considered each of the contentions stated in the memorandum of appeal dated 23.05.2000. It was bounden duty of the appellate authority to examine each of the contentions raised by the appellant in his memorandum of appeal. Apex Court in the case of Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall vs. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and Others reported in (2010) 3 SCC 732 held that appellate authority’s order must be reasoned and speaking order. Further in the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, Para 47 elaborately considered as how the judicial, quasi-judicial and other orders should be. Para 47 reads as under:—

“47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justi