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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Sankar Prasad Mitra and Mr. Justice Arun Kumar Janah, JJ.
Lall Krishna Mundra - Petitioner
v.
Fatick Chandra Hazra - Respondents
C.R. Nos. 656, 1424, 2629 of 1971 and 3252, 3253 of 1970
Decided On : June 8 & 15, 1972
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ARTICLE 14 - CLASSIFICATION - REASONABLENESS - PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT, 1882 (XV OF 1882) - CHAPTER VIII - DISTRESS PROCEEDINGS - WHETHER VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 - HELD, NO - CLASSIFICATION BASED ON GEOGRAPHICAL AREA AND AMOUNT OF RENT - CLASSIFICATION REASONABLE AND NOT ARBITRARY - PROCEDURE FOR DISTRESS PROCEEDINGS - WHETHER ARBITRARY AND WITHOUT GUIDELINES - HELD, NO - PROCEDURE PROVIDES FOR JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ARBITRARY EXERCISE OF POWER - CLASSIFICATION BASED ON AMOUNT OF RENT - WHETHER JUSTIFIABLE - HELD, YES - CLASSIFICATION BASED ON HISTORICAL REASONS, NECESSITIES OF TRADE AND COMMERCE, TEMPO AND COMPLEXITIES OF LIFE, ETC. - CLASSIFICATION PERMISSIBLE.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners challenged the validity of Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (XV of 1882) on the ground that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. They contended that the provisions of Chapter VIII, which allowed landlords to levy 'distress' for arrears of rent, were discriminatory as they gave landlords the option to either levy 'distress' or file a suit, while tenants had no such choice. They also argued that the procedure for 'distress' proceedings was onerous and lacked proper guidelines, making it arbitrary and violative of Article 14.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, was not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court found that the classification of cases based on geographical area and amount of rent was reasonable and not arbitrary. The Court also held that the procedure for 'distress' proceedings was not arbitrary or without guidelines, as it provided for judicial scrutiny and safeguards against arbitrary exercise of power. The Court further held that the classification based on amount of rent was justifiable, considering historical reasons, necessities of trade and commerce, tempo and complexities of life, etc.
Issues: 1. Whether Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India? 2. Whether the classification of cases based on geographical area and amount of rent was reasonable and not arbitrary? 3. Whether the procedure for 'distress' proceedings was arbitrary or without guidelines? 4. Whether the classification based on amount of rent was justifiable?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, was not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court found that the classification of cases based on geographical area and amount of rent was reasonable and not arbitrary. The Court also held that the procedure for 'distress' proceedings was not arbitrary or without guidelines, as it provided for judicial scrutiny and safeguards against arbitrary exercise of power. The Court further held that the classification based on amount of rent was justifiable, considering historical reasons, necessities of trade and commerce, tempo and complexities of life, etc. 2. The Court found that the classification of cases based on geographical area was reasonable as there were historical reasons and differences between the area within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court and the area outside that jurisdiction. The Court also found that the classification based on amount of rent was reasonable as it was based on the tempo and complexities of life, trade, and commerce in the area within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court. 3. The Court held that the procedure for 'distress' proceedings was not arbitrary or without guidelines. The Court found that the procedure provided for judicial scrutiny and safeguards against arbitrary exercise of power, such as the requirement for a sworn affidavit, the discretion of the Judge or Registrar to refuse to issue a warrant, the right of the debtor to apply for discharge or suspension of the warrant, and the right to compensation for damages caused by the 'distress'.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petitions and upheld the validity of Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.
The judgment of the Court was as follows :-
Mitra, J.: In all these Civil Revision cases a common question of law has arisen. The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act of 1882 violates the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. This is the chapter on "Distresses". We shall deal with the relevant provisions of this chapter at the appropriate time. It is common case that a landlord within the limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court can either levy 'distress' or proceed by way of a suit in the Presidency Small Cause Court provided that the rent sought to be recovered is not for more than twelve months. The argument on behalf of the petitioners is that the two choices available to a landlord are discriminatory. The landlord at his sole discretion may proceed under Chapter VIII against one tenant and may file a suit against another tenant. In other words, the selection lies wholly with the landlord as to whether he would file a suit or levy a 'distress'. Secondly, the Act does not prescribe or give any guidance as to how and when the option or selection is to be exercised. Thirdly, the procedure for 'distress' is more onerous than the procedure in a suit. And if there is an ordinary remedy by virture of the ordinary law of the land and also a more drastic remedy, e.g. by way of 'distress', the latter should be struck down. Learned Advocates for the petitioners elaborating their arguments further submit that, so far as arrears of rent for one year or less than one year are concerned, a suit lies in the Small Cause Court under sections 17 and 18 of the Act. In a suit a tenant has ample time to pay up his dues. He can file a written statement. He has also the right to a new trial under section 38 which is more or less by way of appeal. He can ask for payment by instalments by reason of Rule 7 in Chapter XX of the Rule of Practice of the Calcutta Small Cause Court. But these facilities are not available to him in the procedure of 'distress'. On the contrary, under Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act the opposite party can defend only by depositing the bailiff's costs. He has not say in the matter before attachment and seizure of goods. That procedure being onerous should, therefore, be struck down.
2. In support of these contentions reliance was placed on a Special Bench's judgment in (1) S. M. Nawab Ariff v. The Corporation of Calcutta, 64 CWN 1 (SB). The Special Bench was invited, inter alia, to test the validity of some of the section of the Calcutta Municipal Act. In section 251 of this Act it was provided:
Instead of the Commissioner proceeding against a defaulter under the foregoing provisions of this chapter, or after a defaulter has been so proceeded against unsuccessfully or with only partial success it shall be competent for the Corporation to recover from him by suit in any Court of competent jurisdiction, any sum due or the balance of any sum due, as the case may be, on account of the consolidated rate, together with all costs.
3. 'The foregoing provisions' referred to in section 251 were provisions relating to 'distress' which the Commissioner could levy for arrears of consolidated rates. The position, therefore, was that under the Municipal Act for recovery of consolidated rates, either the Commissioner himself could levy a 'distress' or the Corporation could institute a suit in a Court of competent jurisdiction the Special Bench was of opinion that there was no scope for reading in section 251 any principle or policy for guidance of the exercise of the discretion by the authorities in the matter of selection or classification in view of the very clear words used by the Legislature in the phrase.
Instead of the Commissioner proceeding against a defaulter under the provisions of this chapter, or after a defaulter bas been so proceeded against unsuccessfully or with only partial success.
It was further observe
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