The central legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of mens rea for defamation and the importance of considering material placed on record to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.

JUDGMENT

asha Menon, J. - This petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the summoning order dated 29th January, 2020 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-06, South East, Saket District Court in complaint case No.4774/2019.

2. The petitioners have been summoned to face trial for having committed the alleged offences under Sections 499/500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The respondent filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court alleging that by means of a letter dated 10th December, 2018 the petitioner No.2 through the petitioner No.1 i.e., the Managing Director, had defamed the respondent in the eyes of the third persons being vendors. However, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri Nalin Kohli, urged that unless and until there was an intention to cause harm and the contents of the letter had been made without a valid cause, no offence, even prima facie, would be made out against the petitioners. It is submitted that as regards the respondent No.2 being a company, it could have no mens rea as required under Section 499 and that straightway the summoning of the petitioner No.2 had to be quashed.

3. The petitioner No.1 has submitted that the letter in question was necessitated on account of the unlawful activities of the respondent himself. It was submitted that the respondent being an employee of the petitioner No.2, had not made fair disclosures to the petitioner No.2 before employment and had also thereafter engaged in activities detrimental to the interests of the company (petitioner No.2). The employment agreement between the petitioner No.2 and the respondent had come to an end on 31st March, 2017 after which various extortionate demands had been made by the respondent upon the petitioner No.2, which the petitioner No.2 rejected. Thereafter, on 7th June, 2018, the respondent resigned from the petitioner No.2/Company raising baseless allegations against the petitioner No.2/Company. The resignation was duly accepted.

4. On account of certain actions of the respondent along with his mother Smt. Jagrani Gaur, the petitioner No.2 lodged a criminal complaint on 7th September, 2018 at P.S. Safdarjung Enclave under various sections of the IPC. another criminal complaint was registered on 19th September, 2018 at PS Expressway Phase-II, Sector 83, Noida, against the respondent and some others, including the landlord of the premises at Noida, from where the petitioner No.2 was functioning. The allegations were that the respondent, his mother and the landlord had illegally ousted the petitioner No.2 and taken over the business of the petitioner No.2 run from those premises.

5. another FIR No.0819/Case Crime No.819 of 2018 was registered by the Police Station Phase-2, District GB Nagar, Noida on 14th November, 2018 under Sections 406 and 420 IPC against the respondent. Yet another criminal complaint was lodged on behalf of the petitioner No.2 on 29th December, 2018 at the same Police Station against the respondent and some others. It is submitted that the registration of the FIR No.819/2018 was sought to be quashed by the respondent by filing a Criminal Misc. Writ Petition bearing No.35802 of 2018 before the allahabad High Court, which vide order dated 11th December, 2018 refused to quash the same.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the impugned order, the learned MM, by summoning the petitioners, reproduced the letter dated 10th December, 2018 highlighting words such as 'orchestrated an illegal lock out' and 'took over the building and our assets' and 'FIR has already been registered'. Therefore, it is urged that these were the contents that prevailed upon the learned MM to consider the letter as being per se defamatory. However, it was submitted that though two witnesses were examined by the respondent, not a word was mentioned of the actual registration of the FIR which the allahabad High Court had refused to quash.

7. It was further submitted that the petitioners had to