The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Controller has no power to condone the delay in moving an application seeking leave to appear and defend an eviction case brought under Chapter III-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

( 1 ) IN this civil revision brought under Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act challenging the eviction order dated December 17, 1986, made by an Additional Rent Controller, on the ground of eviction covered by clause (e) of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ), a learned Single Judge has made a reference on the question of law to be decided by this Bench. The relevant portion of the referermbered order is reproduced as follows :

"the learned Additional Rent Controller has relied on a judgment of this Court in food Corporation of India v. Smt. Usha Bhardwaj 1986 (2) RCJ 52 (1), for the proposition that the Rent Controller has no power to extend the period of limitation for putting in appearance and filing an application for leave to defend. I have been referred to two contrary judgments of this Court. The first one is by M. L. Jam, J. , in Surinder Kumar v. Prem Kumar. , 1980 RLR 621 (2), and the second one is by Rajinder Sachar, J. , in V. N. Sood v. Dr. Gurbachan Singh 1981 RLR (Note) 46 (3), To the same effect is the judgment in Gurditta v. Bal Sarup , 1980 RLR 186 (4 ). In all these cases it has been held that on the analogy of Order 37 Rule 3 (7) and Rule 4, the Controller has got the power to extend time for putting in appearance and even after the decree has been passed. Thus, I find that there is a clear conflict of judicial opinion in this Court as to whether the Controller has the power to extend time on the analogy of sub-rule (7) of Rule 3 of Order 37. Such questions commonly arise and need determination by a Larger Bench. "

( 2 ) WE may notice the facts of the case before considering the question of law arising in the matter. In the perition brought under Chapter III-A of the Act, the landlord had sought eviction of the tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement for residence. Summons as prescribed in the IIIrd Sohe- rule were issued and were served personally on the tenant. The tenant was in law required to move an application for leave to appear and defend the eviction case within 15 days. The tenant could not do so and later on he moved such an application before the Controller and also prayed that the delay made by him in moving the said application may be condoned. It is not necessary to refer to the grounds pleaded in the application seeking condonation of delay. The application was rejected by the Controller on the short ground that the Controller had no power to condone the delay and the Controller admitting the facts stated in the eviction petition proceeded to pass the eviction order.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that keeping in view the various provisions of the Act it must be held that the Controller is a Court. proper and thus, has the power to condone the delay by taking resort to provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand. has contended that it is now settled law that the Controller under the Act is not a court in the strict sense and the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings brought under the Act and more over the various provisions of the Acts would clearly indicate that the Parliament had vested the power with the Controller to condone the delay in some matters where it thought fit but the Parliament intentionally did not deem it necessary to vest the Controller with such apower in respect of the petitions to be dealt with in Chapter III-A.

( 5 ) WE may notice the various provisions of the Act in order to appreciate the above contentions. Section 12 of the Act prescribed the limitation for moving an application for getting the standard rent fixed. It provides for two years period for moving such an application from the date of letting. However. there is a proviso in the aforesaid Section which empowers the Controller to entertain such an application after the expiry of th