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2024 Supreme(Cal) 579

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
HARISH TANDON, MADHURESH PRASAD, JJ.
Saroj Thakur and Another – Petitioners
Versus
Indo Arya Central Transport Limited and Others – Respondents
FMAT No. 26 of 2024, CAN No. 1 of 2023
Decided On : 06-02-2024

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioners: S.N. Mookherjee, Anuj Singh, V.V.V. Sastry, Aniruddh Goyal.
For the Respondents: Mainak Bose, Partha Pratim Roy, Debjit Mukherjee, Oishik Chatterjee.

The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and the Code of Civil Procedure in the context of an execution appeal.

Headnote:

Execution Appeal - Jurisdiction of High Court - The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, Section 21(1)(a), Code of Civil Procedure, Section 37, Section 38 - The judgment discusses the jurisdiction of the High Court in an execution appeal, interpreting the provisions of The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and the Code of Civil Procedure. It emphasizes the pecuniary limits for appeals and the distinction between the Court of first instance and the Appellate Court for execution purposes.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant obtained a decree for eviction, but it has not been executed due to resistance from various parties. The appeal originates from an order of the Executing Court which impedes the rights of the appellant/decree-holder from proceeding with the execution case. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the appeal before the High Court.

Finding of the Court:

The Court analyzed the provisions of The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and the Code of Civil Procedure to determine the jurisdiction for the appeal. It held that the appeal is maintainable before the High Court.

Issues: The issues revolved around the jurisdiction of the High Court in an execution appeal, the pecuniary limits for appeals, and the distinction between the Court of first instance and the Appellate Court for execution purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court interpreted the relevant provisions of The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and the Code of Civil Procedure to establish the jurisdiction of the High Court in the execution appeal.

Final Decision: The Court held that the appeal is maintainable before the High Court and formally admitted the appeal for further proceedings.

JUDGMENT :

1. This is a classic example of protracting the litigation at every tier of an adjudicatory system and ultimately on the peripheral of the execution proceeding resultantly denying the decree-holder of the fruits of the decree though has ripen yet reverted back to its bud at the behest of the parties claiming their independent right, title and interest in respect of the decretal property. The decree for eviction obtained by the appellant has not been executed as yet as resistance appears to have been seen from various corners and the Court is adjudicating the issues as and when raised.

2. The instant appeal originates from an order of the Executing Court which impedes the rights of the appellant/decree-holder from proceeding with the execution case and a vehement objection is raised on the maintainability of an appeal before this Court.

3. Mr. Bose, learned Advocate appearing for the applicant in the Executing Court took a preliminary objection that in view of the provisions contained under Section 21(1)(a) of The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, the appeal would not lie before the High Court as the reliefs claimed by his client in an execution proceeding was valued at Rs. 100/- and, therefore, the Court before embarking its journey on the circumference of Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure should decide the said preliminary objection. Before we proceed in this regard, it would be apposite and profitable to quote the provisions contained under Section 21 of the said Act which runs thus:

    21. Appeals from - [Civil Judge (Senior Division) and Civil Judge (Junior Division)]:

(1) Save as aforesaid, an appeal from a decree or order of a [Civil Judge (Senior Division)] shall be:

(a) to the District Judge where the value of the original suit in which or in any proceeding arising out of which the decree or order was made did not exceed [One Lakh and Fifty thousand rupees] and in Bihar does not exceed Rupees Ten Lakh.

(b) to the High Court of any other case.

(2) Save as aforesaid, an appeal from a decree or order of a [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] shall lie to the District Judge.

(3) Where the function of receiving any appeals which lie to the District Judge under sub-section (2) has been assigned to an Additional Judge, the appeals may be preferred to the Additional Judge.

(4) The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the [State Government] direct, by notification in the Official Gazette, that appeals lying to the District Judge under sub-section (2) from all or any of the decrees or orders of any [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] shall be preferred to the Court of such [Civil Judge (Senior Division)] as may be mentioned in the notification, and the appeals shall thereupon be preferred accordingly.

4. The meaningful reading of the language employed in the aforesaid Section leaves no ambiguity in our mind that an appeal from a decree or an order passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) shall lie to the District Judge, in the event, the value of the original suit in which such decree or order is passed does not exceed Rs. 1.5 lakh. Clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Code postulates that the situation not covered under Clause (a) thereof, the appeal would lie to the High Court. Admittedly the suit for recovery of possession was valued at Rs. 1.58 lakhs and, therefore, the nuances of the aforesaid provisions are to be construed in the backdrop of the aforesaid admitted fact. The remedy by way of an appeal either under Clause (a) or (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the said Act is dependent upon the value of the reliefs claimed in the original suit from which the decree or the order sprung therefrom and for the purpose of the execution of such decree or order, the said Court would be regarded as a Court of first instance.

5. Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure defines the expression “the Court which passed the decree” in the following:

    Section 37. Definition of Court which pas

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