JUDGMENT :

1. A preliminary objection as to maintainability has been taken by the respondent on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. It is argued by learned senior counsel for the respondent that the arbitration clause categorically stipulates that the Mumbai Courts would have exclusive jurisdiction, whereas the arbitration shall be held at Kolkata. Hence, it is contended that Kolkata was chosen merely as a venue whereas the seat of arbitration has to be Mumbai, thereby conferring jurisdiction on the Bombay High Court to take up an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the 1996 Act”).

2. The Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent, in support of his submission, cites a Delhi High Court judgment rendered in CVS Insurance and Investments Vs. Vipul IT Infrasoft Pvt. Ltd., reported at 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12149, as well as another Delhi High Court judgment delivered in Virgo Softech Ltd. Vs. National Institute of Electronics and Information Technology, reported at 2018 SCC OnLine Del 12723. Against Virgo Softech Ltd (supra), a special leave petition was preferred, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

3. The Learned Senior Advocate next cites Ravi Ranjan Developers Private Limited Vs. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee, reported at 2022 SCC OnLine SC 568.

4. The Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, in controverting such submissions, places reliance on BGS SGS Soma JV Vs. NHPC Limited [(2020) 4 SCC 234], where most of the contemporary judgments in the concerned field were discussed.

5. The petitioner also cites Mankastu Impex Private Limited Vs. Airvisual Limited [(2020) 5 SCC 399] as well the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Mr. Raman Deep Singh Taneja Vs. Crown Realtech Private Limited [2017 SCC OnLine Del 11966].

6. The petitioner further places reliance on Aniket SA Investments LLC, Mauritius Vs. Janapriya Engineers Syndicate Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabhad and others, rendered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, reported at 2021 (4) Mh.L.J. 123.

7. The Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submits that there is no ambiguity in the arbitration clause insofar as the same clearly designates Kolkata as the place where the arbitration proceedings shall be held.

8. It is contended that, in the absence of any contrary indication that the seat and the venue of arbitration would be different, Kolkata remains the chosen seat as well as the venue of arbitration and, as such, would confer jurisdiction on this Court to take up the present application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act.

9. By placing reliance on the BGS SGS Soma JV (supra), it is contended that a similar clause as the present Clause 15 fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in the said matter, insofar as the arbitration proceedings therein, it was stipulated, “shall be held” at New Delhi/Faridabad.

10. A threadbare discussion was undertaken by the Supreme Court to distinguish between “seat” and “venue” as well as the effect of Section 42 of the 1996 Act. In such perspective, it was ultimately held that Delhi was the seat of arbitration and, as such, the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction to take up matters pertaining to such arbitration in the said case.

11. It is further argued that whereas the entire arbitral proceedings has been contemplated to be held in Kolkata, the first portion of the arbitration clause merely stipulates in general terms that the Mumbai courts would have jurisdiction with regard to the agreement. Hence, the Learned Senior Advocate seeks to distinguish between the subject matter of dispute pertaining to the agreement itself and the Curial Law to be applicable to the arbitration. Applying the latter, it is argued that jurisdiction is conferred on the Calcutta High Court to take up applications pertaining to the proposed arbitration.

12. A close analysis of the above principles indicates that the ‘seat-venue-place’ conundrum still persis