Jitendra Kumar, J.—The present petition under Section 482 Cr.PC has been preferred by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 01.07.2016, passed by learned Special Judge, Vigilance- Ist, Patna in Special Case No. 7 of 1999, whereby the application of the petitioner for discharge has been rejected finding that there are sufficient materials on record to charge the petitioner under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. As per the allegation, the petitioner while holding the post of Superintending Engineer in Public Health Engineering Department, Bihar, Patna, has made illegal appointments and promotions without following the rules and regulations. The petitioner retired on 31.01.1998 as a Superintending Engineer and departmental proceeding was started on 08.05.2000. As per the inquiry report, the petitioner was found to be guilty of illegal appointments of 15 persons. However, against the finding and the punishment arising out of inquiry report, the petitioner moved this Court under writ jurisdiction vide C.W.J.C. No. 13390 of 2000, wherein learned writ Court set aside the inquiry report dated 24.07.2000 and consequent order of punishment dated 30.11.2000, finding that the whole finding of the Inquiry Officer was perverse in view of failure of the department to supply the relevant documents in support of the allegation. Learned writ Court also rejected the prayer of the department for remanding the matter for fresh inquiry, because learned writ Court did not deem it fit to expose the petitioner to harassment at this stage of life. The writ Court order dated 31.01.2008 was challenged in L.P.A. No. 687 of 2008, wherein learned L.P.A. Court also upheld the order of learned writ Court vide order dated 26.11.2008, though L.P.A. Court has clarified that there would be no impediment for the State Government to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner from the stage of service of charge memo dated 08.05.2000.

3. I heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Amicus Curiae and learned counsel for the Vigilance Department.

4. Learned Amicus Curiae and learned counsel for the petitioner submit that the impugned order whereby the application of the petitioner for discharge has been rejected is not sustainable in the eye of law.

5. To substantiate their submissions, they submit that the prosecution has been started on the same set of facts as those of the departmental proceeding in which the petitioner stands exonerated after the order of the Writ and L.P.A. Courts. They further submit that the standard of proof in departmental proceeding is just preponderance of probability, whereas the standard of proof in criminal trial is much higher as the prosecution is required to prove the charge by proof beyond reasonable doubts and if the state has failed to meet the standard of preponderance of probability in the departmental proceeding, there is no question of the state to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt in criminal trial. Hence, the outcome of the criminal trial against the petitioner is foregone conclusion and hence, subjecting the petitioner at the fag end of his life to such criminal proceeding would be highly unfair. They also refer to and rely upon the following judgments:—

(i) Ashoo Surendranath Tewari vs. CBI, (2020) 9 SCC 636

(ii) Radheshyam Kejriwal vs. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581

6. However, learned counsel for the Vigilance Department vehemently supports the impugned order submitting that the present petition has become infructuous in view of the change of the stage in the criminal proceeding against the petitioner. Charge has already been framed and evidence is being adduced by the Vigilance Department against the petitioner.

7. He further submits that the petitioner has not been exonerated by learned writ Court on merit. Only on technicality the writ Court has set aside the inqu