Point of Law: Revisional applications - Scope of assumption of jurisdiction by Commercial Court - No question of bar to revisions against interlocutory orders passed by Commercial Courts Act arises in present case in view of patent jurisdictional error committed by trial court in passing impugned orders.

JUDGMENT :

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.

1. All the revisional applications are heard analogously in view of the issue involved being the same. Each of the revisional applications under Article 227 of the Constitution arise out of suits for eviction under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which is evident from the cause of action pleaded in each of the plaints.

2. The primary relief sought in the suits is recovery of possession from the respective defendants. Ancillary reliefs regarding mesne profits etc., have also been sought.

3. By the impugned orders, the court below rejected applications filed by the defendants/petitioners under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for return of the plaint to be presented before an appropriate forum, on the ground that the Commercial Court, in which the suits were instituted, does not have jurisdiction to hear the said suits.

4. Such applications were dismissed on similar reasoning by the orders impugned in all the revisional applications.

5. The primary question which falls for consideration is whether a suit, primarily for recovery of possession of immovable property under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, pertains to a “commercial dispute” under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The crux of the petitioners’ argument is that Section 2(1)(c)(vii) and the explanation to the said Section, read conjointly, indicate that a suit simpliciter for eviction does not come within the purview of a commercial dispute.

6. That apart, the petitioners argue that the mesne profits have been claimed at arbitrary, inflated rates merely to increase the valuation of the suit, to bring it within the purview of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that an order passed in a proceeding where the Court lacks inherent jurisdiction would render the order null and void. For such proposition, learned counsel cites the following judgments:

(a) Amit Suresh Bhatnagar Vs. Nageshwar Steels – A Partnership Firm (R/Special Application No.11639 of 2017);

(b) State of Gujarat Vs. Union of India [2018 SCC OnLine Guj 1515]; and

(c) L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and Others [(1997) 3 SCC 261].

8. On maintainability of the application under Article 227 in the context of the bar contemplated in Section 8 of the 2015 Act, learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution cannot be fettered by such a statutory bar. It is also argued that if a statute curtails the right of a party to approach the High Court under Article 226/227 or the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, such provision would be rendered ultra vires.

9. For the above propositions, learned counsel relies on the following judgments:

(a) L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and Others [(1997) 3 SCC 261]; and

(b) Salini Shyam Shettty and Another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329].

10. Learned counsel for the petitioners next contends that there are no specific pleadings in the plaints to suggest that the property was exclusively being used in trade and commerce and no document disclosing that the matter would fall within the ambit of “commercial dispute” has been annexed to any of the plaints. In such context, learned counsel places reliance on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Vs. K.S. Infra Space LLP & Another, reported at 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1311 and Mrs. Soni Dave Vs. M/s. Trans Asian Industry Exposition Private Limited, reported at AIR 2016 Del 186 and at 2016 SCC OnLine Delhi 4282.

11. “Godown”, the petitioners contend, is a place for storage or a warehouse for goods, as per the 6th Edition of the Second Volume of the Advance Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar. Storage of goods cannot necessarily be equated with trade or commerce, particularly, in the absence of any reference in the agreement and/or pleading of “actual use” of the property-in-dispute exclusively for trade or commerce.

12. The petitioners ar