IMPORTANT POINT
The court emphasized the need to adhere to the statutory limitation period and the requirement of showing sufficient cause for delay in seeking review of judgment and decree.

JUDGMENT :

Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, J.

1. Heard on I.A. No.1/2024, application for condonation of delay in filing the instant review petition for modification in judgment dated 01.09.2012 & decree dated 14.09.2012.

2. The instant review petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 read with Sections 151 & 152 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for review of judgment dated 01.09.2012 and decree dated 14.09.2012 and modify the judgment and decree by rectifying the error apparent on the fact of record and making the compromise deed as a part of the decree which has been barred by 4169 days i.e. approximately 11 years 42 days.

3. The review petitioner has approached this Court seeking review of the order dated 01.09.2012 by which S.A. No. 181 of 2005 has been dismissed as withdrawn by the Lok Adalat and thereafter, decree be drawn vide order dated 14.09.2012. The relevant part of the order of the Lok Adalat is reproduced below:-

“Learned counsel for the appellants and respondent No.7, jointly submitted that parties have amicably settled their dispute outside the Court and in that view of the matter, the appellants do not wish to press the appeal.

In that view of the submission so made, the appeal is dismissed as withdrawn.

Let the decree be drawn. Court fee shall be refunded to the appellants upon production of proper certificate.”

4. Mr. Gyan Prakash Shukla, learned counsel for the review petitioner, submits that the delay in filing the instant review petition has not occurred intentionally, because, since passing of judgment dated 01.09.2012 the petitioner herein has preferred application before the revenue authority and the same was allowed. Thereafter, the other party of the compromise deed has fraudulently tried to eradicate the right of the petitioner and filed numerous frivolous applications before the revenue authority. He also submits that review petitioner was not indolent and the delay occurred in filing the instant review petition is bonafide and condonable. He further submits that petitioner is an old aged person and even after the compromise took place between the parties in Lok Adalat the petitioner has been harassed for more than a decade by the private respondents. He further submits that after the order passed by the Commissioner Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh on 27.08.2021, petitioner has preferred WPC No.3702 of 2023 before this Court which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file appropriate petition. It is also stated that although the delay was occurred in filing the review petition, but, on perusal of the entire order sheets it is quite vivid that the petitioner was contesting his case on the basis of compromise decree, whereas, the clerical mistake on the part of the decree is deserved to be modified because in the Lok Adalat the parties have prayed for passing the decree on the basis of compromise deed and to consider the deed as part of the decree which was overlooked by the Lok Adalat, therefore, the delay occurred in filing the instant review petition is bonafide and is liable to be condoned and the judgment dated 01.09.2012 is liable to be reviewed as well as decree dated 14.09.2012 is liable to be modified. To buttress his submission he relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of N. Balakrishnan vs M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, considered his submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection.

6. A careful perusal of the records and the reasons mentioned in the application for condonation of delay show that the impugned judgment was passed on 01.09.2012 and the decree was drawn on 14.09.2012 and after more than 11 years review petition has been filed by the petitioner, which shows the indolent and lethargic behaviour of the petitioner in taking remedy.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in two recent judicial pronouncements have deprecated such practice