IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA, CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR
HARISH TANDON, RAI CHATTOPADHAYAY, JJ.
The Union of India and Others - Appellants
Versus
S.N. Kanungo (Since deceased) and Another - Respondents
FMAT No. 3 of 2018 IA. No. CAN 1 2023
Decided On : 29-09-2023
Condonation of Delay - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Limitation Act 1963 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - [Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 22 Rule 9(2) of the Code, Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963]
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, Union of India, filed an appeal challenging the dismissal of their prayer for condonation of delay in filing an application for setting aside abetment under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The dispute arose from an arbitration award dated May 31, 2007, and the delay in filing the application was a key issue.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the reasons shown by the appellant for the delay in filing the application were sufficient, and the impugned order was based on limited considerations of counting days only, without considering the larger perspective or what might have served the ends of justice.
Issues: The key issues were the sufficiency of the reasons for the delay in filing the application for setting aside abetment and the propriety of the trial court's decision to dismiss the appellant's prayer for condonation of delay.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized the lenient approach to be taken towards condonation of delay, particularly in cases where substantial rights of the party are at stake. It also highlighted the need to consider the larger perspective and the ends of justice in such matters.
Final Decision: The impugned order was set aside, and the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was allowed, restoring the original case to its file and number.
JUDGMENT :
Rai Chattopadhayay, J.
1. In this mandamus appeal, the Court is required to decide as to the legality and propriety of the order of the Additional District Judge at Port Blair, dated September 7, 2018, in Misc. Judl. Case No. 02 of 2014. By dint of the same the trial court has dismissed appellant’s prayer under section 5 of the Limitation Act, praying for condonation of delay in filing an application for setting aside abetment. Being aggrieved, the appellant/Union of India has challenged the same by filing the present appeal.
2. The Court finds it is not necessary to go into the other details of facts of the case, excepting the following:
3. An arbitration award dated May 31, 2007, is the reason of dispute between the parties. The present appellant was not satisfied with the said award and had preferred an application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the District Judge, for setting aside the said award. During pendency of the case the respondent No.1 had died on October 15, 2012. The present appellant had not been prompt in following up the case with adequate steps pursuant thereto and the said case under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, abetted. Thereafter, only on February 4, 2014 had the present appellants filed before the trial court the Misc. Judl. Case No. 02 of 2014, to prefer applications under order 22 rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that under order 22 rule 9(2) of the said Code, along with an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963. The trial court has proceeded to find that such applications have been preferred at an inordinate delayed period of time, that is, after more than 15 months from the death of the respondent and after more than 12 months from the date of abetment. The trial court has also found that no sufficient ground has been pleaded to explain the reasons for such delay. The trial court has recorded regarding its dissatisfaction to accept the reasons shown by the present appellants for such delay, to be cogent and sufficient and dismissed Misc. Judl. Case No. 02 of 2014, vide the impugned order, that is dated September 7, 2018. Hence this appeal.
4. Mr. V.D. Sivabalan, who is representing the appellant has submitted that the finding of the District Judge so far as insufficiency of the reasons shown by the appellant for occurrence of delay is concerned, may be considered to be erroneous and based on unworthy considerations. Being department of the Administration, the appellant is impaired with several procedural complications, which fact has been overlooked by the District Judge. It has further been stated that the settled position of law regarding a lenient approach to be taken towards condonation of delay, particularly in case where substantial right of the party is at stake, had also been allegedly ignored by the District Judge, resulting into delivery of the order as impugned in this appeal.
5. The appellant, according to Mr. V.D. Sivabalan, is interested to contest the case and has a fair possibility to secure a favourable order in the same. However, even then the finding of the District Judge that the present appellant has not been vigilant to follow up his case, is only jeopardising the appellant’s rights.
6. It has been submitted that a delay of 219 days in filing an application for setting aside abetment along with the application for condonation of delay that period, may be condoned and the impugned order be set aside for the ends of justice.
7. Mr. Lokesh Chezian is representing the respondents. He obviously supports the impugned order dated September 7, 2018. He says that the intentional latches on the part of the appellant in following up of the Court’s proceeding was evident to the Court and the Court has accordingly taken a decision which cannot be termed as erroneous. He says further that the abetment of the case filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliatio
The Court emphasized the lenient approach to be taken towards condonation of delay and the need to consider the larger perspective and the ends of justice in such matters.
The limitation for filing objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.
The main legal point established is that the extendable period of 30 days under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not the period of limitation, and the benefit of limitation on ac....
The court established that delays in appeals under the Arbitration Act are to be strictly limited, with condonation only in exceptional circumstances where compelling reasons are provided.
The court emphasized the strict timelines prescribed in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the Limitation Act, and held that delays beyond the statutory periods cannot be condoned.
The judgment establishes the strict interpretation and application of the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, emphasizing the requirement for sufficient cause and the mandat....
The court adopted a liberal and justice-oriented approach in the matter of condonation of delay, allowing the delay of 23 days to be condoned as sufficient cause was explained by the DDA.
Limitations under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 may be waived in light of extraordinary circumstances, such as a pandemic, as per relevant Supreme Court orders.
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.