2020 Supreme(Del) 144
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
C. Hari Shankar, J.
Uoi – Appellant
Versus
Raju Kumar Shah – Respondent
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3495, 3496, 3497, 3498, 3499, 3536 of 2015; Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 6250, 6252, 6254, 6256, 6258, 6294 of 2015
Decided on : 20-01-2020
Advocate Appeared:
Amit Mahajan, Advocate, Siddharth Das, Advocate, S.K. Bhattacharya, Advocate, Seema Sharma, Advocate, Nandita Talukdarr, Advocate
Headnote:
JUDGMENT : C. Hari Shankar, J. 1. These writ petitions assail awards, dated 1st April, 2014, passed by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "learned Tribunal") in ID Nos. 104/2012, 105/2012, 106/2012, 107/2012, 108/2012 and 109/2012.
Fact of the Case:
The respondents, who claimed to be workmen employed with the petitioner (the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks), and were rendering services for the petitioner, were suddenly disengaged on 31st March, 2009.
Finding of the Court:
The office of the Controller General is an 'industry', within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the ID Act. The finding, of the learned Tribunal, to the said effect, is upheld, and the contention, of the petitioner, to the contrary, is rejected.
Issues: 1. Whether management is an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? 2. Whether the claimant is a 'workman' within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? 3. Whether orders dated 21.04.2010 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal operates as res judicata? 4. Whether claimant rendered continuous service of 240 days as contemplated by section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? 5. Whether the claimant is entitled to relief of reinstatement in service?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Every function, rendered by the Government, is not sovereign, and (ii) all sovereign functions are not insulated from Section 2 (j) of the ID Act and (iii) sovereign functions, which are core, inalienable and, thus, "strictly" sovereign, alone, escape the clutches of Section 2(j). 2. Sovereign functions become inalienably sovereign only when it is impossible to delegate them to any other authority. Statutory conferment, on the Government, or on a specified governmental authority - like the office of the Controller General - of a particular duty or function, by itself, would not render that duty, or function, inalienably sovereign.
Final Decision: These writ petitions are dismissed in the aforesaid terms, with no orders as to costs.
JUDGMENT :
C. Hari Shankar, J.
1. These writ petitions assail awards, dated 1st April, 2014, passed by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "learned Tribunal") in ID Nos. 104/2012, 105/2012, 106/2012, 107/2012, 108/2012 and 109/2012.
Facts
2. The respondents, who claimed to be workmen employed with the petitioner (the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks), and were rendering services for the petitioner, were suddenly disengaged on 31st March, 2009.
3. The respondents initially moved the learned Central Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the learned CAT"), by way of Original Applications (OAs) which were, however, not maintainable. Subsequently, the respondents withdrew the said OAs and raised industrial disputes, which were referred to the Conciliation Officer, as the petitioner contested the claims. On the expiry of 45 days from the date of moving the Conciliation Officer, the respondents filed their claims, before the learned Tribunal under Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the ID Act").
4. By the impugned awards - which are, in sum and substance, identical - the learned Tribunal has directed reinstatement of the respondents, by the petitioner, with 40% of their last drawn wages, as back wages, payable to them.
5. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court.
The impugned award
6. The learned Tribunal has delineated the following issues, as arising for its consideration, based on the rival stands, before it, by the petitioner and the respondents:
"(1) Whether management is an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
(2) Whether the claimant is a 'workman' within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
(3) Whether orders dated 21.04.2010 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal operates as res judicata?
(4) Whether claimant rendered continuous service of 240 days as contemplated by section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
(5) Whether the claimant is entitled to relief of reinstatement in service?"
7. Issue No. (3), as framed by the learned Tribunal, is not of significance, and learned counsel, too, have, advisedly not urged any contention thereon. Inasmuch as the OAs before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal had been preferred by the respondents under a mistaken impression of law, and the OAs were withdrawn, without any res having been decided, it is obvious that the proceedings before learned Tribunal could not be said to be barred by res judicata.
8. I do not, therefore, propose to advert to this issue hereinafter.
9. All the issues, as framed by it, were answered by the learned Tribunal, in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner.
10. Regarding issue No. (1), i.e. as to whether the petitioner, i.e. the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (hereinafter referred to as "the Controller General"), was an 'industry' as defined in Section 2(j) of the ID Act, the learned Tribunal has, essentially, based its decision on the classic exposition, by the seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213.
11. The learned Tribunal has reproduced paras 140 to 144, from the decision in Bangalore Water Supply, (1978) 2 SCC 213 (in which the Supreme Court has "formulated the principles" emerging from its decision), in this regard. For the sake of contextual clarity, I deem it appropriate to reproduce paras 139 to 144 of the report, thus:
"139. Banerji (D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee, (1953) SCR 302: AIR 1953 SC 58: (1953) 1 LLJ 195), amplified by Corporation of Nagpur (The Corporation of The City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, (1960) AIR SC 675) in effect met with its Waterloo in Safdarjung (Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Sing