IMPORTANT POINT
The main legal point established is the interpretation of territorial jurisdiction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, in light of the provisions of Section 142A and Section 142(2)(a) and relevant case law.

JUDGMENT :

1. Since both the acquittal appeals are related to same appellant and dismissed by the learned trial Court on jurisdictional ground, they are heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order.

2. Acquittal Appeal No. 63/2012 filed by the appellant is against order dated 29.11.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod, District- Durg (C.G.) in Criminal Case No. 121/2011, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused from the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the ground that the case is not in territorial jurisdiction of Balod Court.

3. Acquittal Appeal No. 65/2012 filed by the appellant is against judgment dated 29.11.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod, District- Durg (C.G.) in Criminal Case No. 122/2011, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused from the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for want of territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant filed both the acquittal appeals on the ground that in both the cases, appellant presented the cheques in the Bank of Balod where the cheques got dishonoured due to insufficient amount in the account of the accused. The complainant gave notice in writing to respondents/accused for demand of payment of the cheque amount. Therefore, the Court of Balod has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint but the learned trial Court erred in law in not appreciating the settled proposition of law. The learned trial Court grossly erred in holding that the complainant has failed to prove the offence beyond all reasonable doubts. The learned trial Court in Balod has every jurisdiction to decide the Complaint Case of the appellant. As such, the judgments dated 29.11.2011 passed in Criminal Case No. 121/2011 and in Criminal Case No. 122/2011 are liable to be set aside.

5. To substantiate his arguments, he has placed reliance on the decision in the matter of Bridgestone India Pvt Ltd vs. Inderpal Singh, reported in 2015 LawSuit (SC) 1195.

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment.

7. Heard both the counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

8. It is clear from documents on record and the judgments of the learned trial Court that the appellant filed Complaint Cases against the respondents under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of cheques and it is also clear that the cheques were presented by the appellant for encashment at the Balod Bank which intimated the appellant about its dishonour. However, the learned trial Court held in para 8 in both the cases that loan transaction took place in Rajnandgaon, therefore, complainant has to file the Complaint Cases before Rajanandgaon Court and Balod Court has no jurisdiction to decide these cases and accordingly dismissed the Complaint Cases and acquitted the respondents.

9. Hon’ble Apex Court in Bridgestone India Pvt Ltd (supra) held in paras 11, 12 and 13 which reads as under:-

[11] It is, however, imperative for the present controversy, that the appellant overcomes the legal position declared by this Court, as well as, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, a reference may be made to Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, whereby Section 142A was inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act. A perusal of Sub-section (1) thereof leaves no room for any doubt, that insofar as the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned, on the issue of jurisdiction, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, would have to give way to the provisions of the instant enactment on account of the non-obstante clause in sub- section (1) of Section 142A. Likewise, any judgment, decree, order or direction issued by a Court would have n