ORDER

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner; learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the Mining Department.

2. The petitioner has moved the Court for the following reliefs:—

“For issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the letter contained in memo no. 345 dated 26.03.2022 passed by the Minerals Development Officer, Sheikhpura whereby and whereunder the prayer of the petitioner for extension of lease period has been illegally and arbitrarily rejected;

ii. For issuance of appropriate writ(s) /order(s) /direction(s) for commanding the respondents to extend the period of mining lease of the petitioner dated 06.06.2017 ending on 06.06.2022 by another 230 days approximately because during the said period, the petitioner has been prevented/stopped from fulfilling and enjoying the terms and conditions of the lease because of certain actions/happenings which were beyond the control of the petitioner and those happenings cannot be attributed to the petitioner at all”

3. The petitioner, for certain reasons, had approached the State authorities for extension of his lease. The application has been rejected by a six line cryptic order without mentioning the reasons for rejection. There is no detailed consideration of the application of the petitioner.

4. Learned counsel for the Mining Department has vehemently opposed the case and has supported the impugned order and submits that the order of the Collector has not been challenged and the present letter dated 26.03.2022 is a communication about the order of the Collector. He also relies upon the L.P.A No. 379 of 2019, titled as ‘Aman Sethi vs State of Bihar & Ors.’ and has submitted that the petitioner should approach the State authorities for extension which includes concession.

5. I have considered the submissions of the parties.

6. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, reported as (1990) 4 SCC 594, while considering one of the questions, whether there is a general principle of law which requires an administrative authority to record the reasons for its decision, had held as under:—

“36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.

37. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision