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2016 Supreme(Cal) 171

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
MANJULA CHELLUR, SOUMEN SEN, ARIJIT BANERJEE, JJ.
West Bengal Housing Infrastructure Development Corporation - Petitioner
Vs.
M/s. Impression - Respondent
R.V.W. No.117 of 2015; F.M.A 1966 of 2015
Decided On : 18-05-2016

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Mr. Jayanta Kr. Mitra, Ld. Adv. Gen, Mr. Debabrata Banerjee, Mr. Samir Chakraborty
For the Opposite Party : Mr. Anindya Lahiri, Mr. Sourav Mondal

JUDGMENT :

Soumen Sen, J.

A Division Bench of this Court in National Highway Authority of India Vs. M/s. B. Seenaiah & Company (Projects) Limited held that an Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to decide an application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “1996 Act”) as the Court of Additional District Judge is not ‘Court’ within the meaning of the said Act. The said judgment was noticed in West Bengal Housing Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited Vs. M/s. Impression. The later Division Bench, however, held that the Court of an Additional District Judge is ‘Court’ within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act.

These conflicting judgments have resulted in this reference.

The short question that falls for consideration before the Larger Bench is whether the Court of the learned Additional District Judge is a Court within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act.

The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the decision in National Highway Authority of India (supra) is not a correct interpretation of the law on this point and the law laid down by the later judgment in West Bengal Housing Infrastructure (supra) is the correct view being consistent with the views expressed by most of the High Courts on this point.

The learned Advocate General has referred to Articles 233 and 236 of the Constitution of India, Sections 3,4,8,9 and 20 of the Bengal, Agra & Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the “Civil Courts Act”), Sections 3 and 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The learned Advocate General has argued that a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that the Additional District Judge who is exercising the same jurisdictional power as that of the “Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction” does not stand excluded from the definition clause. It is submitted that the test to find out whether the Additional District Judge exercising the same power as that of the District Judge would be whether the said Additional District Judge is a Civil Court inferior to a principal Civil Court. It is submitted that Articles 233 and 236 of the Constitution of India clearly indicates that Additional District Judge is not a Civil Court of a grade inferior to a District Judge. The Court of the District Judge and the Court of Additional District Judge are both of equal grade. The Additional District Judge is not inferior or subordinate to the Court of a District Judge, save and except, certain powers are exclusively exercisable by the District Judge, namely, the power of transfer and withdrawal under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the District Judge by virtue of Section 9 of the Civil Courts Act is having administrative control over all the Civil Courts within the local limits of his jurisdiction subject to the superintendence and control of the High Court. In support of the submission that the Additional District Judge is not a Civil Court of a grade inferior to a District Judge reliance was placed on Ajit Kumar Bhunia Vs. Sm. Kanan Bala Deyi reported at AIR 1960 Cal 565 (Paragraph 12) and M/s. Badrilal Jodhraj & Sons Indore Vs. Girdharilal & Anr. reported at AIR 1988 MP 24 (Paragraph 13).

It is submitted that a careful scrutiny of Section 2(1)(e) of the said Act would clearly show that it does not confer jurisdiction to entertain any application under Part I of the said Act upon the Court of District Judge exclusively in a District. The definition as given is an inclusive definition and the Civil Court not of a grade inferior to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject-matter of arbitration would be competent to decide an application for setting aside of the award as also an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. There is no requirement under the Act that an application unde






































































































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