IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
MOHIT KUMAR SHAH and HARISH KUMAR, JJ.
Cri. App. (DB) Nos. 224, 165, 200, 218, 226 and 243 of 2019
(14.8.2025)
Rajballabh Prasad @ Rajballabh Yadav (in 224)
Sulekha Devi (in 165)
Radha Devi (in 200)
Sandeep Suman @ Pushpanjay (in 218)
Tusi Devi (in 226)
Chhoti Devi @ Amrita (in 243) ... Appellants
vs.
State of Bihar ... Respondents
(in all)
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 – Sections 4 and 5 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 366A, 376 and 120-B – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Sections 4 and 8 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 – Rule 12 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 374(2) – Kidnapping, rape and criminal conspiracy – Immoral Trafficking – Minor victim – Life sentence – Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by Court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents as also its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence – Age of prosecutrix as a minor could not be conclusively established – Conviction can definitely be based on sole testimony of prosecutrix when evidence of prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and that of a sterling quality – Evidence of prosecutrix cannot be stated to be of sterling quality and is not such, upon which reliance can be placed – Contradictions and inconsistencies pertain to core elements of alleged crime which not only undermines their reliability but also manifests that witnesses are not truthful as also evidence is unreliable, no conviction can be based on evidence of such witnesses – Not only mode, manner and place of occurrence have not stood proved conclusively but prosecutrix can also not be said to be truthful and a sterling witness, her sole testimony cannot be relied upon for the purposes of sustaining conviction of appellants. (Paras 178, 187, 190, 192 and 193)
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Sections 4 and 8 – Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 – Sections 4 and 5 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 366A, 376 and 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 374(2) – Kidnapping, rape and criminal conspiracy – Immoral Trafficking – Life sentence – Where medical evidence rules out possibility of ocular evidence being true, ocular evidence may be disbelieved – If evidence of prosecutrix is unsupported by any medical evidence or whole surrounding circumstances are highly improbable and belie case set up by prosecution, Court shall not act on solitary evidence of prosecutrix – Conduct of a person making statement should also be considered along with intervening circumstances so as to arrive at a just conclusion – In a rape case accused can be convicted on sole testimony of prosecutrix, if it is unimpeachable and beyond reproach and is capable of inspiring confidence in mind of Courts, however if testimony of prosecutrix is unsupported by any medical evidence, entire associated/ surrounding circumstances leave a mark of doubt to treat testimony of prosecutrix natural and truthful to inspire confidence, then Court shall not act on solitary evidence of prosecutrix – Not only prosecutrix but accused also has a right for a fair trial – Prosecutrix has been found to be used to sex – Evidence of prosecutrix is unsupported by any medical evidence. (Paras 199, 201, 202 and 204)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 366A, 376 and 120-B – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Sections 4 and 8 – Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 – Sections 4 and 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 65B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 374(2) – Kidnapping, rape and criminal conspiracy – Immoral Trafficking – Life sentence – Even in a case of rape onus is always on prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of offence it seeks to establish – Such onus never shifts as also it is no part of duty of defence to explain as to how and why in a rape case victim and other witnesses have falsely implicated accused – There is initial presumption of innocence of accused as also prosecution has to bring home offence against accused by reliable evidence – Though C.D.R. data can be an important and effective piece of evidence which may facilitate Court in ascertaining location of accused involved in commission of offence as also location of complainant, however C.D.R. data can only be used as a supportive and corroborative piece of evidence – Defence witnesses are entitled to equal respect and treatment as that of prosecution and evidence tendered by defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one by reason of factum of witnesses being examined by defence – There is no proof that prosecutrix was below age of 18 years as on date of alleged occurrence – Provisions of POCSO Act, 2012 shall not apply in present case – Medical evidence definitely rules out possibility of ocular evidence being true and does not support case of prosecution relating to offence of rape – Appellants acquitted of charges levelled against them – Appeals allowed. (Paras 207, 210, 211, 216, 221, 224, 225, 226, 230, 231 and 232)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 61 to 73 – So long as an original document is in existence and is available, its contents must be proved by primary evidence – When a particular fact is to be established by production of documentary evidence, there is no scope for leading oral evidence. (Para 178)
Mohit Kumar Shah, J. – The aforesaid six appeals preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’) arise out of the same judgment of conviction dated 15.12.2018 and order of sentence dated 21.12.2018, passed by the learned Special Judge (Elected Member of Parliament, Member of Legislative Assembly and Member of Legislative Council), Bihar, Patna (hereinafter referred to as the “Ld. Trial Judge”), in Special Case No. 145 of 2018 (arising out of Mahila (Nalanda) P.S. Case No. 15 of 2016) and therefore, these appeals have been heard together and are being disposed off by the present common judgment and order.
2. By the impugned judgment and order, the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under: –
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 224 of 2019
| Appellant's name | Conviction under Section | Sentence | ||
| Imprisonment | Fine (Rs.) | In default of fine | ||
| Rajballabh Prasad @ Rajballabh Yadav (herein after referred to as the Appellant No.1) | 376 of the IPC | Life Imprisonment | 50,000/- | Six months simple imprisonment |
| 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereafter referred to as the “POCSO Act”) | No separate sentence | X | X | |
| 8 of the POCSO Act | Five years rigorous imprisonment | 10,000/- | Three months simple imprisonment | |
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 165 of 2019
| Appellant's name | Conviction under Section | Sentence | ||
| Imprisonment | Fine (Rs.) | In default of fine | ||
| Sulekha Devi (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant No.2) | 366A of the IPC | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | 10,000/- | 3 months simple imprisonment |
| 376/120B of the IPC | Life imprisonment | 20,000/- | 3 months simple imprisonment | |
| 4 /17 of the POCSO Act | Life imprisonment | 20,000/- | 3 months simple imprisonment | |
| 8/17 of the POCSO Act | 5 years rigorous imprisonment | 10,000/- | 3 months simple imprisonment | |
| 4 of The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (herein after referred to as the Act, 1956) | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | X | X | |
| 5 of the Act, 1956 | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | X | X |
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 200 of 2019
| Appellant's name | Conviction under Section | Sentence | ||
| Imprisonment | Fine (Rs.) | In default of fine | ||
| Radha Devi (herein after referred to as the Appellant No.3) | 376/120B of the IPC | Life imprisonment | 20,000/- | 3 months simple imprisonment |
| 4/17 of the POCSO Act | Life imprisonment | 20,000/- | 3 months simple imprisonment | |
| 8/17 of the POCSO Act | 5 years rigorous imprisonment | 10,000/- | imprisonment | |
| 4 of the Act, 1956 | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | X | X | |
| 5 of the Act, 1956 | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | X | X | |
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2019
| Appellant's name | Conviction under Section | Sentence | ||
| Imprisonment | Fine (Rs.) | In default of fine | ||
| Sandeep Suman @ Pushpanjay (herein after referred to as the Appellant No.4) | 4 of the Act, 1956 | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | X | X |
| 5 of the Act, 1956 | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | X | X | |
| 376/120B of the IPC | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | 10,000/- | 3 months simple imprisonment | |
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 226 of 2019
| Appellant's name | Conviction under Section | Sentence | ||
| Imprisonment | Fine (Rs.) | In default of fine | ||
| Tusi Devi (herein after referred to as the Appellant No.5) | 4 of the Act, 1956 | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | X | X |
| 5 of the Act, 1956 | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | X | X | |
| 376/120B of the IPC | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | 10,000/- | 3 months simple imprisonment | |
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 243 of 2019
| Appellant's name | Conviction under Section | Sentence | ||
| Imprisonment | Fine (Rs.) | In default of fine | ||
| Chhoti Devi @ Amrita (herein after referred to as the Appellant No.6) | 366A of the IPC | Ten years rigorous imprisonment | 10,000/- | Three months simple imprisonment |
| 4 of the Act, 1956 | 10 years rigorous imprisonment | X | X | |
| 5 of the Act, 1956 | 10 years rigoro | |||
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