IMPORTANT POINT
The main legal point established is the liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to advance substantial justice and the need to decide matters on merits unless they are hopelessly without merit.

ORDER ON BOARD

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

1. Since common question of fact and law is involved in all these writ petitions, they have been clubbed together, heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.

2. This batch of writ petitions is directed against the order dated 20-2- 2024 passed separately by the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal dismissing the appeals preferred under Section 13 of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011 (for short, ‘the Act of 2011’) as barred by limitation of 170 days.

3. Mr. Shobhit Koshta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, would submit that no notice was served to the petitioners by the Rent Controller and the petitioners were proceeded ex parte on 3-1-2022, and ultimately, on 28-2-2023, the Rent Controller has passed the order of eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent on the ground that the respondent landlord has proved his title and tenancy has been established. He would further submit that the petitioners have received notice of execution of order dated 28-2-2023 on 14-9-2023 and within seven days from the date of service of notice, on 21-9- 2023, the appeals were filed explaining the delay in filing the appeal, but the learned Tribunal dismissed the appeals as also the applications for condonation of delay, as such, the impugned orders are liable to be set-aside and the appeals be remanded to the Rent Control Tribunal for consideration on merits.

4. Mr. Vibhor Goverdhan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, would submit that the Rent Control Tribunal is absolutely justified in dismissing the appeals as the delay of 170 days in filing the appeals has not been satisfactorily explained and therefore the appeals have rightly been dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection.

6. True it is that the petitioners were proceeded ex parte on 3-1-2022 and on 28-2-2023, the Rent Control Authority has passed the order of eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent against the petitioners and in favour of the respondent herein against which the petitioners herein had preferred appeals on 21-9-2023. The Rent Control Tribunal has recorded a finding that the petitioners have been served by registered post, but they have refused to accept the notice and as such, they have duly been served and therefore no sufficient cause has been shown and consequently, dismissed the applications for condonation of delay and also dismissed the appeals as barred by limitation.

7. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the provision contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides as under: -

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.

—Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

8. Section 5 of the Limitation Act confers the power on the court to entertain the appeal after the prescribed period if the appellate court is satisfied that the concerned appellant has shown sufficient cause for not preferring appeal within the prescribed time. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the